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Abstract and Keywords
Upon becoming President of the United States in 1981, Ronald Reagan faced a rapidly
deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union in the midst of the ongoing Cold War,
exacerbated by the events of the 1980s, including the 1980 Olympic boycott and
President Jimmy Carter’s administration. President Reagan’s bellicose statements and
staunch anti-communism stance further aggravated the situation, reasserting and
deepening Cold War anxieties in the Soviet Union. Compared to his predecessors,
Reagan was a war hawk determined to bring an absolute end to the Soviet Union and the
socialist world. This was no more apparent than in his foreign policy towards the Soviet
Union during his first four years in office when he initiated his desire for the strategic
defense initiative, his massive American military buildup, and his decision to invade the
Caribbean island of Grenada to stave off Soviet influence in the Third World. Each and
every action taken by President Reagan was constructed in order to bring the Soviet
Union to its knees via political and economic pressure. However, Reagan seemingly had
a sudden change of stance when Los Angeles hosted the 1984 Olympic Summer Games.
The Kremlin, in turn for Soviet Bloc attendance at the Olympics, requested several
demands that had to be met – for example, the right for Soviet Aeroflot flights to land at
Los Angeles International Airport and an unprecedented amount of security to protect
Soviet athletes and interest. Reagan’s decisions concerning the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympic Summer Games were a glaring anomaly when compared to the previous three
years of Reagan’s harsh anti-communism and “hawkish” actions and opinion regarding
the Soviet Union. Drawing from declassified documents from the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library and Museum, this research examines how and why the Olympic
Movement was able to transcend Cold War politics in regards to President Reagan
meeting each and every one of the Soviet demands despite numerous outside pressures
and occurrences making it increasingly difficult for him to do so.

Keywords: President Ronald Reagan, 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, Cold War
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Chapter 1 – Prelude
“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We
didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for,
1
protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”

1.1 Introduction
In the early morning of 20 January 1989, United States President Ronald Reagan
stood in the Oval Office one final time as the highest elected American official. He
would soon be escorted down Pennsylvania Avenue to the inauguration ceremonies for
President-elect George H.W. Bush. Before Reagan exited his office, National Security
Advisor Colin Powell entered to provide Reagan with his last national security briefing.
After years of teetering on the verge of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union,
Powell informed Reagan: “Mr. President, the world is quiet today.” With that, Reagan
2

departed the Oval Office.

The Cold War Reagan consigned to Bush was immensely different from the
conflict Reagan inherited from President Jimmy Carter. Upon his arrival in the White
House, Reagan brought with him a reputation of being a “hawk on national defense” and
being the main protagonist for enacting “openly confrontational policies towards the

1

An excerpt from a 30 March 1961 Reagan speech to the annual meeting of the Phoenix Chamber of
Commerce. Tom Freiling, Reagan’s God and Country: A President’s Moral Compass, (Ventura,
California: Regal Books, 2003), 56.
2

Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 722.

2
3

Soviet Union.” These policies were aimed at achieving one goal: completely reversing
the course of the Cold War. In only his first three years of office, President Reagan
approved a substantial military buildup aimed at driving the Soviet Union into
bankruptcy, several overt military operations ordered to stem the tide of communism
spreading into the still free world, a significant campaign to limit Soviet access to
Western technology, and two detailed national-security directives written to directly
challenge the Soviet Union. Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union stood in stark
contrast to his immediate predecessors. While they sought to simply operate in a
peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, Reagan desired to bring the Soviet Union to
its knees and bring an end to what he considered nothing more than a pre-ordained failed
social experiment.
Before Reagan’s election as President, the American approach towards the Soviet
4

Union had been that of détente and containment. Reagan believed that détente, a term
integrated into the American political lexicon after the thirteen days that defined the
Cuban Missile Crisis, was a “one-way street that the Soviet Union used to pursue its own
5

aims.” Opponents from both sides of the American political spectrum argued that
détente provided only a sense of legitimacy to both the Soviet Union and the socialist

3

Jim Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Penguin
Books, 2009), 39.
4

At their core, détente and containment were a defensive strategy aiming to prevent the expansion of
Soviet influence outside of its satellite states while waiting for a gradual mellowing in relations. For more,
see Mark Lagon, The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War’s Last Chapter
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994).
5

Quoted in Francis Marlo, Planning Reagan’s War: Conservative Strategists and America’s Cold War
Victory (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2012), 13.

3

order. While Carter focused on the “immorality” of détente, Reagan, on the other hand,
argued that the feebleness of détente underscored an acknowledgment of American
6

weakness. Further, Reagan felt containment, a strategy developed under President Harry
7

Truman’s tenure, was failing. Reagan’s beliefs were not unsubstantiated. Of utmost
concern were the Soviet advances into the Third World, particularly Central America and
Africa. The eruption of the Carnation Revolution in April of 1974 provided the Soviet
8

Union an opportunity to spread communist ideology to Africa. For example, in the
battle for political control of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
– a declared Marxism-Leninism faction – received support from both the Soviet Union
and Cuba. The capture of Angola to Marxism-Leninism rule supported Reagan’s
conviction that containment was no longer stemming the growing sphere of communist
influence. To Reagan’s dismay, Angola was not the only African country to fall prey to
the communist threat; Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mozambique were all

6

Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of
the Cold War (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2013), 149.
7

Strikingly familiar to the ‘Reagan Doctrine,’ the ‘Truman Doctrine’ was birthed in March of 1947.
Truman made it robustly clear to world leaders that the American government would provide both financial
and military aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. Truman’s philosophy
ultimately derived itself from the famed “Long Telegram” as authored by George F. Kennan in 1946.
Kennan vehemently argued that the Soviets would only respond to use of force; thus, the optimal way to
combat communism was through slowing its geographical expansion. For a thoroughly detailed account see
Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Palo Alto,
California: Stanford University Press, 2002) and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall
Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (New York: Free Press, 2008).
8

There is substantial literature on the Angola situation of 1974-1976. Many of these histories contain the
history of those last Portugal colonies in Africa that also took part in the revolution. See for instance Arthur
Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Westview,
1980); Rene Lemarchand, ed., American Policy in South Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, 2d ed.
(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1981), 63-143; Suzanne Jolicoeur Katsika, The Arc of
Socialist Revolution: Angola to Afghanistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982), 55-84.

4
9

within the Soviet orbit by the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet’s 1979 Christmas
Eve invasion of Afghanistan was another damaging low to the concept of containment.
The spirit of détente also dissolved with the invasion.
In the public realm, Reagan was the definition of an oratorical “freedom fighter.”
Even on the campaign trail during his failed 1976 bid for the presidency, Reagan was
harsh on the Soviets.

10

In a 31 March 1976 nationwide campaign speech, Reagan

implored Americans to ask the citizens “of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary, and all the others” what it was like to live in a world “where the Soviet
Union is number one.” Reagan insisted that he did not want to live in a world like that
and he was not ready to “consign” every state of the Union “to the dustbin of history.”

11

Reagan’s anti-communist rhetoric continued unceasingly through his 1980 election as
President.
Indeed, Reagan’s Soviet discourse frightened Soviet leadership. Reagan’s
declamatory approach to the Soviet Union was derivative of his first National Security
Planning Group.

12

The consortium intended to begin a “concerted effort to play on the

9

For a detailed account of the Soviet Union’s foray into Africa see Vladimir Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’:
The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008).
10

Generally, the term “soviet” is defined as the organizations during the Russian Revolution that guarded
against counter-revolution until an election of a constituent assembly could take place. In the text of this
research – in line with broader and popular Cold War history – the term “Soviets” will be used as a
connotation to describe the Soviet government or the Soviet leadership as a whole.
11

David W. Houch and Amos Kiewe, Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The Public Speeches of Ronald Reagan
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 157.
12

Heresafter NSPG.

5
13

Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and weakness.”

As further explained by Richard

Allen, one of Reagan’s national security advisors, the Kremlin
first-class nut-ball on their hands.”

15

14

“thought they had some

The general thinking among Reagan’s

administration was that the Soviets did not desire to play a game of “nuclear chicken with
a madman.”

16

Early in Reagan’s first term, KGB Chief Yuri Andropov worried that the

“new administration” was attempting to “push the whole development of international
17

relations on to a dangerous path.”

Reagan’s vitriolic lambasting continued. On 17 May 1981, Reagan provided the
first public hint of his strategy towards the Soviet Union during a speech at Notre Dame
University. “The West,” he said, “won’t contain communism, it will transcend
communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages

13

Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened The Collaspe of
the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 8.
14

The word “Kremlin” can be argued as being quite ambiguous. In its most literal sense, a kremlin
(lowercase) is a significant fortress complex in historic Russian cities. Throughout this research, the word
“Kremlin” is used as a synecdoche to refer to the Moscow Kremlin as the government of the Russian
Federation much like how the term “White House” is often used to refer to the American government.
Doing so is standard practice in the writing of both Sovietology and Kremlinology and in general Cold War
history. For examples, please see Benjamin Lambeth and Kevin Lewis, “The Kremlin and SDI,” Foreign
Affairs (66), no. 4 (Spring, 1988), 755-770; David Holloway, “The View from the Kremlin,” The Wilson
Quarterly (7), no. 5 (Winter, 1983), 102-111; Ian Bremmer, “Who’s in Charge in the Kremlin,” World
Policy Journal (22), no. 4 (Winter, 2005/2006), 1-6; Paul Klebniov, Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline
of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism (New York: Harcourt Books), 2000; Gregory Mitrovich,
Undermining The Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert The Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Cornell, New York:
Cornell University Press, 2000); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold
War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1997.
15
16
17

Ibid.
Ibid.
Hanhimaki, 141-42.

6

are even now being written.”

18

In a speech in front of the British House of Commons on

8 June 1982, Reagan stated his certainty that “… freedom and democracy will leave
Marxism and Leninism on the ash heap of history.”

19

However, Reagan’s most pointed

verbal attack on the Soviet Union occurred on 8 March 1983. In a speech to the National
Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, Reagan lectured:
They preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over
individual man and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on Earth.
They are the focus of evil in the modern world. So, in your discussion of
the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride,
the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves about it all and label both
sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive
impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant
misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between
20

right and wrong and good and evil.

Despite the harsh words, the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union
realized that acting upon them would lead to a nuclear confrontation and, thus, likely the
end of the world. Many American Presidents prior to Reagan struggled with the concept
of fighting a conceptual war without troops, infantry, planes, or ships. Notwithstanding
the best wishes of the International Olympic Committee, Cold War politics was a longentrenched feature of international competition upon Reagan’s election as president. As

18

Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: Harper Perennial,
2007), 77.
19

Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the
Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 293.
20

Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897 (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 486. Italics mine.

7

aptly phrased by historian Kenneth Osgood, the Cold War thus became an ideological
struggle for the “hearts and minds of the world.”

21

With either side wishing to avoid

armed conflict, the battle to prove the supreme ideology moved in part to the athletic field
– specifically the Olympic Games, no doubt due to its global scale and social reach.
In Carter’s case, the 1980 American-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics was an
overt use of the Olympic Games to declare discontent over the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan – the first time since the end of World War II that the Soviet Union occupied
territory not already under its control. Conversely, Reagan’s use of the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympic Summer Games stood in vivid contrast to the President’s desire to bring an end
to the Soviet Union and the socialist world.

1.2 Statement of Purpose
This research examines how and why the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer
Games became a noticeable exception to President Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy
towards the Soviet Union and communism. That is, Reagan’s decision to concede to all
Soviet demands in turn for Soviet Bloc attendance at the Los Angeles Olympics was in
direct contrast to his long-held and firmly entrenched anti-communism and “hawkish”
beliefs as evidenced by his desire to construct the strategic defense initiative, his peace
through strength program, his anti-Soviet rhetoric, the assistance given to Third World
countries to fend off the impulses of communism, and his Presidential order to invade
Grenada.

21

Kenneth Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4,
no. 2 (May, 2002), 85-107.

8

1.3 Literature Review
That the keepers of the Olympics failed to keep the movement free of political
interference cannot be argued. The historiography of political intrusion of the Olympic
Games is voluminous, oft entangled in multiple social, cultural, racial undertones, the
origins traceable to various groups, people, and causes. For instance, the 1968 Mexico
City Olympic Summer Games were marred by two enduring political statements: (1) the
raised, gloved fists of Tommy Smith and John Carlos in an attempt to bring focus to the
plight of African Americans in the tumultuous times of the American civil rights
movement and, (2) the massacre, by members of the Mexican armed forces, of students
protesting the cost of hosting the Games.

22

Additionally, one interested in political

statements made via the Olympic Games need look no further than the ‘Munich
Massacre’ at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany. The Palestinian
group Black September took eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage and
demanded the release of 234 prisoners held hostage in Israeli prisons. The end of the
hostage crisis was an unthinkable tragedy; all the hostages were murdered.

23

These two

examples underscore an infallible theme: the history of political interference in the
Olympic Movement is vast, each topic subjecting researchers and readers to abundant
rabbit holes to investigate in order to disclose the entire account both accurately and

22

For an unsurpassed account of both these incidents see, Kevin Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the
World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).
23

For more about the hostage situation, and the response of the IOC, specifically that of President Avery
Brundage, see, Allen Guttman, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). For a comprehensive work on just the hostage situation see,
Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (New
York: Random House, 2007).

9

comprehensively. To circumvent a meandering narrative, this review will maintain a
focus on those instances where the Olympic Games were intertwined with American
foreign policy.
The first such occurrence transpired during the lead-up to the 1936 Berlin
Summer Olympics, otherwise referred to as the Nazi Olympics. The issue at hand was
that of American participation. The Berlin Games, awarded to the city before Hitler’s
accession to supremacy, became a political ploy to display Nazi ideology. Most
worrisome was the Third Reich’s treatment of Jews. As noted by historian Alan Bullock,
Hitler’s hatred of the Jews “was perhaps the most sincere emotion of which he was
24

capable.”

By 1 April 1933 all non-Aryans employed through civil service and at

universities were removed from their positions. Shortly after, the edict included the
professions of law and medicine. Members of the Olympic Movement did not avoid
Hitler’s purge. As noted by Richard Mandell, there was “consternation” within the IOC
when members learned Dr. Theodor Lewald, the Christian president of the German
25

Olympic Committee, was among those removed from power.

It rapidly became

apparent that Germany’s Olympic teams would field no athletes of Jewish descent. In
reaction to the Gleichschaltung of German sport, American sports leaders called for a
boycott of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The boycott debate quickly descended
into the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. However, as Olympic historian Stephen
Wenn noted, the White House resisted being dragged into the participation issue “despite

24
25

Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper Press, 1952), 420.
Richard Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (Champaign: The University of Illinois Press, 1987), 61.

10

the personal protestations of a number of American private citizens in the latter stages of
26

1935 and early months of 1936.”

Indeed, the Roosevelt administration argued that the

Olympic Games and all pertinent decisions were a matter best left to those private
organizations that ran such events. Despite the German government’s marked
propaganda purposes for hosting the Olympic festival, the State Department and Franklin
27

Roosevelt, as Wenn stated, opted not to mix politics into the Olympic Movement.

After the Olympics departed Berlin, the German atrocities continued – leading to
the second World War. The last desperate offensive measure of the German army failed
in January of 1945. On 4 February 1945, the leaders of the Allied countries convened for
the Yalta Conference, deciding on both the occupation of post-war Germany and the
action needed in the Pacific theatre. The signing of the Japanese surrender documents
aboard the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945 marked the end of the death and
widespread destruction caused by World War II. However, it also heralded the
establishment of the Cold War.
The birth of the nuclear age made a third World War unthinkable to both the
White House and the Kremlin. Therefore, the two superpowers of post-World War II
were forced to find other ways to prove superiority over the other. Cold War historian
John Lewis Gaddis stated it succinctly:
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Both of the ideologies [Capitalism and Communism] that defined [these]
worlds were meant to offer hope: that is why one has an ideology in the
first place. One of them, however, had come to depend, for its
functioning, upon the creation of fear. The other had no need to do so.
Therein lay the basic ideological asymmetry of the Cold War.

28

Thus, to succeed as an alternative, the American ideology of capitalism had to show that
communism suppressed freedom, and that only capitalism could sustain such freedom.
Conversely, the Soviet Union desired to prove to its people and the rest of the free world
29

that communism was the dominant ideology over capitalism.

Gaddis argued that both

“embraced ideologies with global aspirations” and those leaders from either side
concluded “what worked at home would also do so for the rest of the world.”

30

In lieu of a “hot war,” the Soviet Union and the United States waged an
ideological battle that encompassed all parts of culture and society. The Truman and
Eisenhower administrations were the first to utilize non-diplomatic entreaties. In his
seminal 1997 book, Walter Hixon illustrated that “modern communications, including
radio, television, and film, as well as direct contracts through exhibitions, tourism, and
31

exchange programs, were agents of Western political infiltration.”

Future

administrations continued the activities. Frances Stoner Saunders outlined the Congress
for Cultural Freedoms, which, from 1950 to 1967, assisted in the operations of all manner
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of artists, writers, and academics behind the Iron Curtain. The objective, Saunders
explained, “was to inoculate the world against the contagion of communism, and to ease
32

the passage of American foreign policy interest abroad.”

The Cold War became what Kenneth Osgood described as a “Total War.”
Further, he explained “virtually every aspect of the American way of life – from political
organization and philosophical ideas, to cultural products and scientific achievements, to
economic practices and social relationships – was exposed to scrutiny in this total contest
for the hearts and minds of the world’s people.”

33

Sport was not overlooked as an avenue

to compete with the Soviet Union and communism. As British sports historian James
Riordan stated, “sport became an area of great social significance” only after “the
division of much of the world into two camps in the 1950s with the nuclear stalemate and
the intensifying ‘battle for men’s mind’s.’”

34

After the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet

Union ignored “bourgeois” sport – especially the Olympics Games, viewed by the
Soviets as an organization designed to “deflect workers from the class struggle and to
train them for new imperialist wars.”

35

Riordan argued that the development of the ten-

state Soviet Bloc – and, thus, the change of the balance of power in the world – warmed
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the Soviets to sport as an “obvious arena for defeating one’s ideological opponent.”

The Soviet Party resolution on sport in 1949 confirmed Riordan’s claim, urging all sports
committees “to spread sport to every corner of the land, raise the level of skill and, on
that basis, help Soviet athletes win world supremacy in major sports in the immediate
37

future.”

Gaddis further validated the claim, contending that by the end of 1949, the

“Soviet-American contest for Europe had become a stalemate” which caused both
countries to seek other exploitable opportunities.

38

Sport, contended Peter Beck, became

a “high-profile battlefield” whereupon “superiority was not an abstraction, but a reality to
be demonstrated repeatedly and conspicuously.”

39

This sporting reality became even

more significant upon the Soviet entrance to the Olympic Movement. Several scholars
have adequately covered this milestone in Soviet sport history, some of the best work
40

done by Jennifer Parks.

The Soviet Union first sent athletes to the 1952 Olympics Games in Helsinki.
Cold War connotations permeated the event to the tune of “counting medals.” The
United States finished atop the medal standings. However, the 1956 Melbourne Games
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marked a substantial victory for the Soviet Union. American journalists calculated the
final medal count to be 722-593 in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviets crowed that
41

“the myth of US superiority in sports” had been “dissipated completely.”

The Soviet

Union viewed such athletic victories as a “victory for the Soviet form of society and the
socialist sports system; it provides irrefutable proof of the superiority of the socialist
42

culture over the decaying culture of the capitalist states.”

The rapid rise of Soviet success in the Olympics forced the American public into
43

a “Cold War social anxiety.”

In doing so, the United States government created what

Montex de Oca called a “muscle gap discourse” – the focus of which was to develop an
American sporting philosophy that denied the Soviets “easy political victories at the
44

Olympics.”

Montex de Oca contended that the American government developed a two-

prong approach to closing the “muscle gap.” The first approach was compelling nongovernmental organizations such as the American Olympic Committee, the Amateur
Athletic Union, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association to raise funds to finance
the American Olympic teams. The second approach was to design American collegiate
athletic programs as a training ground for Olympic athletes.
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This design, created to

directly compete with Soviet superiority at the Olympics, signified, as Montex de Oca
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argued, that the American government under the direction of President Dwight D.
46

Eisenhower viewed the Olympics as a cultural arena for geopolitical struggles.

In the battle of ideologies, the Soviet Union clearly maintained a lead in the use of
sport. The Soviet Union preserved athletic superiority through the use of state-athletes,
thus spinning each victory into communist propaganda against the capitalist societies of
the world. In a speech to an audience at Friendship International Airport in Baltimore,
Republican Senator John Marshall Butler proclaimed:
Are we in the United States – where our record of excellence in the field
of amateur sportsmanship is a byproduct of our unique system of
government – allowing the Soviet Union to pollute the Olympic Games; to
use, with diabolic deceit, the spirit of sportsmanship itself as a velvet47

gloved iron fist to ruthlessly hammer out their Godless propaganda?

Butler was not alone in his assessment of the troublesome position the United States was
48

in.

The first overt signs that the American Government was resisting Soviet
ideological advances through sport came via the USA-USSR dual track meets of the late
1950s and 1960s. Joseph Turrini argued that these dual track meets were the “most
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important and visible of the Cold War sport competitions” aside from the Olympic
49

Games.

Turrini asserted that while the events were “first and foremost athletic

competitions,” the meets also “functioned as propaganda and foreign diplomacy tools.”

50

President Eisenhower felt that the track meets could be a “useful tool in demonstrating to
51

the Soviet people the success of American capitalism and democracy.”

While Eisenhower applauded the use of the track meets as overt surrogate Cold
War battlefields, he also permitted the use of clandestine operations to undermine Soviet
sport and, in general, communism. In his 1976 doctoral dissertation, Thomas Domer
utilized Presidential Libraries, the National Archives, the Congressional Record, and the
Brundage Collection to make the claim that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations tried to “take every opportunity short of direct and total subsidy to
enhance the sports image of the United States.”

52

Often, especially during the

Eisenhower administration, private groups were intertwined with government-led
initiatives, none more so psychologically damaging to the Soviet Union than the
defection of Hungarian athletes after the Melbourne Olympic Games. Toby Rider
discussed several such state-private networks in relation to using the Olympic Movement
as a way to resist communist propaganda. For instance, the Hungarian National Sports
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Federation

53

derived from the flux of Hungarian migration to America that occurred in

three phases: the 45-ers, the 47-ers, and the 56-ers. Rider noted that the group maintained
close affiliation to the Hungarian National Council, an outreach of the National
Committee for a Free Europe, “an exile organization funded secretly by the U.S.
government.”

54

The support, provided via the United States Central Intelligence Agency,

provided both funding and an office space for the group. In turn, the National Committee
for a Free Europe assisted in the operations of its sister groups.
In his doctoral dissertation, Rider built on the work previously completed by
Domer. By using declassified sources previously unattainable to scholars such as Domer,
Rider argued that the United States government responded to the “post-war challenge of
Soviet sport earlier, and far more aggressively, than previously acknowledged.”

55

However, Rider asserted that the American response was not an overt overhauling of the
American sporting system; rather, the U.S. government partook in “covert psychological
56

warfare operations and overt propaganda distributed to the free world.”

Most pertinent

to this study is Rider’s discussion of U.S. government propaganda surrounding the
Olympic Games. Rider stated that “news stories, cartoons, and radio commentaries”
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were disseminated through various methods behind the Iron Curtain. In an attempt to
counter Soviet propaganda, the information distributed by the American government was
meant to depict the American “way of life” and the “benefits and opportunities afforded
57

by a democratic society.”

However, in the late 1960s, “the secret network of CIA
58

fronts” began to be exposed by mainstream American media.

With the undoing of the clandestine operations, national policy toward the
Olympics again turned toward broadly-based national fitness campaigns and reforms.
59

Thomas Hunt argued that while Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford

focused on the reform needed among the country’s amateur sports bodies, the Johnson
administration “struggled with how best to use sport as a means of influence in the
cultural Cold War.”

60

Hunt attributed Johnson’s struggles to the immense size and
61

complexity of both the American government and sport system.
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preoccupation with the enduring Vietnam War surely contributed to Johnson’s lack of
Olympic vision.
The focus of American sport policy again turned to reform upon the election of
Nixon to America’s highest office. However, the process of selecting the host site for the
1976 Olympic Summer Games thrust the Nixon administration directly into a cultural
Cold War battle. Cold War historian Nicholas Evan Sarantakes noted that the Nixon
White House largely ignored Los Angeles’ bid for the 1976 through the first year of the
process. While Nixon penned just three sentences of support of Los Angeles to the IOC,
then Governor of California Ronald Reagan provided a much stronger – and lengthier –
message. Los Angeles’ effort would have continued being ignored, argued Sarantakes, if
not for LAOOC member Rodney Rood contacting an old colleague – H.R. Haldeman, the
White House Chief of Staff. Rood wrote to Haldeman upon the Soviet entry into the
bidding contest, saying, “We are now in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union on the
level of international politics – a confrontation to determine international public appeal
under the guise of non-politics – the award of the Summer Olympic Games of 1976.”

62

As history now notes, the award of the 1976 Olympics went to Montreal. Nixon and his
staff attempted to negotiate with the IOC and international sport much as they would the
United Nations. Sarantakes concluded that the Nixon administration “learned that
63

influencing international sport was different from the political affairs of nation-states.”
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If Nixon attempted to use politics to influence international sport, one of his eventual
successors attempted to use sport to influence international politics.
Jimmy Carter’s attempt to leverage the Olympics Games in international politics
failed just as miserably as Nixon’s previous attempt at Olympic influence. To show
displeasure over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter prompted an international
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Sarantakes again provided an outstanding
academic work on the topic and argued that the Olympics “turned out to be far more
64

resilient than [Carter] ever imagined.”

Carter’s administration made the same fatal

mistake as Nixon’s administration in attempting to influence the Olympic Movement
through proper political channels. Sarantakes concluded that the Carter approach was
“riddled with errors” and that the “ignorance and arrogance” of the administration
blinded it to the fact that national Olympic committees were “independent of their
65

governments in many Western democracies.

Little has been written on the Soviet Bloc boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympics. To date, the only significant work to use primary sources is authored by
Harold Wilson, Jr. In his article, The Golden Opportunity, Wilson examined the Reagan
administration’s attempts to influence Romania to rebel against the Kremlin’s call for
66

boycott and attend the Olympics.

In short, Reagan informed Romanian President
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Romania was not the only country the Reagan administration was targeting. In this specific case,
Romania was targeted due to Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu continuously “toeing the Soviet party
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Nicolae Ceaușescu that the American government would provide favorable “trade
67

clauses” to the country while renewing its “Most Favored Nation” status.

The tradeoff

worked, as the Romanian Olympic team proudly marched into the Los Angeles
Coliseum, thus continuing Romania’s reputation of being the “maverick of Eastern
Europe” and securing a major Olympic coup for Reagan and his administration.

1.4 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge
The 1984 Soviet Bloc boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games is a woefully
undeveloped area of Olympic research. There are two contributing factors for this: (1)
68

previous scholarship simply summarizing the boycott was a retaliatory effort

and (2)

the embargo of primary sources that would validate any counter claims. While the
USSR’s reasoning for the boycott is difficult to dissect without access to the Soviet
archives, a thorough exploration of American primary sources can provide a wellrounded exploration of the American governmental understanding and approach to an
otherwise largely ignored part of Olympic history.
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Of those previous authors who have written on the 1984 boycott, only John
Hoberman extended the investigation beyond the “retaliatory effort” stance. In Olympic
Crisis, Hoberman argues that the Soviet Bloc withdrawal was the result of anticommunist rhetoric from Reagan, the fear of defection by star athletes, and concerns of
security and American public dissent.

69

While others besides Hoberman have speculated

on a more substantial narrative behind the Soviet response, no research has yet been
completed to tell such a narrative.

70

That said, his work is based wholly on the use of

historical newspapers accounts along with a modicum of his own impressive scholarly
estimations and theories.
This study is largely in agreement with Hoberman’s arguments. That is, that
Reagan’s hardline rhetoric maintained a role in the 1984 Olympics; that the United States
government was fully cognizant of the defection issue; and that concerns of security by
the Soviets were unwarranted while such concerns over American public dissent were
likely well-deserved. Indeed, Hoberman argued that the pieces of a “much larger
mosaic” need to be assembled to complete the narrative of the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympic Games boycott. This study intends to begin the process of putting the pieces of
that mosaic together and further moving the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics away
from a mere retaliatory story. In order to make this argument, this research is the first
work on the 1984 boycott to utilize the Presidential Archives of Ronald Reagan and the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee Archives.
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This research contributes to the current body of knowledge in three significant
ways. First, it serves to fill in a large gap in the current literature of Olympic history. No
substantial archival work on the 1984 Olympic boycott has been completed. This
research fills that void. Second, the research provides a substantial contribution to the
area of Cold War history, specifically the sub-niche of the Reagan administration and the
Cold War. Aside from Hoberman’s book, no singular piece of Reagan research has
explained the 1984 Olympic boycott as anything more than an afterthought. However, a
significant amount of examination has been completed concerning Reagan’s approach to
the Soviet Union and Cold War – specifically his rapprochement beginning at the end of
1983. This research shows that the Olympics played a part in the motives, particularly
Reagan’s conviction of maintaining the opportunity for compromise and quiet diplomacy.
The Reagan administration’s handling of the 1984 Olympics exemplifies this delicate
approach to US/USSR relations. Lastly, this research adds to the growing body of
literature pertaining to the role of American presidential administrations in the Olympic
Games, specifically from a foreign and international policy viewpoint. By studying the
Reagan administration, this research is positioned as the most contemporary research thus
far in the aforementioned area of presidential administrations and the Olympic
Movement.

1.5 Method and Methodology
Archival resources principally underscored this research and, as such, will be
presented in the form of a historical narrative. The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
and Archives provided the majority of the research for this project. The archives hold the
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papers of Michael Deaver who served as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff from
January 1981 to May 1985. More important to this study, he served as the presidential
liaison for the 1984 Olympics. Additionally, the archives also house the papers of John
Kenneth Hill, who served under Deaver as the Federal Security Coordinator for the 1984
Summer Olympics. Both collections are invaluable to the completion of this research.
Also vital to the completion of this research are the papers of Richard Pipes, who served
as the Director of East European and Soviet Affairs for the first two years of Reagan’s
tenure as President. Pipes’ writing vividly details the state of US/USSR relations during
Reagan’s hardline rhetoric.
The voluminous Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee archives housed on
the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) also served as a key
repository for this research in that it provided a paper trail to compare to the documents
found in the Reagan Archives. While the Reagan Archives adequately show the
decision-making at the top level of American government, the LAOOC archives display
how the organizers took the assistance of the American government and put it into action.
More so than anything, the Soviets voiced displeasure over the perceived lack of security
at the Los Angeles Olympics; the records of the LAOOC demonstrate that the Soviets
were mistaken in their concern about the issue.

1.6 Limitations
I have not attempted to use Soviet archives in this research. However, as my
focus is not on Soviet reasoning for the boycott, it detracts little from the overall effort.
Thus, the premise of this research revolves around the Ronald Reagan administration and
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its attempts to appease Soviet leaders under the guise of the White House’s new foreign
policy towards the Kremlin. It makes no claims or declarations about the intent of Soviet
Union leadership to boycott.
As well, any research pertaining to politics should rightfully be accompanied with
a declaration of the author’s place in the political spectrum. This dissertation shall be no
different. Being born and raised in West Virginia provided for a smorgasbord of politics
education. The southern West Virginia coalfields – including such counties as
McDowell, Mingo, and Logan – are largely Democratic hotbeds. The Eastern Panhandle
of the state, including the Potomac Highlands, is an area of large Republican support.
The Northern Panhandle of West Virginia is split between the two parties. Indeed, even
West Virginia’s election history is just as fragmented as its split areas of support. In the
2012 Presidential election, West Virginians provided their Electoral College points to the
Republican ticket. However, the state’s residents elected a Democratic governor. The
House and Senate members from West Virginia are Democratic as well. My childhood
household was just as equally divided. Raised in a small town in the Northern Panhandle
– approximately 45-minutes away from downtown Pittsburgh – my liberal leanings
remained a minority within the family. I do find myself identifying more so with the
liberal agenda and the “political left” – or, in direct opposition to Reagan – but for
purposes of remaining open to progressive candidates from the “political right,” I remain
– and shall remain – a registered independent.
Regardless of my political inclinations, any research pertaining to the 40th
President of the United States must still manage to traverse the “Reagan paradox.” A
devoted New Deal Democrat until a sudden change at the age of fifty, Reagan remains
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one of the most admired conservative Republicans in American history. This, despite a
parade of contradictions in what he believed in and what he acted on. He detested the
concept of big government; yet, he made government bigger. During the 1980
presidential election campaign, he harped on his belief of fiscal conservatism; yet, he
inherited a national debt of $80 billion and managed to increase it to $200 billion in his
eight years of office.

71

The anti-abortionists revered him; yet he did little – if anything –

to champion their cause. Some of his more harsh critics argued that Reagan had no right
to argue for either family stability or the church as Reagan was divorced from his first
wife and rarely attended service. Moreover, these same critics argued that the bitterness
and estrangement Reagan created with his children was yet another contradiction to the
wholesome virtues that Reagan portrayed himself to stand for. These contradictions
caused Clark Clifford – a prominent Democrat lawyer who served Harry S. Truman, John
D. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Jimmy Carter – to label Ronald Reagan as an
72

“amicable dunce.”

The context of this dissertation is largely void of any of these

contradictions but, where applicable, has provided footnoted explanations on the ones
that do exist. As for my own beliefs regarding Reagan, the text of this research arguably
showcases my admiration for Reagan as a public speaker and for his ability to connect
with his audience using homespun humor and grace – a talent he brought to the White
House after a successful career in Hollywood. From a political viewpoint, I have
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attempted to maintain a distance between my own beliefs and leanings and Reagan’s
agenda as I discovered in his archives.
Lastly, any study built upon archival research is only as sound and completed as
the archives it pulls from. In the case of this archival research, the majority of the
material was 29 years old – or, in other words, over the mandatory 25-year holding
period on presidential documents and, in some cases, just approaching the holding period
on other material deemed “sensitive.” However, my research in the archives of the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum discovered many files and folders
regarding to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games still classified; no researcher had yet
requested them to be moved through the declassification process. As well, several
Freedom of Information Act Requests through the United States Department of State
remain open at the time of the defense of this dissertation. However, the requested
documents are largely peripheral – documents pertaining to Romania and Africa – and
detract little from my initial argument as I continue to pursue this area of research. The
lack of these documents may impair the length of this research, but in no way does it
harm the integrity of my argument.

1.7 Delimitations
The focus of this study is directed between the years of 1980 and 1984. The
starting point of 1980 is used to coincide with Reagan’s campaign for the presidency. It
also marks the start of correspondence between the federal government, the LAOOC, and
the Kremlin. The end of this study is marked by the conclusion of the Los Angeles
Olympics on 12 August 1984.
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1.8 Outline of Chapters
Following a brief introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the history of the Olympic
Movement in the city of Los Angeles. A series of events transpired that permitted the
city to host the Olympics in 1984, thus allowing Reagan to use the Olympics in his new
foreign policy with the Soviet Union. First, the chapter provides a brief introduction to
the 1932 Olympics held in Los Angeles. It was on the success of these Olympics that the
Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games was formed. It was this
Committee that worked tirelessly to promote the Olympic Movement in Los Angeles and
to attempt to lure the worldwide festival back to their beloved city. Starting in the early
1960s, Chapter 2 examines the tumultuous history behind Los Angeles finally getting the
Olympic Games again in 1984. In doing so, the chapter discusses Montreal’s successful
bid for the 1976 Olympics, Moscow’s gain of the 1980 Games, and, finally, how Los
Angeles earned the Games for 1984 through being the only choice and how the city
nearly lost the right to host afterwards.
Chapter 3 follows Ronald Reagan’s 1980 Presidential campaign and his eventual
triumph over President Jimmy Carter. The chapter examines the differences between
Carter’s foreign policy against that of Reagan’s proposed plans. From there, the chapter
will discuss how Reagan’s foreign policy assisted in the creation of his program dubbed
“peace through strength.” Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the early relationship
between Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union from 1964 until his death in 1982, and President Reagan. The correspondence
between the two world leaders, as found in the Ronald Reagan Archives, depicts two
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countries facing a foreign policy stalemate – neither wishing to concede to the other. It is
with this setting that the chapter then examines Richard Pipes’ first Soviet policy for
President Reagan. The understanding of this policy is vital, as it stood as Reagan’s
posture towards the Soviet Union until late 1983. The chapter then examines how three
events in the fall of 1983 signaled to President Reagan that American approach to the
Soviet Union was in dire need of adjustment, thus deviating from Pipes’ Soviet strategy.
Lastly, Chapter 3 discusses Reagan’s monumental 16 January 1984 speech in which he
laid out his future plans for the Soviet Union, including his desire for peace, compromise,
and quiet diplomacy as a result of extraordinary circumstances.
Chapter 4 opens with a discussion regarding President Reagan, the Olympics, and
cultural exchanges between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.
Exploring these relationships is important as the Soviet Union’s shooting of KAL 007
brought a halting crash to much of it. Subsequently, Chapter 4 enters into a detailed
examination of the KAL 007 incident and how it impacted both the American psyche and
the Olympic Movement. The chapter then moves to a discussion of the Ban The Soviets
Coalition, the Gruzia, and Olympic safety. Formed as a way to combat Soviet
participation in the Olympics, the Ban the Soviets Coalition was largely a pest to the Los
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, the American government, and the
International Olympic Committee. The actions of the Ban the Soviets Coalition directly
impacted guarantees of athlete safety at the Olympics, as well as the Soviet Union’s
request to berth the ship Gruzia at Long Beach Harbor during the duration of the Games.
The chapter also examines how the majority of Ronald Reagan’s administration was
wholly against accommodating any Soviet requests for the Los Angeles Olympic Games.
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In concluding, Chapter 4 examines how and why President Reagan ignored his closest
advisors and unilaterally approved Soviet requests.
Chapter 5 investigates the Reagan administration’s reaction when the Soviet
Union announced its intentions to boycott the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer
Games. As well, the chapter examines how the success of the Los Angeles Olympics
spurred renewed interest in the Olympic Movement from other potential host cities.
Chapter 5 also answers a rather vital question regarding this line of research – did Reagan
only accommodate the Soviet Union to comply with the Olympic Charter? Chapter 5
also includes a brief look at Reagan’s political manipulation of Romania in order to get
the country to attend the Olympics. Chapter 5 concludes with an explanation of how
Reagan’s overtures at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics allowed for future positive
relations between the President and new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

31

Chapter 2 – The City of Angels
“Yes, our athletes have a love, a happiness, and an exuberance in being
American. They’re as patriotic as the Pledge of Allegiance; as red, white,
and blue as the flag. They’re filled with the spirit of our land in all of its
magnificent diversity, a diversity you can see even in their faces. Ours are
the faces of all humanity, just as our nation was built by the hopes of all
humanity. So, as you watch these Olympics, remember – win, lose, or
draw – how much we have to be proud and thankful for. After all, we’re
1
Americans.”
2.1 The Battle of Los Angeles
That the 1984 Olympic Summer Games were held in Los Angeles was of no small
consequence to the Ronald Reagan administration. It provided the President the
opportunity to quickly commence the process of achieving his newly founded desire to
begin repairing relations with the Soviet Union. The Los Angeles Olympics provided the
reasoning for the two countries to communicate – even if the interaction was through the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee serving as an intermediary. Fortuitously
for Reagan, those attempting to bring the Olympic Games to Los Angeles through the
1970s did not abandon their plans as the International Olympic Committee picked other
world cities to host the Olympics. Finally, in the late 1970s, a series of events occurred
that placed Los Angeles in an opportune position to host the 1984 Olympic Summer
Games and, thus, gave Ronald Reagan his first chance at reconciliation with the Soviet
Union.

1

An excerpt from Ronald Reagan’s 17 September 1988 radio address to the nation concerning the
upcoming Olympic Summer Games in Seoul, South Korea. For the entirety of the speech, please see the
Reagan Archive’s digital collection of all his radio addresses.
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The 1984 Olympic Summer Games was not the first time that the city of Los
Angeles bid for the right to host the festival; nor was it the first time that the city hosted
it. Having first hosted the Olympics in 1932, Los Angeles subsequently maintained a
sustained history with the Olympic Movement. However, it was not until the bidding
sequence for the 1976 Olympic Games did Cold War undertones imbed themselves into
the Los Angeles Olympic narrative. The IOC’s decision to award the 1976 Summer
Olympics to Montreal had long-lasting ramifications that permitted the Ronald Reagan
administration to use the 1984 Los Angeles Games as a political ploy in Cold War
relations.
Formed in 1938 through a direct request of the United States Olympic
2

3

Committee, the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games was organized
by civic and Olympic leaders William May Garland and Paul Helms – both notable
names synonymous with the Los Angeles Olympic Games. Garland, a member of the
IOC from 1922 to 1948, successfully secured the bid for the 1932 Games and then led the
process of hosting a highly successful Olympic festival in the midst of the Great
Depression. Helms, on the other hand, is most remembered for being the baker behind
4

the ‘Great Bread War’ between himself and IOC president Avery Brundage. The task of
the SCCOG was quite clear: after the success of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, the

2

The signing of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 officially marked the creation of the United State Olympic
Committee. However, for the sake of clarity and consistency, the name United States Olympic Committee
(hereafter USOC) will be used rather than American Olympic Committee.
3
4

Hereafter SCCOG

For more see Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, Selling The Five Rings: The
International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2004), 31-49.
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USOC directed the Southern California group to provide continued support for the
Olympic Movement in Los Angeles and to bid for future Games. The group presented
the Los Angeles bids to the IOC in 1948, 1952, and 1956. It presented the city to the
USOC to be its candidate city for the 1960, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1984
5

Olympic Games. When the USOC awarded international bidding rights to Los Angeles
for the 1976 Summer Olympic Games, then Los Angeles mayor Sam Yorty called for the
6

establishment of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee. The purpose of the
Committee was to lead the international voting effort, thus vesting the power to the
LAOOC that the members of the SCCOG thought they rightfully maintained.
On 29 October 1962, then acting President of the Southern California Committee,
7

Lee Combs, wrote a letter to IOC President Brundage. The subject was clear: Combs
was not pleased with the final result of the 1964 domestic bid, the process of which
granted American bidding rights to Detroit, Michigan over Los Angeles. In bullet-point
fashion, Combs laid out his concerns to Brundage – the main one being that Detroit and
its chief representative, Douglas Roby, “had no intentions of getting the Games to the
United States, but wanted the bidding privilege solely for personal, local, and political
8

reasons in order to get sports facilities for professional purposes in their own city.”

5
6

http://www.sccog.org/webapp/about-us
Hereafter LAOOC.

7

Bill Harvey, the President of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games, fell too ill to
complete his presidential duties during this period.
8

Lee Combs to Avery Brundage, 29 October 1962, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter ABC), Box 113,
Reel 62, The International Centre for Olympic Studies (hereafter ICOS), London, Ontario, Canada.
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Combs also professed to Brundage that the awarding of the bid to Detroit was an insult to
such men as William Garland and Paul Helms who “worked as dedicated men for over 30
9

years” in the name of the Olympic Movement.

Correspondence between Combs and Brundage appears to have taken a sevenyear hiatus after the bidding contest between Los Angeles and Detroit concluded.
Correspondence between them started again in 1969 in the middle of Los Angeles’
international bid for the 1976 Summer Olympics. In a letter dated 21 March 1969,
Combs opened with a matter-of-fact statement, expressing his concerns over the
increasing professionalism in athletics. Combs knew how to play to a favorite Brundage
peeve. Combs then moved on to the crux of his letter. Combs informed Brundage that he
was “deeply concerned with the ‘tone,’ the personnel, and underlying purposes of the Los
Angeles Mayor’s Committee…”

10

Combs requested a personal meeting with Brundage
11

in either Chicago or Santa Barbara, California to discuss the issue.

As the acting President of the Southern California Committee, Combs took it
upon himself to attempt to place the SCCOG in what he thought was its rightful place –
at the helm of Los Angeles’ international Olympic bid. With no apparent response from
Brundage, Combs began to write directly to the Southern California Committee’s
adversarial group – the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee. Additionally,
Combs copied each letter directly to Brundage at the La Salle Hotel near Chicago’s

9

Ibid.

10
11

Combs to Brundage, 21 March 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
The Brundage Collection contains no reply to Combs’ request.
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Monroe Harbor. In a 15 July 1969 letter to the LAOOC president, John Kilroy, Combs
expressed the Southern California group’s mounting concern over the 1976 Olympic
Games, presenting to Kilroy a brief, if not a self-righteous history, of the SCCOG, which
informed that his group had “been working on the matter [the Olympics] since 1936, the
year when William May Garland, Paul Helms, and Ralph Chick organized it.” Combs
also let Kilroy know that the SCCOG maintained strong “international Olympic
connections.” Combs concluded an on arrogant note. Claiming he recently had had
12

lunch with Brundage at the IOC President’s request,

he implied that he was above

Kilroy in Olympic matters as he had been involved with Olympic affairs “since 1926”
and that the LAOOC had “problems of which” they were “not at all aware.”

13

On 29 July 1969, Combs responded to a letter from Kilroy. From Combs’ pointed
words, one can infer how Kilroy responded to Combs’ earlier letter. Combs first
chastised Kilroy for implying in his response that Combs was nothing more than a
“concerned citizen” and not the “acting head of the Southern California Committee for
the Olympic Games.” Kilroy also insisted in his response to Combs that his group, the
Los Angeles Olympic Committee, was working closely with the Southern California
group. Combs vehemently argued otherwise, stating the members chosen to attend the
LAOOC meetings were handpicked by the LAOOC, none of whom were sitting members
of the SCCOG’s executive board. Lastly, Combs informed Kilroy that the Southern
California group was keeping Brundage abreast of the situation in an effort to “clear up”

12
13

Nothing in the Brundage Collection exists to validate this claim.
Combs to John Kilroy, 15 July 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
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erroneous impressions. Exactly which erroneous impressions Combs believed Brundage
14

to be receiving were not addressed.

Immediately after dispatching his letter to Kilroy, Combs prepared a missive to
Brundage. The purpose of the letter was two-fold: (1) to argue to Brundage that the
LAOOC, as formed by Mayor Yorty, was not legitimate when weighed against the
Olympic Charter and (2) to explain that cooperation between the two groups was “wholly
unsatisfactory.” Combs argued to the IOC President that Olympic Charter protocol
placed the onus of building an organizing committee “on the shoulders of the National
Committee [USOC] of the city to which the games were awarded.”

15

Combs further

argued that any right or privilege the LAOOC felt it inherited from Mayor Sam Yorty did
“not extend to the creation of an organizing committee to conduct the Games, if awarded
to Los Angeles.” Combs was not only railing against the LAOOC being in charge of the
bidding process, but was also informing Brundage that the squabbling would endure if
Los Angeles were awarded the 1976 Summer Olympic Games. Combs sent a copy of the
letter to Kilroy.

16

Unsatisfied with his effort thus far – the very next day Combs wrote yet another
letter to Brundage. He charged the LAOOC as being nothing short of “opportunists and
politicians.” Because of this, Combs reasoned, the Los Angeles group “ought not be
permitted” to deal with Olympic matters. Knowing the Los Angeles group would be

14
15
16

Combs to Kilroy, 29 July 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Combs to Brundage, 29 July 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS. Brackets mine.
Ibid.
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infuriated with Combs’ claim, Combs informed Brundage that he was very well aware
that Kilroy would not be “happy with him” but that he could not “sit quietly by” and
17

watch Los Angeles’ Olympic dream go its present course.

Combs received a reply from the Los Angeles group on 4 August 1969. In what
surely implied an insult to Combs, the letter was sent by Paul Zimmerman – an advisor to
the LAOOC. He was not a sitting member of the executive board. Zimmerman opened
the letter to Combs by informing him that Kilroy was currently in Europe dealing with
“pressing Olympic matters,” lest Combs become further “hurt” by not receiving
immediate responses. Zimmerman related that he was “startled” that Combs “would put
self before the success of Los Angeles’ bid by writing” as he did to Brundage. In
response to Combs’ disagreement over those Southern California group members picked
to serve on the Mayor’s committee, Zimmerman professed his personal opinion that
Combs was simply upset that he was not appointed over the others. Zimmerman copied
18

his letter to both Kilroy and Brundage.

It took Combs only two days to respond to Zimmerman’s charges. Combs
informed Zimmerman that his personal attack was “not too surprising” especially coming
19

from “an employee of a corporation like the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee.”
Further, he charged that Zimmerman’s claim of his [Comb’s] hurt feelings over non-

appointment to the Los Angeles Committee were “ridiculous.” In a roundabout insult,

17
18
19

Combs to Brundage, 30 July 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Paul Zimmerman to Combs, 4 August 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Ibid.
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Combs wrote: “without any compensation, I chairmanned an important national Olympic
Committee when you [Zimmerman] were a young newspaper reporter for a local
20

newspaper.”

Combs continued, “The time I have spent on Olympism and amateur

sports has been without pay – a contribution of thousands of hours and tens of thousands
of dollars cash over the last four and a half decades. Our two situations are not at all
comparable.” Combs then lectured Zimmerman and the Los Angeles group in general for
desiring to “preserve the ‘Garland Image’ as an asset in seeking the 1976 Games,” but
21

doing so without inviting Garland,

a well-respected members of the Southern California

group’s executive board, to sit on the Los Angeles Olympic Committee. As he typically
did, Combs ended the letter by assuring Zimmerman that Brundage would be receiving a
22

copy of all correspondence between the two groups.

Indeed, Combs lost little time in apprising Brundage on the developments. True
to his normal practice, Combs wrote to Brundage on the same day he replied to
Zimmerman. The fact that Brundage had yet to reply to either group was either lost on
Combs, or he simply did not care that Brundage appeared to be distancing himself from
the situation. In his 6 August 1969 letter to Brundage, Combs perhaps made his boldest
claim during the entirety of exchanges. He explained to Brundage that Mel Pierson,
“who spearheaded the Mayor’s Committee about two years ago, is one of Mayor Yorty’s

20

A well-known sports journalist, Zimmerman covered college football for the Los Angeles Times from
1931-68. He went on to cover three Olympic Games for the New York Post.
21
22

In this case, Combs is reference John Garland’s son who continued his father’s Olympic tradition.
Combs to Zimmerman, 6 August 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
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Commissioners presently under indictment for bribery.”

23

Combs concluded, “without

changes, I don’t think the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee has enough solid
Olympic background to qualify it to run the Olympic Games.”

24

Brundage, once again,

did not respond. On 19 August 1969, Kilroy responded to Combs – copying Brundage –
with a short and to-the-point letter. In it, Kilroy simply stated, “The Los Angeles 1976
Olympic Committee, as presently constituted, is duely [sic] authorized to represent the
City of Los Angeles and the United States Olympic Committee in its quest for the 1976
25

Summer Games.”

The narratives of both the LAOOC and the Southern California group drastically
changed on 21 November 1969 when the Soviet Union decided to make a late entry into
the bidding contest. In a supposedly confidential report composed shortly after the Soviet
announcement, the Los Angeles group put forth its understanding of the new Cold War
connotations. The report stated that the Soviet bid was “not a challenge by Moscow to
Los Angeles alone” but a “challenge to the United States by Russia in the name of
Moscow.”

26

The Los Angeles group believed the Soviets were “exerting every

conceivable pressure in every possible area of influence” and that “the tremendous effort”
the Soviets put forth were “at the expense of their government.” To Brundage, who

23

Serving as the Recreation and Parks Commissioner, a grand jury indicted Pierson in September 1968 on
charges of bribery and conspiracy in the rezoning of land in the San Fernando Valley.
24
25
26

Combs to Brundage, 6 August 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Kilroy to Combs, 19 August 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.

Status and Needs of the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee Versus the Bid of Moscow for the XXIst
Summer Olympiad, n.d., ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
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detested any mixture of politics and the Olympic Movement, the brewing political
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union under the auspices of the
1976 Summer Games bidding process was an alarming development.
The Soviet’s late entry into the 1976 Olympic bidding contest did not catch the
LAOOC off guard. The internal report declared there was a “persistent rumor,” though it
is noted as “never confirmed,” that “Moscow might come into the picture as a staging for
a more serious bid in 1980.” This is not to say the group was not worried by the
Kremlin’s actions. Certainly, the LAOOC was aware that the Moscow bid was “totally
political” and “inspired under the guise of International Sports.” Regardless of Soviet
motivation, the leader of Los Angeles’ Olympic bid understood that a Soviet bid could
“thwart the otherwise apparent award [of the Olympics] to Los Angeles.”

27

Indeed, the

competition posed by Montreal was deemed an afterthought.
In its internal and confidential memo, the LAOOC outlined the entirety of the
history between the Cold War and the Olympics, as well as editorializing its own
thoughts into the narration. For example, the LAOOC felt the 1956 Melbourne Olympic
Committee acted “courageously” in its refusal to allow an ocean liner to serve as official
28

Soviet housing.

On the subject of the Soviet “run out” of the 1966 Duel Meet, the

LAOOC felt it exemplified the belief that Soviet “sport commitments and political needs
are not separated and subject to adjustment on a case basis for what they think is their
greatest advantage.” Lastly, the LAOOC pondered if the true justification behind the

27
28

Ibid.
Ibid.

41

Soviet bid was due to the Kremlin being “reluctant to have the many athletes of the Iron
29

Curtain countries visit the United States.”

The memo also included numerous impacts the Moscow bid could theoretically
have. Primarily, the LAOOC felt the Moscow bid “could open up the use of the sports
media throughout the world for further political propaganda.” Such an occurrence, the
LAOOC felt, was “a very substantial coup.” The LAOOC also made connections
between the Soviet bid and the East-West Germany issue – what the group called a
“tremendous interrelationship with the 1972 Games in Munich.” The LAOOC fretted
that a denial of the 1976 Games to Moscow would result in a Soviet-led boycott of the
1972 Munich Games and “other pressures to save face with East Germany.”

30

While its

first two concerns were quite legitimate, the LAOOC also discussed possible secondary
impacts of the Moscow bid. In the occurrence of a Moscow loss in the bidding process,
the LAOOC felt:
The Russians could emphasize that the IOC, ‘composed of royalty,
colonists, imperialists and capitalists’ (their oft-stated words), had denied
them their rightful bid for the Summer Games and that the actions in their
denial should be justification for their (IOC) disbandment, and call for a
referral of the matter of the Olympic Games to an ‘International
Democratic Council’ composed of National Olympic Committees.

29
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Ibid.
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The LAOOC argued that “the very fact of bidding” was a “substantial plus for Moscow
unless the bid is countered by the award to Los Angeles.” Lastly, the memo closed the
discussion of the USSR’s bid impact by emphasizing that “various federations and
National Olympic Committees” created “concurrent pressures to further their own
expansionistic aims pointing toward the direction of control of sport, television money
32

and personal award.”

The impact and effects of a Moscow victory were also discussed in the memo.
Broadly, the LAOOC felt the primary objective of a Soviet victory was to “defeat and
deny the United States in the world sports movement.” As noted, this also included
“control of international sports media for political purposes.” The LAOOC foresaw a
more apocalyptic result of an award to Moscow: the Kremlin could “suggest that other
countries not meeting their political criteria for one reason or another should not be
admitted for the Games.” The LAOOC admitted this was a “wild claim” but that it was
33

not out of the realm of possibilities.

Finally, the LAOOC argued the awarding of the

Games to Moscow could effectively destroy the IOC:
The control of the bid by a country as powerful and as defiant as Russia
and the continuous downgrading of the IOC by direct negotiations with
the NOC committees and the sports federations while ignoring the IOC
could destroy the total effect and strength of the IOC, causing its merger
with an International Sports Council or equivalent. This is of particular
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Ibid.
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concern because of the advanced age of Avery Brundage, the real
“strength” of the IOC today.

34

The Los Angeles group agreed on a two-pronged approach to counter the Moscow
bid. First, the group went the commonly accepted route of receiving an official
endorsement from the President of the United States. Additionally, the group desired that
the President write privately and candidly to each member of the International Olympic
Committee. Second, under the advisement of the State Department, the Los Angeles
group endeavored in “all ways to try and obtain” the vote of those countries in Eastern
Europe under the unwilling sphere of Soviet influence.

35

That Brundage was given

access to this information, assumingly by Combs, did not forebode a promising future for
the Los Angeles’ Olympic aspirations.
In May 1970, the International Olympic Committee faced an uncomfortable
situation: both the United States and the Soviet Union bid for the right to host the 1976
Olympic Summer Games. By choosing either country, was the IOC picking a side in the
Cold War’s ideological struggle? To avoid such an unsavory situation in both the
Olympic Movement and international relations, the IOC opted to award Montreal with
the responsibility of hosting the Summer Olympics in 1976.

34
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The decision proved to

Ibid.
Ibid.

There was confusion on the part of the Soviets during the announcement made on 12 May 1970 at the
RAI Centre Theatre in the Netherlands. Avery Brundage announced that while Moscow was ahead in the
first count, no candidate city obtained an overall majority. There would be a second round of voting. Not
waiting to hear the second part of Brundage’s announcement, TASS broadcasted a worldwide message
informing that Moscow was victorious. Los Angeles was the first city voted out. Moscow won the first
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alter the face of the Olympic Movement for years to come. As well, many in the
southern California media felt that hosting the Olympics was a colossal mistake. A Los
Angeles Times editorial argued that it was “foolishness for a 9-man delegation to go to
Vienna to get the 1980 Olympic Games for L.A.” and that “a Los Angeles Olympics at
some future time might be warranted.” As for the 1976 festival, many Los Angelenos
37

watched happily as Montreal took on the burden.

Shortly after the vote, a flurry of letter writing took place. On 15 June 1970,
Kilroy wrote to Brundage and exclaimed that the International Olympic Committee and
its leaders failed “to impose upon themselves the same disciplines that they insist be
imposed upon all other participants.” He then asked Brundage how the “traditional and
oft stated objective of the Olympic ideal be extended to and understood by youth if it is
not understood and practiced by the Committee.” Kilroy ended by insisting that the letter
was written without acrimony.

38

In a 4 June 1970 letter to Al Stump of the Herald Examiner, Brundage claimed
that the Los Angeles group’s reaction to the defeat was “disgraceful” and “as usual Avery
Brundage” was blamed for the loss.

39

Brundage further vented his feelings in a 3 July

1970 letter to William Nicholas, the general manager of the Los Angeles Memorial

round of voting with 28 votes to Montreal’s 25. However, the second round of voting saw the previous
American support swing to the Canadians for a 41-to-28 Montreal victory over Moscow.
37
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Staff editorial, “An Olympic Waste of Money,” The Los Angeles Times, 30 September 1974.
Kilroy to Brundage, 15 June 1970, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Brundage to Al Stump, 4 June 1970, ABC, Box 23, Reel 39, ICOS.
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Coliseum Commission. Brundage felt that the “moans, groans, howls, and wails
40

emanating from the Los Angeles group” were beginning to come to an end.

But, more

importantly, he “resented” the Los Angeles group blaming the loss on the IOC President.
Brundage was convinced that the failure of the Los Angeles bid was a result that the
Americans had few friends when it came to “voting on matters” such as the Olympics –
this, “despite the billions of aid that [America] has scattered through the world.”
Brundage felt that the loss had much to do with the “newspapers of the world” being
filled with the “Kent College affair and other anti-United States propaganda.” Lastly,
Brundage confirmed to Nicholas that he was wholly “skeptical” of the promised votes
41

Los Angeles felt they were due to receive.

Lee Combs resumed his writing to Brundage on 16 June 1970. He conveyed to
Brundage that he had “long hesitated” in writing because of the “catastrophe, so far as
Los Angeles Olympism is concerned, that occurred in Amsterdam.”

42

In light of the

struggle with the Los Angeles group and the eventual loss of the city’s bid, Combs
admitted to Brundage that he “seriously considered whether or not [he] should attempt to
hold together an organization which [had] been deeply torn apart.”

43

Ultimately, Combs

committed himself to doing so, but explained to Brundage his belief that too much
damage was done to Los Angeles’ reputation because of the bickering and the Cold War.
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Brundage to William Nicholas, 3 July 1970, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
Ibid.
Combs to Brundage, 16 June 1970, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS.
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Combs told Brundage he felt it would be several decades before Los Angeles would
recover and that he – meaning Combs – would be “gone” before the Olympics ever
returned to his beloved city.

44

Combs summarized the entirety of the situation by saying the fighting, the
bickering, and the Cold War overtones were a “shattering experience upon Los Angeles,
its people,” and its Olympic dreams.

45

As Combs soon found out, however, the IOC’s

decision to award the 1976 Olympic to Montreal was just the beginning for both Los
Angeles’ Olympic dreams and an international and diplomatic struggle with the Soviet
Union under the façade of international sport.

2.2 Los Angeles’ 1984 Bid for America
On 23 September 1977, Michael T. Harrigan sat before the House International
Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations. Harrigan, the President of
Trigon Sports and the Executive Director of the President’s Commission on Olympic
Sports, was tasked with reporting back to then President Jimmy Carter on the most
effective and prudent way to organize and protect amateur sports in the country.
Harrigan’s Commission noted the same long-problematic symptoms of the country’s
amateur sports system: athletes utilizing their own cash for training travel, athletes
scarcely affording the costs of getting to the Olympic festival site.
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Harrigan argued that

Ibid.
Ibid.

Michael T. Harrigan to the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations,
23 September 1977.
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it was difficult for “any athlete that is not in school or college or who competes in a sport
that is not part of school or college athletic programs has a tough time … making ends
meet.”

47

Harrigan’s speech before the Subcommittee had other agendas than simply
providing possible solutions for amateur athletics in America. Harrigan informed his
listeners of the crisis being created by the intersection of the Olympic Games and
international politics. Moreover, Harrigan argued that “the Games may die if politics
continue to raise their ugly spectre.”

48

Though Harrigan did not quite agree with a

prominent friend’s assessment that the “Games may be lost forever” if the United States
did not host the 1984 Summer Olympics, he did believe – no matter how misguided –
that “only the U.S. can turn the clock back to a Games that is free from politics.”

49

Finally, Harrigan informed the Subcommittee that the Olympic Movement needed
leadership to survive, and that their country could provide it “in a big way by hosting the
50

1984 Games.”

Luckily for Harrigan, Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Summer Olympics

Games quite likely insured that Los Angeles would be the home of the 1984 Olympics.
The man in charge of Montreal’s Olympic bid was Jean Drapeau, the flamboyant
Mayor of the city from 1954 through 1957 and again from 1960 to 1986. Drapeau – of
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For example, Harrigan spoke of American speedskaters paying $2,000 of their own money to train in
Europe where refrigerated rinks remained easily accessible and that is costs Dorothy Hamill – an American
figure skater -- $17,000 a year of her own earnings to train.
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French descent– became involved in the Olympic Games as early as 1966 when he led
Montreal’s bid for the 1972 Olympic Games, which ultimately went to Munich. The loss
did not deter Drapeau. Described as a man of “sober dress” and with a “neatly trimmed
moustache,” Drapeau continued to work Olympic circles, often approaching those in
power with the opening line, “Sir, may I talk to you about Montreal?”

51

During these

conversations, Drapeau often spoke of the “autofinancement” of the Olympic Games –
or, his belief that the Olympic Games were completely capable of funding themselves. It
was partly this belief that led to his stance that all those staying in the Olympic Village
would do so at no costs if the IOC awarded the Games to Montreal in 1972.
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In contrast to Drapeau’s beliefs, the Olympic Movement was struggling with the
spiraling cots of organizing the event. The Montreal Mayor paid no mind. When
Montreal was awarded the 1976 Olympic Games, he claimed that “the Olympics could no
more produce a deficit, than a man a baby.”
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The Montreal Organizing Committee

tabbed the estimated costs of hosting the Olympics at $310 million; a handsome profit
was likely. The group could not have been more in error. A significant number of
setbacks and cost overruns devastated Montreal’s Olympic budget. By the time the
Games moved onwards to 1980 and Moscow, the city of Montreal was burdened with
debts of over $1 billion. It took the province of Quebec – and its tax dollars – over thirty
years to erase the deficit caused by hosting the Olympic festival.
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With Moscow hosting the 1980 Olympic Summer Games, the city of Los Angeles
focused on the 1984 festival. It was thought that Los Angeles’ first-round ouster for the
1976 Olympics was the result of the city’s bid committee only desiring to make its
54

interest in the 1984 Games known to the members of the IOC.

The possibility also

existed that President Nixon informed Brezhnev that Los Angeles was not going to bid in
earnest until the next Olympiad.
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At the American level, the United States Olympic

Committee received luke warm interest – at best – from other cities aside from Los
Angeles. Atlanta provided a brief – yet underwhelming – interest in hosting, with the
leader of the movement bellowing that the cost of bringing the Games to Atlanta would
be between $300-400 million and that the financial crisis of Montreal would not be
56

repeated, as Atlanta was “much better organized.”

Of the other potential suitors – New

York City, Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans – only New York City seemed prepared to
tackle the herculean task of bidding for and, hopefully, hosting the Olympic Games.
New York’s bid was backed by a governor prepared to provide $225 million to the
Olympic project. Furthermore, the mayor invigorated his constituents with his desire to
use the Olympics Games as a springboard to provide the necessary enlargement and
57

refurbishing of downtrodden Shea Stadium in Queens.
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David Anable, “U.S. cities race to host ’84 Summer Olympics,” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 July
1977.
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As Los Angeles and New York City geared up their bid campaigns, the leaders of
the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games were all but claiming victory.
Though John Argue, the lawyer overseeing Los Angeles’ bid, conceded that the Los
Angeles group was “taking New York very seriously,” he believed that the Southern
California city maintained a “commanding lead.” With a Los Angeles victory predicted
by those behind it, public concern in Los Angeles over the cost of the Olympics became a
pressing issue. The bid committee asserted – that even under the worst of circumstances
– the city was likely to break even, if not turn a $200 million profit.
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Others vehemently

disagreed. Economic analyst Susan Fields defied the Committee, and publically argued
that a net loss of over $336 million was likely “depending on various unpredictable
factors, such as the uncertain costs of providing an Olympic Village to house athletes.”
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Fields made sure to mention that the numbers, presented in 1977 dollars, “could be
substantially higher” with inflation” by 1984. Argue came to the defense of the Los
Angeles Committee, correcting Fields, insisting that the Committee planned “to put on a
60

Spartan, business like Olympics.”

Further, Argues explained that the television rights

and sales of commemorative coins were likely to provide nearly $200 million in
61

revenues.

Others intimate with the bid confirmed Argue’s statements. Los Angeles

Mayor Tom Bradley stated for the record that the “back to basics” approach the bid
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committee was seeking allowed Los Angeles to “minimize overhead and turn back the
spiral of grand shows and high deficits.”

62

The Governor of California, Edmond Brown,

noted that as long “as the proposal is sound, the real focus ought to be on the athlete and
individual competitions and the commitment to excellence. It’s not just something to
make businessmen a few extra profits.”
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Two days before the 26 September 1977 USOC meeting to pick the American
host nominee, USOC President Robert J. Kane made it clear that both the “proposals by
Los Angeles and New York City” were in “excellent order.” And, to dispel rumors, he
insisted that New York City had not “gained the edge” over Los Angeles and that “it was
a close horse race.”
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However, the Los Angeles Committee had reason to worry.

During the meetings with the USOC in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the New York
Committee invited New York Governor Hugh Carey to guarantee the USOC that
“exclusive of any possible federal aid, New York State would erase any deficit New York
City might sustain” if it were to host the 1984 Olympic Summer Games. Carey’s arrival
was memorable: arriving several hours before the Los Angeles Mayor, Carey “roared
into town in a limousine and made a flamboyant entry to a USOC luncheon to which both
65

delegations had been invited. He was accompanied by numerous aides.”
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The state of New York’s pledge to the Olympics was a devastating blow to Los
Angeles’ chances. Governor Brown, stating his stance on Los Angeles’ Olympic bid,
reiterated that he wanted to “conduct the Games in an era of limits, not opulence” and
66

that he desired to “make sure no public funds would be pumped in.”

Despite Brown’s

stance, the Los Angeles Committee immediately summoned the Governor to Colorado
Springs to – if anything – balance off the attendance of Governor Carey. In a cryptic
message from Gray Davis, Brown’s executive secretary, it was announced,
“circumstances” in Colorado Springs “have changed and the governor’s presence is
67

important.”

Brown immediately chartered a private jet from Santa Maria, California

and arrived at the USOC meeting in mere hours. While Brown could not make the same
financial assurances as New York, he guaranteed to the United States Olympic
Committee that the Los Angeles bid group had the backing and blessing of the state
government.
Despite the vast difference in governmental support, Los Angeles successfully
secured the American nomination and stood poised to move on to the international
bidding phase. New York’s desire to use the Olympics to bolster Shea Stadium may have
caused more concern in the voting than originally anticipated. The USOC feared that M.
Donald Grant, the chairman of the board of the New York Mets, the principal tenant of
Shea Stadium, “would refuse to move his team to Yankee Stadium for the year that the
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Olympics” were to be held.

With the national victory secured, Los Angeles Mayor

Tom Bradley continued to press the issue of a Spartan Olympics, saying, “we have no
intention of going into the red. We think our revenue projections are sound and
conservative. We think our managerial abilities will prevent the expenditures from
getting out of hand.”

69

E. Newman Black IV, the chairman of the USOC’s site selection

committee suggested that Los Angeles’ financial plan, and the fact that its existing
stadium was not come burdened with potential scheduling issues, factored into the
results, commenting that Los Angeles provided “a very low capital spending budget,
involving its existing coliseum.”
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2.3 The Only Choice
It was an unprecedented dilemma for the IOC. Due to the financial disaster of the
Montreal Olympics, as well as the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Games, little
interest prevailed from governments to host ever-expanding Games. Los Angeles and
Tehran, Iran stood as the only cities to formally bid for the 1984 Olympic Games. The
underlying belief was that Tehran would have lost to Los Angeles regardless, as the
Iranian Olympic Committee campaigned “openly for the admission of Communist China
to the Olympic Movement and the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan).”
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Tehran’s desires were of small benefit, as the support of the IOC remained solidly with
the Taiwanese Olympic Committee. However, with Tehran’s ultimate decision to
withdraw its bid, the International Olympic Committee had no choice but to hear Los
Angeles’ proposal as the only remaining bid city. Lord Killanin, who served as the
President of the IOC from 1972 until just before the Moscow Olympics in 1980,
reasoned:
Whlist it is disappointing that there is only one candidate for the Olympic
Games, it is not surprising. Los Angeles had already made two previous
and unsuccessful bids. Los Angeles therefore was in a strong position to
be awarded the Games for 1984. Further, I have no doubt that smaller
National Olympic Committees have been frightened by the exaggerated
statements regarding costs. It is important to distinguish between capital
costs that are of lasting benefit to the areas concerned, and the running
costs that showed a profit of $940.9 million in Munich and $126.8 million
72

in Montreal.

However, what Lord Killanin deemed “exaggerated statements” regarding the
financial implication of hosting the Olympic Games proved to be threats to the future
financial solvency of each and every host city. Despite the Cold War undertones of the
approaching 1980 Moscow Olympics, and the tragedy that occurred at the 1972 Munich
Olympics, many still felt that “the most immediate threat to the future of the Olympics”
was not “politics or nationalism” but “the cost of hosting the Games.”
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However, Los

Lord Killanin, “1984,” Olympic Review, October 1977, 664.

Ross Atkin, “Costs impair Olympics; Red Grange was ‘hot’ too,” The Christian Science Monitor, 11
November 1977.
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Angeles’ bid for the Olympic Games was on much sturdier ground than the previous
Summer Olympics. For example, Los Angeles planned to spend only $33.5 million on
the entirety of their construction costs; Montreal spent $650 million solely on the
construction of the Olympic stadium.
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The estimated low costs to produce the Olympic Games in Los Angeles was not
enough to quell still more vocal outcry from both the public and the Los Angeles City
Council. On 15 November 1977, Baxter Ward, the Supervisor of Los Angeles County,
proposed that the county’s voters “decide whether or not to ban the use of county funds to
finance the 1984 Olympic Games.”

75

The movement was nothing more than a

ceremonial ploy by the County Supervisor, something confirmed by John McFaden, the
Vice President of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games, who
explained that the county’s vote was completely unnecessary. McFaden further argued
that the county was not “involved in any way, shape or form in staging the games. As
well, the Vice President of the SCCOG insisted that Los Angeles was not “another
76

Munich; we are not another Montreal.”

However, Council members Bob Ronka and Joy Picus provided another question
to the citywide referendum up for vote in June of the following year (1978). Rather than
simply asking Los Angeles residents whether or not county funds could be used – which
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the Olympic bid committee had no desire to do to begin with – the Council planned on
introducing the bill to allow the “city voters” to decide “whether the city should be
77

prohibited from hosting the Olympics at all.”

Argue, the head of the SCCOG, insisted

that delaying a vote on the issue until June of the following year “would get in the way of
the city’s being awarded the Games at a scheduled International Olympic Committee
meeting in Athens” the following May.
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While holding a news conference at the New

Otani to address the issue, Argue pledged to guarantee a fiscally responsible Olympic
Games. Both he and Mayor Bradley were resisting “exorbitant demands from the
International Olympic Committee and the International Sports Federations.” To drive his
point home, Argue laid out the ultimatum that Los Angeles was either “going to do it in a
financially responsible way, or not at all” and that the city of Los Angeles would “rather
79

lose the Olympics than go forward on the wrong basis.”

Aside from the citywide referendum issue, the Los Angeles Olympic Bid
Committee was also close to completing an “extremely detailed IOC and Sports
Federations questionnaire” that the city was required to provide to the IOC by the end of
1977. In the same news conference, Argue informed those present that he planned to
“answer some questions yes and some questions no.” As well, the bid committee fully
believed that the IOC and Federations were likely to ask for things the city was not
prepared to provide, insisting on the questionnaire that because of their “first duty” being
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to the “taxpayers of our city, we can’t give them everything they would like to have.” As
an example of the hardnosed attitude Los Angeles planned to put forth with the IOC,
Argue noted that at the USOC meeting the previous September, the city “said no to a
permanent velodrome, no to a closed swim stadium, and no to a fancier rowing course,
and no to a practice track near the Coliseum.”
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Los Angeles’ inflexible stance on hosting a financially austere Olympics was an
acceptable desire by IOC standards. However, it was the city’s intentions on how to do
so that ratcheted the ire of the international organization. The SCCOG presented its
completed questionnaire to the IOC, who deemed some of the answers “arrogant – even
insulting.”
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Specifically, the IOC abhorred the SCCOG’s forthrightness in declaring

that the city would be “responsible for television rights” and avowed that “all television
revenue” would be kept by the city to offset the cost of producing and hosting the
Olympic Games. The Los Angeles group was most peeved by Rule 21 of the Olympic
Charter, which read:
… cities entrusted with the organization of the Olympic Games shall be
liable to pay to the IOC whatever sum the IOC shall have fixed … all
sums arising out of the celebration of the Olympic Games belong to the
International Olympic Committee. It reserves the right opt grant a portion
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Associated Press Report, “Olympic Committee angry with Los Angeles, other bids welcome,” Daily
Collegian, 30 March 1978.
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to the Organizing Committee and to allocate a portion to the International
82

Federations and the National Olympic Committees.

In a letter to the SCCOG, the IOC instructed the Southern California group that
the overseers of the Olympic Movement had “the last word on television contracts” and
that there was installed a “regular formula for splitting up the revenue, with a little more
than one-third going to the IOC and the rest to the local organizing committee.”
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The

SCCOG responded to the IOC, writing, “These provisions … are unacceptable to the City
of Los Angeles. … All sums will be received and controlled by the OGOC [the
organizing committee that will be formed once the Games are awarded] which has the
responsibility for staging the Games.”

84

To counter Los Angeles’ claims, Lord Killanin

stated that the IOC maintained “contingency plans” if hosting the Olympics in Southern
California became an impossibility, as well as noting that the leaders of Montreal’s
Olympic Games vowed to host again in 1984 if “… [Los Angeles] could not.”
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Tom

Keller, the President of the General Assembly of International Sports Federations, agreed
with this sentiment, arguing, “there are many other cities which could handle the Games,
and are geared for them, like Munich and Montreal.”
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The Executive Committee of the IOC deplored Los Angeles’ attempting to usurp
the powers of the international organization. As well, the Executive Committee went on
record as being regretful that only having one candidate city was unfortunate, as it
provided Los Angeles, in the circumstance, to be more aggressive than any other
87

previous potential host city.

Anton Calleia, the chief aide to Los Angeles Mayor Tom

Bradley, attempted to clarify that SCCOG was not “challenging the authority of the
international committee.” Rather, the Southern California group was simply signifying
that the city of Los Angeles maintained no plans to “sign a blank check” in order to
ensure the Games did not place Los Angeles in an unrecoverable debt for the foreseeable
future.
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All involved parties – the SCCOG, President Killanin, the USOC, and the General
Assembly of International Sports Federations – convened for a “take-it-or-leave-it”
meeting in Mexico City the second week of April 1978. With the host city selection
merely a month away in Athens, the Los Angeles group steadfastly refused to agree to
“any conditions” that did not “give the city complete control over the “cost of staging the
Games.”
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In a press conference after the meeting in Mexico City, Mayor Bradley cited
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that Los Angeles representatives used the meeting to “acknowledge public cynicism and
distrust” towards the city’s desire to conduct low-cost Olympics, as well to make sure
that those on the outside did not compare Los Angeles’ bid to Munich or Montreal, “or
any other city which had large cost overruns.”

90

To avoid “runaway deficits,” the

representatives of both Los Angeles and the IOC agreed on three key decisions. First, the
gathered representatives decided that Los Angeles would continue to maintain “veto
power over any decision which could increase the cost of the 1984 Games.” Second, the
IOC agreed to let Los Angeles negotiate its own television rights as long as the city
provided one-third of “all television revenue to the IOC.” Lastly, Killanin agreed to
waive a “rule assigning all proceeds from the Games to the International Committee.”
After taking the first $1 million in revenues, the IOC would share – on a “sliding scale” –
91

all additional revenues with the soon-to-be-created Los Angeles Olympic Committee.

With the agreements in place, Lord Killanin took the decisions back to the IOC which
would decide the fate of Los Angeles’ bid during the May 17-18 gathering in Athens,
Greece.
At the IOC meeting of 17-18 May, Lord Killanin announced Los Angeles as the
provisional host of the 1984 Olympic Summer Games. The award, Killanin explained,

billion-dollar deficit” accrued by Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Olympics, Drapeau’s move was “greeted
with incredulity and considerable opposition.
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was “subject to the city’s entering into a contract in accordance with the Olympic rules
and in the form prescribed by the IOC before August 1st.”

92

Though the previous

meeting in Mexico City laid the foundations of an agreement, no official contract was yet
signed by either involved party. Before any contractually binding agreement could be
signed, Los Angeles Mayor Bradley was faced with the onus of getting the majority of
eight votes he needed from the 15-member city council in order to approve the contract.
By mid-May, Bradley – who the media argued was staking “his political reputation on his
ability to return the quadrennial amateur sports event to its 1932 home” – had the public
93

support of only six council members.

More daunting than finding the two additional

votes was overcoming the vehement opposition, led by council members Zev
Yaroslavsky and Peggy Stevenson. Yaroslavsky, aside from introducing a resolution
forcing Mayor Bradley “to provide the council with full and complete information about
all commitments made concerning the Games,” was also considering pushing a resolution
94

that forced the Olympic issue to a public vote in November.

With the IOC demanding

an August 1 decision, a public vote in November signaled possible demise of Los
Angeles’ Olympic aspirations. Stevenson publically announced her intentions to vote
against the Olympic contract, calling Mayor Bradley, “double-crossed by the landed
95

gentry and aristocrats” of the IOC.
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Figure 2.1 John Argue explains to the media that the city may
withdraw its bid for the 1984 Olympic Games. Los Angeles Mayor
Tom Bradley looks on. From the Centre Daily Times, 19 July 1978.
As early as 1 June, Councilman Marvin Braude was arguing that it was time to
“pull the plug” on Los Angeles’ Olympic bid and formally withdraw its offer to the
IOC.
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Even former Olympic athletics were writing off the Los Angeles bid. Dwight

Stones, the former world-record holder in the high jump, insisted “if they [SCCOG] think
they can hold the Olympics in Los Angeles without it costing the taxpayers, they’re
crazy.”
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The public – and, more importantly, the Los Angeles City Council – agreed
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63

with Stones’ assessment. After the tax revolt that was Proposition 13 passed in the State
of California, leading to the closing of branch libraries in many cities, the cancelling of
summer school sessions throughout the state, and the dilution of police and fire protection
– it was highly unlikely that the Los Angeles Council would approve the Olympic
98

measure.

Sensing impending failure – and a looming deadline from the IOC – Mayor

Bradley announced on 18 July 1978 his recommendation that Los Angeles withdraw its
bid for the 1984 Summer Olympics. Bradley argued that the city’s requirement to take
on full financial responsibility for the Olympic Games was “unacceptable.” Killanin
unwaveringly retorted that the “IOC must protect itself for the future and not compromise
99

itself with other cities.”

Mayor Bradley’s and SCCOG President Argue’s intent to explore ending Los
Angeles’ Olympic aspirations turned out to be an effective strategy. With no solid
backup plan aside from general interest from Montreal, Lord Killanin informed the
USOC that the deadline for the Los Angeles committee to agree to IOC conditions was to
be extended until 21 August 1978. Mayor Bradley and the SCCOG still hoped to install a
private corporation to oversee the hosting of the Olympics, thus relieving taxpayers of the
burden of paying for the Games. President Killanin considered Bradley’s response to the
IOC’s rejection of this stipulation “hasty.” Argue asked for a face-to-face meeting with
Killanin in hopes of extending the deadline even further – to 31 August 1978 – but was
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turned away by the Irish lord, who reiterated, “Until the Games are awarded, it is
100

essential to deal with the USOC and the mayor.”

With the deadline officially extended by the IOC, the USOC extended a helping
hand to Los Angeles. In a proposed partnership, the USOC agreed to assume the
financial responsibility of the 1984 Olympics if hosted in Los Angeles. William Simon,
the treasurer of the USOC, reasoned that a Los Angeles Games was likely to produce a
profit of $100 million, if not more, explaining, “it will not become another Montreal,
which had construction costs of $1.3 billion. Los Angeles needs only to build a
swimming pool, velodrome and rowing course and to install a track in the Coliseum at an
estimated price of $33.4 million.” Because of the other athletic facilities already in place
in Southern California, the city of Los Angeles could produce the Olympic Games at a
cost of $183 million, as opposed to Montreal’s $1.6 billion.
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While the specifics were

not yet finalized, Robert Kane –president of the USOC – further explained that the “plan
would be for the City of Los Angeles to sign its contract with the IOC according to the
rules” and “within that contract, it would be certified that the organizing committee of
Los Angeles, in partnership with the United States Olympic Committee, would indemnify
102

the City of Los Angeles.”

As well, despite admitting that it was likely against IOC

regulations, Kane announced that there existed “several large private corporations in the
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United States” willing to “underwrite the 1984 Summer Olympics in exchange for a share
103

in the profits.”

Deviating from the Olympic Charter, Lord Killanin provisionally permitted Los
Angeles to host the Olympics without the city’s taxpayers having to contribute pending
an IOC mail ballot of its membership. The USOC’s decision to intervene was paramount
in the eyes of the IOC. At the conclusion of an 30-31 August Executive Committee
meeting of the IOC at the Chateau de Vidy in Lausanne, Killanin issued a press release
that stated, “the IOC Executive Committee has unanimously recommended a postal vote
104

to close on 7 October 1978, on the agreements…”

Killanin also admitted that the

Olympic opportunity should have been taken away from Los Angeles at the original
105

deadline, but “many [executive committee] members wished to help” Los Angeles.

The completed IOC postal vote was overwhelmingly positive for Los Angeles: 74 ayes,
three nays, and eight abstentions.

106

Lord Killanin remarked, “Under the contract that

has now been drawn, the city of [Los Angeles] is absolved of liability, which is handed
instead to the USOC and the private LAOOC. It may be a pattern for Olympic Games of
the future.”
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Mayor Bradley was ecstatic at getting the Games back to Los Angeles for

the first time since William May Garland and Paul Helms worked persistently to bring

103
104
105

Ibid.
Lyberg, ed., IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume III 1969-1981 (1992), 219.
Ibid.

106

Kenneth Reich and Bill Boyarskey, “IOC approves L.A. bid for ’84 Olympics,” Los Angeles Times, 10
October 1978.
107

Ibid.

66

the festival to the City of Angels in 1932. Concerning the final approval of the IOC,
Bradley remarked, “It is of great significance that the 1984 Olympics will come to Los
Angeles without burdening our local citizens with huge tax bills. Gone are the days of
unbridled extravagance.”
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2.4 The LAOOC and Onward
On 26 March 1979, Peter Ueberroth – the President of First Travel Corporation –
received a phone call in his office. On the other end was Paul Ziffren, a representative of
the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee – the group formed to handle the
logistics of hosting the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics. The purpose of the call
was to inform Ueberroth, after multiple meet and greets and interviews, that he was
elected President of the LAOOC, and that Ziffren himself was named chairman.
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Shortly after Ueberroth’s election as President, tensions rose in Moscow. The
first hint of discontent was the White House’s – specifically President Jimmy Carter’s –
defiance over the standard protocol of flying the American flag over the Moscow
Olympic Stadium during the closing ceremonies of the 1980 Olympic Games. Further, as
a result of the American-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the U.S. government
informed both the Soviet and the IOC that ‘Old Glory’ was not to fly “at any time during

108
109

Mark Stevens, “Los Angeles caps Olympics cost,” The Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1978.

Peter Ueberroth, Richard Levin, and Amy Quinn, Made in America: His Own Story (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1985), 32-3.

67
110

the Games.”

According to Monique Berlioux, the director of the IOC, the raising of

the American flag – as dictated in the Olympic Charter – symbolized the closing of the
Moscow Olympiad, and the beginning of the Los Angeles Olympiad. Ignaty Novikov,
the deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union and President of the Moscow Organizing
Committee, quelled the swelling discussion by stating that American action towards the
Moscow Olympics was likely to result in a Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Olympics.
Novikov summarized, “we want to be present at Los Angeles, and we shall try to be
present, not like the Americans. But time can change a great deal. We would like to
think there will be good mutual understanding, after what has happened, and it will be a
111

pleasure for us to participate, if we are invited.”

Ueberroth quickly learned, however, that the Soviets were not always true to their
word. As well, the LAOOC Chief was soon to find out that the intrusion of politics into
the Olympic Movement did not end with President Carter’s boycott movement. Rather,
Ueberroth’s vision for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games became dramatically
intertwined with the soon-to-be elected Reagan administration’s desire to revamp and
improve American-Soviet relations through a rapprochement foreign policy. The hosting
of the 1984 Olympic Games in the United States was to become an agent of that
rapprochement.
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Chapter 3 – Going Red: Ronald Reagan’s Presidency
“… and how stands the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more
secure, and happier than it was eight years ago. … And she’s still a
beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, from all the
pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness,
1
towards home.”
3.1 Carter to Reagan
At approximately 8:15pm on 4 November 1980, NBC News declared Ronald
Reagan, with running mate George H.W. Bush, victorious in the 49th quadrennial
Presidential election. Reagan’s triumph over incumbent President Jimmy Carter was
staggering in its numbers: the Republican duo beat Carter by nearly 10 percentage points
in the popular vote and decimated the former Naval Midshipman in the electorate system
– Carter winning only 49 electoral college votes to Reagan’s imposing 489. Carter’s
turn-of-the-hour concession marked the worst election performance by an incumbent
President since Franklin D. Roosevelt used his promise of a “new deal” to secure a
resounding 18-percent margin of victory over Herbert Hoover. Further, less than five
percent difference prevented all of Carter’s few-and-far between “blue states” from
turning red in the historic landslide, not only slighting Carter’s campaign, but also
exemplifying the American public’s desire for a categorically different direction for the

1

At approximately 9:02 at night on 11 January 1989, Reagan delivered his farewell address to the nation
from the Oval Office. This quote is an excerpt from the final minutes of his speech. For the entirety of the
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on a hill cannot be hidden.” Reagan also used the reference in his Republican presidential nomination
speech on 23 August 1984, explaining his dream where America stood as a “shining city on a hill.”Kiewe,
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“city upon a hill.” Carter’s election thrilled foreign countries just as equally. In a
“humiliating and frustrating episode” for the Carter administration, the Iranians released
2

American hostages minutes into Reagan’s presidency. The release of the hostages on
the morning of Reagan’s inauguration was yet another embarrassing blow to the Carter
3

administration.

The outgoing President’s blunders and dangerously ill-conceived notion of
American public despondence was a critical factor in not only Carter’s election loss but
also more so in Reagan’s dominating victory. The Carter era coincided with stagnant
wages, double-digit inflation, poor benefits for non-union workers, and an increasing
number of lost jobs. Carter informed the American people that the nation’s problems
were of their own making – that a “crisis” reflected an “erosion of confidence” that struck
“at the very heart and soul and spirit of the national will” which threatened “to destroy
4

the social and political fabric of America.” On the other side of the spectrum stood

2
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742.
3

Michael Deaver, Reagan’s Deputy Chief of Staff, recalled that Carter placed a call to the President-elect
at 7:00am the morning of the inauguration to inform Reagan that the release of the hostages was imminent.
Carter was dismayed to learn that his call had to be taken by aides, as Reagan was still in bed. Deaver
explained, “ … if it was me, if I was about to become president of the United States, I don’t think I’d still
be asleep at nine o’clock on the morning of my swearing in.” For more of Deaver’s recollections regarding
that morning, please see Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 26. For more on the Iranian hostage crisis see, David
Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006).
4

Dinesh D’Souza, Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1997), 34. Political pundits later dubbed the Carter’s words the “Malaise Speech” even
though Carter never used the word “malaise.” Literature often misquotes the speech and includes the word.

70
5

Reagan. Born to an alcoholic, shoe-selling father in 1911 Illinois, Reagan derived from
6

his mother an uninhibited nature of optimism and a “talent for happiness.” It was if
Reagan was a “real-life Gatsby,” whom Fitzgerald declared preserved an “extraordinary
7

gift for hope.” Reagan often exploited this characteristic as an attack against Carter
during the 1980 presidential campaign. During a speech in Kokomo, Indiana, Reagan
explained that during his travels across America he “found a longing among our people
for hope, a longing for a belief in ourselves and the vision that gave birth to this nation.
… Jimmy Carter would have us believe that this dream is over … or at least in need of
8

some kind of drastic change.” In direct contrast to Carter’s melancholy attitude, Reagan
9

thoroughly believed that America had a “rendezvous with destiny.” Reagan exited his
eight years in office a “mythic figure,” his legacy running “continuously in everyone’s
home movies of the mind.”

10

Reagan critic Haynes Johnson articulated that Reagan was

“cocky without arrogance, wisecracking, and fun-loving” and that he “appeared to
embody what the country identified as American virtues: informality humor, patriotism.

5
6
7
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He had played the part so well so many times [in Hollywod] that it was hard to separate
11

role from reality.”

Two events in during Reagan’s terms further concreted his mythic

position in American annals. The assassination attempt just nine weeks after his
inauguration elevated “Reagan into a place in the affections of his fellow citizens that he
12

never lost during his years as president.”

The other – happening four months later –

was his firing of 11,600 air traffic controllers for walking from their position in strike.
Johnson argued that “it was such a move of boldness and decisiveness that he was
henceforth seen not as an engaging actor playing a president but as the kind of leader the
country longed for and thought it had lost: a strong president, willing to take unpopular
13

risks to achieve what he believed to be in the best public interest.”

After graduating from Eureka College with a degree in economics, Reagan
worked as a sports broadcaster before moving to Hollywood where he appeared in over
fifty films, including King’s Row, Bedtime for Bonzo, and Knute Rockne – All American
(for which he forever earned the nickname “the Gipper”). Reagan’s term as the President
of the Screen Actors Guild during the era of McCarthyism left two ineradicable
impressions on the New Deal Democrat: taxes were much too high and “communists
were a real and determined threat to liberty.”

14
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Reagan’s campaign strategy was largely based on three core concepts: (1.) the
idea of “peace through strength” in regard to the Soviet Union; (2.) a widely-stated
promise of a 30-percent income tax cut, a prerogative of Reagan’s “supply side
economics” belief; (3.) a move to ensure governmental policies integrated “traditional
and commonsense values.”

15

Carter’s camp, realizing that Reagan was finding

unexpected success, utilized the media to highlight many of Reagan’s political gaffes.
For example, Carter grilled Reagan in the media for declaring that the American
economy was in the midst of a depression, stating that it exemplified just “how little he
16

knows.”

In typical Reagan style, the Presidential candidate turned a Carter offensive

into a memorable campaign moment when he responded: “A recession is when your
neighbor loses his job. A depression is when you lose yours. And recovery is when
Jimmy Carter loses his.”

17

However, perhaps Reagan’s most crowning achievement during his time in office
was not the effect of “Reaganomics” on the economy, but his management of the Cold
War. From Reagan’s election in 1981 until late 1983, the administration espoused a
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definitive hardline stance on all matters communist. No longer would American foreign
policy be based on “soft” ideas such as human rights – such as it was under Carter – but it
18

would move back to the core tenants of the Cold War: strength and power.

This is no

more evident than in Reagan’s desire to regroup the nation’s military to match the
strength of the Soviets’ military might. Moreover, Reagan returned to the Cold War
policies of “us versus them,” “good versus evil,” and “democracy versus communism.”
Moderated under the Carter administration, the hardline rhetoric used by Reagan again
19

reawakened Cold War anxieties in the Soviet Union.

3.2 The Early Brezhnev Correspondence
Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union from 1964 until his death in 1982, became a member of the Central Committee in
a time that ultimately hardened him. From 1934 to 1939, Joseph Stalin conducted the
‘Great Purge.’ Its terror reached its climax in 1936 and 1938 when “1.6 million people
were arrested, and up to 3.6 million individuals were in prisons, labor camps, and internal
20

exile settlements.”
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Stalin’s purges did not exclude the Communist Party itself. Seeking those that
had committed crimes against the state – a rather ambiguous charge – Stalin ordered
nearly 40 percent of the Communist Party members arrested. Most of the 1934 delegates
to the Seventieth Congress Party were shot. Further, “of the 139 members of the 1934
Central Committee, 110 were killed or driven to suicide.” Soviet historian John
Thompson states that the empty seats left behind by Stalin’s purge were “quickly filled
21

by a rough, less-educated, ambitious new generation willing to knuckle under Stalin.”

Of these new Congress members stood Brezhnev. The new Soviet leader, catapulted into
power after the removal of Nikita Khrushchev, is portrayed as the “blandest and most
one-dimensional of all Soviet leaders.”

22

Brezhnev was equally unsure of himself. He

criticized himself for having never dealt with foreign policy, stating, “ … here I am,
sitting in the Kremlin and looking at the world only via papers that reach my desk.”

23

It

was a peculiar lack of confidence for a man whose lapels were filled with medals from
his service in World War II. Brezhnev, then 35, found himself on the front lines at
Dnepropetrovsk when the Germans launched their attack in August 1941. After being
forced to retreat after ten days of resistance, Brezhnev stayed with the troops and further
assisted in their evacuation across the Dnieper River. He also saw later action in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
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It was this upbringing in the Communist Party that Brezhnev communicated with
Reagan. The embittered relationship between Brezhnev and Reagan assisted in the
materialization of a foreign policy stalemate between the two leaders. It was this
stalemate that largely persisted – even as Soviet leadership was continuously in flux –
until Reagan’s change of heart in late 1983. Brezhnev was the first of the two to put pen
to paper. The letter, received by the White House on 6 March 1981, opened:
I consider it necessary to turn to you concerning the most vital problems
that are raised by the present international situation. I suppose you are
aware that the Congress of our Party, which recently took place in
Moscow, devoted paramount attention to the analysis and evaluation of
the international situation; as well as to the practical conclusions stemming
from this. The question was, what should be done in order to preserve
peace and to ensure for present and future generations the most basic right
of each person – the right to life. This is the essence of the decisions that
were taken, which will determine the foreign policy course of the Soviet
Union in the years ahead.

25

Further, the letter touched on the Soviets creating “numerous proposals for reducing the
threat of war and for increasing international security.” Brezhnev noted the vital
necessity of a “safe, peaceful future” and that the Soviet Union was continuously creating
“new, large initiatives” in order to “restrain the arms race, deepen détente, [and]
26

strengthen peace.”

Alexander Haig, Reagan’s Secretary of State, felt Brezhnev’s letter

did not “signal any modifications” of the Soviet system and that it only served as
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Leonid Brezhnev to Ronald Reagan, March 6, 1981, folder “Head of State Correspondence Jan – June
1981 (1/2),” box 64, John Matlock Files, RRL.
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“another step in the ongoing Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign” to further
contrast what the Soviets felt as American “footdragging” in repairing East/West
relations.

27

As well, the administration considered the letter as a Soviet attempt to put the

“U.S. on the spot” and served as an opportunity for the Kremlin to achieve peace talks on
28

their own terms.

The socialists newspaper, Pravda, succinctly summed up the Soviet

position on attempting to place the Reagan administration in a precarious situation,
writing, “the captains of Western policy will sooner or later have to heed the inexorable
realities of our time, the might community of socialist nations and the movement of
peoples for social progress and national independence which is gathering momentum.
29

No one is going to turn back the wheel of history.”

Reagan had no reason to believe that the “wheel of history” was turning towards a
worldwide socialist revolution. Not believing a revolution was on the verge of taking
place, Reagan felt no pressure to enter peace talks hastily, thus negating his strategy of
“peace through strength.” The President’s response to Brezhnev’s first entreaty was as
direct and unforgiving as his foreign policy. Reagan argued that the elements of “mutual
confidence and trust” were missing because of the “policy and actions of the Soviet
Union.” In particular, Reagan insisted that the “… USSR’s unrelenting and
comprehensive military build-up over the past decade” and the “Soviet Union’s pursuit of

27
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unilateral advantage in other parts of the world and its repeated resort to the direct and
indirect use of force” were the sole harbingers of discontent between the two countries.

30

Reagan’s letter made it clear that the “prospects for improved East-West relations … will
31

primarily [be] a function of Soviet restraint.”

Additionally, Reagan, without

provocation in Brezhnev’s letter, addressed the brewing issue of the Polish Solidarity
Movement. Directly after informing the Brezhnev that a major source of international
tension was due to the continued Military presence in Afghanistan, the President warned
him that any “Soviet intervention in Poland would have a profoundly negative and lasting
32

impact on US-Soviet relations and on the East/West relationship in general.”

In

closing, Reagan suggested a “traditional meeting” at the upcoming United Nations
gathering and marked it as a chance to “deepen” the “bilateral dialogue” between the two
countries as well as using it as a measuring stick for the future of building a “better and
33

happier relationship.”

The growing rift over which country was at fault for the volatile state of affairs
continued to grow as letters changed hands through the summer of 1981. The Reagan
administration received on 15 October 1981 a reply from Brezhnev regarding a 22
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September 1981 letter from Reagan.

In the letter, Brezhnev quickly called it

“regrettable” that Reagan again attempted to deflect the entirety of the blame for the
tension between the two superpowers on the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was also agitated
by Reagan’s insistence that the relationship could only improve after Soviet behavior
changed, writing, “ … to proceed on this premise is to steer clearly the whole matter
toward a deadlock.” Brezhnev countered Reagan’s belief that a Soviet change in
behavior was needed in order to restore trust and confidence by arguing that the Soviet
Union was not the sole country with “serious and legitimate objections … with the
United States and its policy.”

35

Further, Brezhnev reasoned that the American

government lacked any moral or ethical authority to decry Soviet actions when the
American government itself “… perceives its interests everywhere and in everything.”
Brezhnev continued, informing Reagan that only once the United States abandoned its
“double standard” would there be an opportunity for the “stabilization of the world
situation.”

36

Lastly, the letter indicated an unsettled feeling on the Soviet part towards

Reagan’s “incessant campaign” regarding the “so-called Soviet military threat.”
Brezhnev argued that these “fantastic fables” had traces of reality, saying that a belief
that any country can be victorious in a “nuclear duel” was nothing more than a

34
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calculation of “insanity.” Brezhnev signed off on the letter only after wishing the
exchanges to serve as a medium for “establishing a better understanding on the key issues
37

of Soviet-American relations.”

In his 17 November 1981 reply, Reagan immediately rebutted Brezhnev’s
claim that Soviet actions should have no bearing on US-Soviet relations, writing:
Your letter of October 15 makes it clear once again how profound are the
differences in our respective assessments of the causes of the major
sources of tension in the world. I find it difficult to accept your
declaration that Soviet actions in other parts of the world must have no
bearing on our relations. Soviet actions are having a direct and adverse
impact on American interests in many parts of the world. As I said in my
letter to you of September 22, Soviet resort to direct and indirect use of
force in regional conflicts is a matter of deep concern to us as is the
continued build up of military strength beyond the need for self defense.

38

Reagan then entered a discussion regarding Soviet action in Afghanistan and Soviet
concern over possible American interference in Cuba. Reagan assumed that the Soviet
Union shared the desire for a “non-aligned, independent Afghanistan, free of any foreign
military presence and guaranteed against any outside interference.”

39

To that end, Reagan

argued the only obstacle constricting such a reality was the “complete withdrawal of
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Soviet forces … at the earliest possible date.”

40

In what amounted to a brief window of

reconciliation, Reagan calmed Brezhnev’s suspicions of an American invasion of Cuba
by assuring the Soviet leader that the United States did “not seek to interfere with Cuba’s
independence” nor was the country currently “interfering in Cuba’s internal affairs.”
However, Reagan did foreshadow coming American foreign policy interventions, when
informing Brezhnev that he did “find entirely unacceptable Cuba’s unremitting efforts to
export its revolution by fomenting violent insurgencies and terrorism against legitimate
governments in Central America.”

41

At the end of the letter, Reagan again placed the

onus of world change on the Soviet Union, charging “if the Soviet Union is prepared to
move forward in these areas of genuine concern to the United States and its Allies, you
42

will find me a ready partner.”

Reagan’s National Security Council assured the President that his letter allowed
the Soviets to have a “clear understanding” of the American approach. Further, the
letters clarified the “specific concerns” the administration held, as well as attesting to the
ideal that improved relations were based only on “Soviet actions, not words, over the
43

coming months.”

40

It was insisted, however, that despite Reagan’s best attempts, the
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Soviet Union still considered “terms that require Moscow to change its foreign policy”
wholly unacceptable.

44

Brezhnev fully validated the National Security Council beliefs in his 1 December
1981 reply. After two opening paragraphs espousing finding “common ground” and
“eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons,” Brezhnev scolded Reagan, writing, “…
frankly, the considerations advanced in your letter on specific issues are, to put it mildly,
very far from the objective reality.” Reagan’s argument from his first letter to Brezhnev
concerning the Soviet Union’s “unrelenting military build up” was, to the Soviet leader,
an incident of “double book-keeping whereby in counting the Soviet arms in question
their numbers are made to look many times higher, and – conversely – when it comes to
the US, such numbers are drastically understated.”

45

In an effort to snub Reagan’s

conviction that Soviet action was stalling reconciliation, Brezhnev informed the President
of the USSR’s withdraw “from Central Europe [some] 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks,
while the US, on the contrary, added tens of thousands of men to its troops in Europe.”
Brezhnev, insinuating that Reagan lived in a world of fantasy, stated that those numbers
46

presented the “actual state of affairs in real life.”

It was Brezhnev’s first attempt of

countering Reagan’s claims with substantiated facts. In doing so, it led Brezhnev to
propose to President Reagan a vital question regarding the shaky components of world
affairs: “ … the question is which side is lacking in constructiveness and practical
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steps?”

Secretary of State Haig considered Brezhnev’s choice of words the “harshest

Presidential level communication” received from the Kremlin in “recent years.” As well,
the State Department analyzed the letter as “uncompromisingly tough in rejecting” the
American desire for Soviet change.

48

As well, Brezhnev’s approach to the rapidly evolving situation in Poland caused
great alarm to the State Department. In the same memorandum to the President, Haig
suggested several unilateral actions the administration could take against the Kremlin in
order to “deter the Soviets from brining about a major escalation” or to “impose punitive
49

sanctions against Moscow following direct Soviet intervention.”

Of the suggestions

prompted to the President, the most broad consisted of a sweeping economic sanction
against the USSR. The State Department desired to “impose a total trade embargo, expel
all Soviet commercial representatives, ban all Soviet fishing in U.S. water, discourage
tourist travels to the USSR, suspend Aeroflot service to the U.S. and end Soviet maritime
access to U.S. ports, suspend negotiations on economic matters, and pressure U.S. banks
to curtail credits.” Finally, the State Department urged the President to “carry through”
50

with his “threats,” and not take any “flabby actions.”
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Following Brezhnev’s fundamental question, the letter correspondence between
the two leaders transitioned into a regular exchange regarding the Poland situation, the
plight of seven Christians who sought refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, the
crisis in Lebanon, and human rights as a whole. Reagan failed to mention any potential
sanctions or actions against the USSR for its participation in the Poland movement. The
letters arriving from Brezhnev continued to prod the United States to take a share of the
responsibility for the current state of world affairs. One such letter in late 1982
concerning the massacre of Palestinians in West Beirut, in which Brezhnev apportioned
“a certain share of the responsibility to those who could but did not prevent what has
been committed by Tel Aviv,”

51

was yet another example of the Soviet leader producing

clear references of where he thought the Americans were lacking in rectifying the world
political order.
Reagan’s correspondence with the Soviet leadership was most certainly not a
laissez-faire affair. Even with the drafts of responses going through multiple departments
and multiple hands, a central strategy directed the general thrust of the communication
towards the Soviet Union. Richard Pipes, the former director of Harvard’s Russian
Research Center from 1968 and 1973 – and a member of Reagan’s National Security
Council as the Director of East European and Soviet Affairs – was the chief author of
Cold War strategy and policy. Born into an assimilated Jewish family in Poland, Pipes
went on to earn his PhD from Harvard University. Pipes’ first foray into American
political work was during his tenure with “Team B,” a constructed group of civilian
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experts and retired military officers whose task it was to evaluate and analyze the threats
posed by the Soviet Union to the United States. As indicated by Pipes’ later writing,
“Team B” found that the Central Intelligence Agency’s understanding of Soviet
intelligence vastly underestimated Soviet military power and largely misinterpreted
Soviet strategic policies. After a brief stint in academe, Pipes transition into his role on
the National Security Council, holding the position of Director of East European and
Soviet Affairs. His innate distaste for the spirit of détente was not lost on Reagan who
largely would have agreed when Pipes argued that détente was “inspired by intellectual
indolence and based on ignorance of one’s antagonist and therefore inherently inept.”
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It was with this background and belief that Pipes authored one of the seminal building
blocks for the Reagan Doctrine.

3.3 Pipes’ Reagan Soviet Policy
In October of 1981, in the midst of Poland’s Solidarity Movement, National
Security Council member Richard Pipes presented to the Reagan administration a major
paper detailing the foundation and ongoing construction of Reagan’s Soviet policy.
Pipes’ policy for Reagan hinged on four key propositions, including Pipes’ belief that
communism was “inherently expansionist” and that the only way to tide such expansion
of communism into the free world was to either assist in collapsing the ideology or, “at
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the very least,” to thoroughly reform it.

53

In regards to collapsing the ideology, Pipes

believed that the “Stalinist model on which Soviet Communism … is based” was on the
precipice of a catastrophic failure brought on by multiple economic failures and
“difficulties brought about by overexpansion.” As well, Pipes argued that the eventual
successors of Brezhnev were likely to split into “conservative” and “reformist” factions,
“the latter of which” were likely to “press for modest economic and political
democratization.” Finally, the last proposition of Pipes’ paper noted that the best course
of action for the United States was to “promote the reformist tendencies in the USSR” by
either “encouraging pro-reform forces inside” the country or, conversely, increasing the
consequences for any Soviet imperialism.

54

After presenting his scheme, Pipes laid out his overall argument and, thus,
Reagan’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future: in order to
regain superiority in the Cold War, the United States needed to “exploit not so much” its
own strengths, but the Soviet Union’s weaknesses. Pipes argued that “frustrating [the]
adversary’s strategy and turning it against them” was an “imaginative, realistic,
sustainable counter-strategy” that would sufficiently neutralize “the aggressive designs”
of the USSR. In what served as Pipes’ rationale for his strategy, he explained what he
considered an unobjectionable truth about the Soviet Union, and Communism in general:
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The Soviet Union decidedly is not the “vanguard of history.” Rather, it is
a misbegotten experiment based on nineteenth century ideas and Russian
historic experience that bears little relationship to contemporary reality,
and would long have been relegated to history books were it not for Soviet
bayonets and tanks. Communism has been unable to realize a single one
of its stated objectives. Its symbol is the sealed frontier guarded by
security personnel to ensure that no one escapes. No nation has freely
adopted Communism; every nation on which it has been imposed has
striven at the first opportunity to be rid of it. Communism is a pre-historic
55

relic.

After stating what he believed to be the universal truth about the Soviet Union, Pipes laid
out the specifics of Reagan’s political strategy for the Communist world. Primarily,
Pipes urged the need for an “economic grand strategy” that allowed for maximum
“political leverage” for the West and inflicted “anti-reformist” elements in the East.
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Pipes failed to make any suggestions on how to develop such an economic strategy.
Before the release of Pipes’ paper, however, the Reagan administration implemented the
“peace through strength” initiative. In doing so, the administration indirectly declared
“economic warfare.” That is, by forcing the Soviet Union to compete with the American
military buildup, the Reagan administration was forcing Moscow to stress its economic
abilities to the brink. Even if Pipes had declared a concrete economic strategy against the
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Soviet Union, the White House, in favor of the measures already implemented, would
have likely ignored it. To that end, Pipes and the administration largely agreed that the
“theorists of détente” were largely misguided in “improving the performance of the
57

Soviet economy as long as it adheres to the Stalinist model.”

Secondly, Pipes suggested the encouragement of dissent within the USSR,
especially among those groups “that strive for greater democracy and human rights.” To
do so, Pipes championed the deployment of propaganda and ideological warfare arguing,
“propaganda will move to the forefront and become the single most effective instrument
58

in our struggle Soviet expansionism.”

The message to deliver to those behind the Iron

Curtain, Pipes argued, should “not seek to sell the United States and our way of life.”
Pipes felt doing so was wholly unnecessary, as the citizens of Eastern Europe already
possessed a “rose view” of the American condition and actually considered the prospect
of doing so “insulting” to the recipients of the propaganda. Rather, Pipes insisted that the
material “perform the function of a non-existent Soviet free press and inform Soviet
citizens of the failures and misdeeds of their own government, of which they are the
59

principal victims.”
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Pipes recommended that some of the material to be covered include: the immense costs of the Soviet
Union’s defense programs, instances of official corruption and abuses of authority, and information about
Soviet military causalities abroad, including the names of the dead, wounded, and those taken prisoner.
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Thirdly, Pipes recommended that the Reagan administration “actively resist
Soviet imperialism outside the Soviet Bloc.”

60

Of Pipes’ proposed ideas, the suggestion

of interfering in countries such as “Angola or Cambodia” is the one most evident in
Reagan’s foreign policy. Pipes immediately advocated for a “transfer of arms” to those
countries fending off a Communist revolution, and that such action be completed in a
“clandestine fashion.” It was also made explicitly clear in the paper that unless the “vital
interests” of the American Republic was endangered, that there was no need “to send
61

U.S. combat troops to contain Communist aggression.”

Pipes concluded his manifesto by summing up the “underlying morality of
Communists.” In doing so, Pipes argued that it was defined as: “When I am weak, I
appeal to the sense of fairness because this is your principle; when I am strong, I appeal
to power because that is my principle.”
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Reagan immediately indicated his agreement

with Pipes’ paper and quickly began to incorporate Pipes’ thoughts, beliefs, and
arguments into his own public rhetoric. For example, a June 1982 speech in Westminster
Hall in London bore witness to Reagan orating:
In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great
revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are
conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is
happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of MarxistLeninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the
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tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its
citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty … While we must be
cautious about forcing the pace of things, we must not hesitate to declare
our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them.
The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure
of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties,
universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop
their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful
means. This is not cultural imperialism, it is providing the means for
genuine self-determination and protection for diversity.

63

Pipes’ writings and beliefs on the Soviet Union – and communism as a whole – played a
powerful and deciding factor in the creation of National Security Decision Directive 75
and the formation of The Reagan Doctrine.
3.4 NSDD 75 & The Reagan Doctrine
Reagan’s abhorrence of communism was not a political façade – it was a deepseeded and personal disavowing of all that the socialist order embroiled. It was his
anticommunism belief that drove Reagan into politics in the first place. As the President
of the Screen Actors Guild during the McCarthy era, Reagan became entangled in the
fight over the communist influence in Hollywood. As President of the Screen Actors
Guild, Reagan at one time “spent seven months … meeting communists and communist64

influenced people across a table in almost daily sessions.”

In was in these sessions that
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the nucleus for Reagan’s distrust for the communist culture was cultivated, writing in a
1960 letter to Playboy publisher Hugh Hefner: “I, like you, will defend the right of any
American to openly practice and preach any political philosophy from monarchy to
anarchy. But this is not the case with regard to the communist. He [a communist] is
bound by party discipline to deny he is a communist so that he can by subversion and
steal impose on an unwilling people the rule of the International Communist Party which
65

is in fact the government of Soviet Russia.”

Reagan came to believe that the Soviets

faced “serious political … deficiencies that could be used to the West’s advantage.”
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During the 1980 campaign, Reagan espoused his beliefs about the ideological weaknesses
and his view of the absurdity of communism, arguing:
The greatest fallacy of the Lenin-Marxist philosophy is that it is the “wave
of the future.” Everything about it is a primitive as tribal rule; compulsion
in place of free initiative; coercion in place of law; piracy in place of trade,
and empire building for the benefit of a chosen few at the expense of the
many. We have seen nothing like it since feudalism.
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Reagan’s election as President provided a new beginning in Cold War relations –
a prospect the Soviets were quite aware of. Shortly after the 1980 election concluded, the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service was providing the White House with continuing
updates on the position of various Soviet leaders. For instance, Soviet Premier Nikolay
Tikhonov argued that the Soviet relationship with the United States could improve only
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on the basis of “equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and not causing harm to the
security” of either country.

68

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, at a Kremlin dinner

speech on 18 November 1980, remarked about Reagan’s victorious campaign:
Much in the development of the international situation will, of course,
depend on the position of the United States. A new president has now
been elected there. I shall not dwell on what was said by him and his
supporters and opponents in the heat of the election struggle. I can only
state with full responsibility that any constructive steps by the U.S.
Administration in the field of Soviet-American relations and urgent world
69

problems will meet with positive response on our part.

In its indirect appeals to President-elect Reagan, the Politburo did nothing but attempt to
elongate the long-held stance of détente. The desire of “noninterference in internal
affairs” and “equality” was nothing more than a carry over of the longstanding American
approach to Cold War affairs. Reagan’s campaign and tenure as California governor
made it overwhelmingly clear that maintaining the status quo of détente was simply not
going to happen once his administration took over Washington. Reagan held a wildly
differing view of how the Cold War was supposed to end in the absence of détente: “we

68
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win, they lose.”

70

In order to obtain this ideological victory over the Soviet Union and

the socialist order, Reagan and his administration enacted policies and initiatives that
became known as The Reagan Doctrine.
The impetus of The Reagan Doctrine was NSDD 75, largely drafted by Richard
Pipes and built upon the foundation he crafted in his earlier Soviet strategy paper that
Reagan drew anti-communism rhetoric from. The basis of NSDD 75 was rather straight
forward: “U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external
resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of
Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity,
outstanding disagreements.”

71

Specifically, NSDD 75 focused on two major tasks for the

United States to undertake. First, NSDD 75 aimed:
To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing
effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international
arenas – particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical
regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the
72

primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

Not only did concepts of NSDD 75 aim to confront and challenge communism in
those areas on the verge of coming under the Soviet sphere of influence, it aimed to
stimulate change within the Soviet Union itself:
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To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change
in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic
system in whish the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually
reduce. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in
the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take
into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its
73

capacity to engage in aggression.

Functionally, NSDD 75 aimed for the United States to “modernize its military forces –
both nuclear and conventional – so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S.
administration is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military
posture.”

74

As well, it was deemed vital that the “U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its

commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and
friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist
Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special
targets of Soviet policy.
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Further, it was determined in NSDD 75 that American policy

would “seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients.
It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links
between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage
democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these
countries.”
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Reagan wasted little in incorporating elements of The Reagan Doctrine into
American government policy, for example, his “peace through strength” initiative.
Reagan largely shunned the belief that peace was nothing more than the lack of war. He
also rejected the idealist philosophy that peace was a policy, arguing, “… peace is a goal,
not a policy” and that “lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it
doesn’t describe the steps we must take nor the paths we should follow to reach that
goal.”
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Reagan’s “peace through strength” initiative focused on not only building the

American military into an overwhelming power, but also conveying an unrelenting
assurance that such power would be used if necessary. Reagan backed his pledge of
using force if necessary as early as the campaign for 1980, saying, “no one wants to use
atomic weapons, but the enemy should go to sleep every night in fear that we could use
them.”
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The Reagan administration felt that while the Soviets constructed a military
superpower, the United States built down – the result of which was a “dangerous military
79

imbalance.”

Reagan declared America’s military depletion a “window of vulnerability”

and argued, “that the truth of the matter is that on balance, the Soviet Union does have a
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definite margin of superiority.”

80

In his effort to increase American military strength,

Reagan proposed the largest peacetime military budget in the country’s history. The
Reagan administration allocated an astonishing $33.8 billion in extra military budget
funding and proposed an additional 7 percent per year increase in military spending
during their first term in the White House, totaling over one trillion dollars. The
unprecedented amount of funding backed the military’s strategic forces, combat
81

readiness, force mobility, and general needs.

As well, the surge of finances into the

military budget allowed for the construction of several thousand combat aircraft, the
construction of nearly 600 Naval ships, and the development of the B-1 stealth bomber
that President Carter cancelled during his administration.
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The immense military

buildup did not, however, serve as a vehicle to reverse by force Communist control of
Eastern Europe. Rather, conservatives argued, an unrivaled American military would
devalue the Soviets’ main strategic asset in the Cold War. Additionally, by matching
Soviet military might, the American government would be in a capable position to focus
on “political, economic, and spiritual” conversations and compromises with the Soviet
83

Union.

More importantly: forcing the Soviet Union to match growing American

military might was capable of forcing the collapse of an already fragile Soviet economy.
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In March of 1983, President Reagan took his “peace through strength” initiative
and desire to fiscally collapse the Soviet Union a step even further. On 23 March 1983,
after a consultation with his Joint Chiefs of Staff, Reagan announced his decision to
“embark on a long-range research-and-development effort to counter the threat of Soviet
ballistic missiles and to make … nuclear weapons … impotent and obsolete.”
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The

beginning of the effort was born on 31 July 1979 during Reagan’s visit to the NORAD
headquarters near Colorado Springs, Colorado. During a discussion with General James
Hill, Reagan was dismayed to learn that there was nothing that could be done to stop a
nuclear missile fired by the Soviet Union.
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Even with Reagan’s rapid military growth,

the fate of the world still rested on the laurels of Mutually Assured Destruction – or, the
immediate firing of American nuclear missiles once a Soviet first strike was verified to be
airborne. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative – or “Star Wars” – was the most farreaching and expensive portion of Reagan’s “peace through strength” movement. No
longer would Mutually Assured Destruction drive the Cold War. Reagan was now
proposing a system that would shoot down incoming Soviet missiles and “thus protect the
United States from a nuclear attack.”
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Even if “Star Was” was a fabrication of scientific

nonsense, the Soviets were sufficiently impressed “by U.S. technological capabilities.”
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986,
recalled that the Soviet leadership viewed Reagan’s SDI initiative was a “real threat” as it
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had the potential to render the entire Soviet nuclear program useless.

Indeed, the

Moscow newspaper Izvestiya admitted that Reagan’s proposed SDI program was likely to
“impose on us an even more ruinous arms race.”
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Reagan also stayed true to his desire to reverse Soviet expansionism as outlined in
NSDD 75. By the 1980s, the United States had grown concerned about the ongoing
expansion of Soviet influence in the Caribbean. The President had growing concerns
regarding the Caribbean since attending a conference in Barbados in late 1982. Shortly
after, in a March 1983 address, Reagan proclaimed: “the rapid buildup of Grenada’s
military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of under
100,000 … The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as a
power projection into the region.” A bloody coup by the People’s Revolutionary
Government in Grenada in October 1983 reaffirmed Reagan’s belief, and was viewed by
Reagan as a direct Marxist threat to both American security and interest. On 25 October
1983, approximately 2,000 United States armed forces launched a campaign against the
soldiers of the Marxist regime who had staged the earlier coup. The military campaign
lasted three days before American superiority in numbers, power, and technology
overwhelmed the revolutionaries. The Grenada operation was of vast significance to the
Reagan Doctrine – it served as the first American “effort to restore democracy to a
89

communist country.”
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President Reagan sought to exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union through
the political, economic, and military strength of the United States. However, a series of
events in late 1983 led Reagan to give a nationally televised address that seemed to
counter everything the President had done in his first three years in office to bring the
ultimate demise to the Soviet Union. The speech, it seemed, indicated that Reagan had
“blinked first” in the Cold War conflict.

3.5 Morning In The Soviet Union
Political scientist Beth Fischer argued that a series of three events in the fall of
1983 signaled to President Ronald Reagan that American approach to the Soviet Union
90

was in dire need of change, or else nuclear war would inescapable.

The experience of

the three events led Reagan to alter his Soviet policy in January of 1984, providing the
administration a unique opportunity to employ the Olympics use as mediator in bettering
American-Soviet relations.
In the early morning of 1 September 1983, Korean Airlines flight 007 departed
New York and, after a short layover for fuel in Anchorage, departed for its final
destination, Seoul. In a disastrous mistake, the pilots of the aircraft incorrectly set the
plane’s automatic navigational system causing the aircraft, unknowingly to the crew, to
veer over three hundred miles into Soviet airspace. In a case of cruel luck, hours before
the passenger airliner entered enemy airspace, the Soviet Union was tracking an
American intelligence plane which was operating near the current flight path of KAL
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007. The Kremlin was dismayed as KAL 007 – believing it to be the same American
intelligence aircraft – neared the sensitive Soviet military base near Vladivostok. A
Soviet fighter jet scrambled to intercept the out-of-place jet. All efforts to identify the
aircraft failed, including the Soviet pilot firing warning shots, dropping flares, and
attempting to make radio contact with the astray pilots of KAL 007. Acting on the orders
of the Kremlin, the Soviet pilot – Lieutenant Colonel Gennadi Osipovich – fired upon
KAL 007, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 American citizens. Reagan
91

immediately christened the Soviet action an “act of inhuman brutality.”

Four days after

the incident, Reagan spoke to a shocked and outraged nation:
But, despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the
evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. They have
persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed,
they have not even told the Russian people that a plane was shot down. The
92

Soviet Government calls the whole thing an accident. I call it murder.
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Presidential Television Address: Flight 007, Sept. 5, 1983, folder “KAL 007 (2),” box 28, John F.
Matlock Files, RRL.
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Figure 3.1 - Reagan delivering his speech regarding KAL 007 to the
nation. Photo courtesy of the Ronald Reagan Archives.

Privately, the President was “deeply disturbed that the Soviets could make such an
error.”
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Reagan concluded that the shooting down of KAL 007 illustrated how

dangerously close the world was to the nuclear precipice. The Commander-in-Chief
questioned if such “mistakes could be made by a fighter pilot, what about a similar
miscalculation by the commander of a missile launch crew?”
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The implications

surrounding the KAL 007 tragedy resulted in Reagan questioning the validity and
likelihood of an accidental nuclear war.
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A little over a month later, on 10 October 1983 – and with KAL 007 still a painful
memory – the President settled in at Camp David to view a copy of ABC’s made-fortelevision movie “The Day After.” The film depicted the daily lives of those living in
Lawrence, Kansas and followed these people as a nuclear exchange between the Soviet
Union and the United States destroyed the town and the surrounding area. Fischer
remarked that “The Day After” was most certainly was not the first film to illustrate a
nuclear holocaust – but it was the first to do it in such a graphic nature, as well as
95

providing it in an anecdotal form which allowed for familiarity with the townspeople.

The Washington Post described the film as a “horrific vision of [a] nuclear holocaust.”
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Others felt that the movie was making much too big of an advertising and political
statement. The Campaign Against Nuclear War, a group based in the nation’s capital,
was pleased to feel that ABC was “doing a $7 million advertising job” for the group’s
contentious issue. Representative Edward T. Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat, firmly
believed that the movie was bound to be “the most powerful television program in
history.”
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The film creators’ political stance was not difficult to find as the end of the

movie provided a printed message, white on a black background, that read: “It is hoped
that the images of this film will inspire the nations of this earth, their people and leaders,
to find the means to avert the fateful day.”
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The movie did, indeed, inspire such hope.

Fischer, 115.
Peter Perl, “’The Day After’: Nation Girds for Firestorm,” Washington Post, 20 November 1983.
John Corry, “’The Day After’: TV as Rallying Force,” The New York Times, 20 November 1983.

Ibid. Corry made the argument in his article that the “word ‘means’ is a code. The movie has
conditioned us to accept disarmament, or, at least, to call for a nuclear freeze.”
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Shortly after the first national broadcast took place on 20 November 1983, “hundreds of
citizens” of Lawrence itself “conducted a candlelight vigil after the broadcast, gathering
outdoors beneath a full moon on a crisp night to hear local leaders plead for nuclear
disarmament.”
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The film certainly would have affected Reagan regardless. But, with his recent
thoughts about how an accident could cause a nuclear holocaust – much like an accident
caused KAL 007 – the President was doubly inflicted by the film, writing:
In the morning at Camp D[avid]. I ran the tape of the movie ABC is
running Nov. 20. It’s called “The Day After” in which Lawrence, Kansas
is wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done, all $7
million worth. It’s very effective and left me greatly depressed. So far
they haven’t sold any of the 25 ads scheduled and I can see why … my
own reaction: we have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there
100

is never a nuclear war.”

In the movie, Reagan witnessed, “in agonizing and explicit detail the effects” of a nuclear
attack.
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He viewed citizen of Lawrence, Kansas being “vaporized or burned alive by

the firestorm on screen” including one woman looking down “to see her legs engulfed in
flames that quickly consume the rest of her.” Further, the movie depicted the “ravages of
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radiation sickness from nuclear fallout” with the end result being “virtually everybody in
the movie” either dying or clearly going to die.

102

Reagan used the movie to argue against those in the Pentagon who “claimed a
nuclear war was winnable.” In short, Reagan felt those members of the administration
were “crazy.” Reagan again declared that the world was on a nuclear precipice.

103

The

American Broadcasting Company (ABC) provided the Reagan administration the
opportunity to speak to the nation directly after the movie. Secretary of State Schultz
explained that the film was a “vivid and dramatic portrayal of the fact that nuclear war is
simply not acceptable” and that the administration was very much focused on getting
President Reagan and Soviet leaders together for talks aimed at reducing nuclear arms to
ensure that such a devastating nuclear event never occurred.
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However, the KAL 007 incident clearly did not involve nuclear weapons – it
merely invoked a fear in Reagan concerning “what could be.” As well, “The Day After”
was a fictional depiction of a nuclear holocaust. However, in early November of 1983,
the Reagan administration endured the most significant threat of an all-out nuclear war
since the Cuban Missile Crisis. It completed the chain of events that ultimately led
Reagan to soften his bellicose approach to American-Soviet relations and, thus, to a
foreign policy-shifting speech that announced a search for rapprochement with the
Kremlin.
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On 8 November 1983, Yuri Andropov – then still the director of the KGB – sent
urgent cables to his agents in Western Europe. The purpose of the message was to
inform the agents in the region that their KGB colleagues responsible for monitoring
American military bases in Germany reported U.S. armed forces being placed on high
alert. This occurred on the heels of Andropov believing military movement between the
United States and its NATO allies codenamed “Able Archer 83” was the first sign of an
imminent first nuclear strike from the American government. The KGB chief’s beliefs
were highly misplaced, though one cannot fault his assumptions. In actuality, “Able
Archer 83” was nothing more than a large-scale military exercise designed to simulate
the command and communication procedures if the Soviet Union instigated a nuclear
105

war.

The Kremlin viewed it, however, as the United States obscuring Western

preparations for a first strike. The size of the operation shocked the Soviet Union; it
stretched from Norway to Turkey and westward to the Atlantic.

106

The American administration was aware that the exercise could push the
limits of an already tense relationship with the Soviet Union. It was noted that:
The original plan for the 1983 exercise called for Weinberger [the U.S.
secretary of defense], members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supreme
commander of NATO, and, in its very first discussion stages, even
[President] Reagan and [Vice President George] Bush, to participate in
this sophisticated test of nuclear attack procedures. According to Robert
McFarlane, who had succeeded William Clark two weeks earlier as the
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Fischer, 123.
Ibid, 128.
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White House national security advisor, this part of the “war game” was
scaled down and most of the top-ranking civilian and military officials
were taken out of the exercise because of concern about the high state of
Soviet nervousness. Nevertheless, the exercise was still more realistic
than in the past.
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Soviet leaders faced a critical decision: they could either wait for the United
States to launch its missile and then immediately respond with their own launch or,
conversely, the Soviets could make a preemptive strike based on the assumption that
“Able Archer’s” movements predicated a planned American launch. Moscow responded
by “upgrading the alert status of twelve of its nuclear-capable fighter aircraft and by
ordering Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland to prepare for a retaliatory nuclear
strike.”

108

The Soviet Union decided to wait until a Western launch before retaliating.

“Able Archer 83” officially concluded on 11 November and, thus, so did “the most
109

dangerous moment that the world lived through since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

The Soviet response to “Able Archer 83” shook Reagan, who called it a “nuclear
near miss.”

110

As well, the President was still reeling from his viewing of “The Day

After” and the Soviet actions in the KAL 007 incident. Put together, the events and the
“genuine anxiety” Reagan felt regarding how a simple miscommunication – a
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misunderstanding from either side – could result in all-out nuclear war caused the
President to reevaluate his approach to not only superpower relations, but also the very
basis of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. His hardline stance on the
Soviet Union was the root of the Kremlin’s mistrust; it was this mistrust that caused
“Able Archer 83” to bring the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. There was a
palpable chasm of misunderstanding and miscommunication between the two world
superpowers; it was this misunderstanding and miscommunication that assisted in the
loss of 269 souls abroad KAL 007. Lastly, Reagan’s ghastly visions of a nuclear winter
descending upon his United States of America shook him to the core. The speech
111

introduced “striking changes to U.S. policy”

and, at face value, portrayed Reagan as a

President poised to charter a new course on American-Soviet relations built upon a
foundation of “cooperation and understanding.”

112

3.6 Reagan’s 16 January 1984 Speech
On 16 January 1984 at ten in the morning, President Reagan spoke to the world
from the East Room of the White House. The purpose of the speech was to introduce
striking changes in American policy towards the Soviet Union as deemed necessary by
the President after the events of the preceding months. In a change of operating standards
within the administration, Soviet experts rather than Reagan’s regular speechwriters
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largely wrote the speech.

113

As well, the Reagan administration went through the

procedure of notifying world leaders of the contents and scope of the speech before the
live television address. For example, three days before giving the speech, Reagan wrote
to Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, to inform that the 16 January
speech would “reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and
realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable
long-term relationship.” Reagan assured the Prime Minister that the speech would make
114

“clear” his “sincere desire to improve East-West relations.”

Even as various world leaders received the letter providing a forewarning of the
address, the Reagan administration was internally debating the context and specific
composition of the speech itself. Approximately a week before the speech was to be
delivered, Donald Fortier – who served as Reagan’s Deputy Assistant to the President
with responsibility for policy development

115

– worried that the speech conveyed a sense

of reassurance to the Soviet Union, but did so in “a rather simple way.” Fortier urged
Robert McFarlane – the recipient of his analysis – to aid the President in forming a
speech that impressed both domestic and foreign audiences with its “thoughtfulness,”
while avoiding the impression that the speech was aimed towards an “electoral
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Ronald Reagan to Robert Muldoon, January 13, 1983, folder “Presidential Address, US-Soviet
Relations – Background,” box 32, John Matlock Files, RRL.
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Fortier served in this capacity under the auspices of the National Security Council.

108
116

audience.”

Fortier also felt that speech lacked detailed explanations of what both

countries were required to do to “seize the opportunities” of peace and compromise and,
by changing the speech from “goal” oriented to “tasks” oriented, a entirely different –
more direct – message would be sent to both the Soviet Union and the world at large.

117

Reagan’s speech focused on what the United States and the Soviet Union had in
common; the administration felt that, for far too long, the Cold War was waged only
because of a fundamental understanding in the vast differences between the two
countries. The President insisted, “neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies and our two philosophies. But we should always
remember that we do have common interests.”

118

Most important among these common

interests, Reagan believed, was peace. Reagan continued, arguing, “reducing the risk of
war – and especially nuclear war – is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well
be mankind’s last.” The President spoke of the “dangerous misunderstandings” between
the two countries – most recently evident in Soviet panic over “Able Archer 83” – and
argued that the “gap in Soviet and American perceptions” of each other’s actions greatly
increased the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. Reagan no longer viewed Soviet
expansionism and military strength as the greatest threat to East-West relations; it was
now war. Because of this, the American government sought “cooperation and
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understanding.” Reagan continued, “We must establish a better working relationship.
One marked by greater cooperation and understanding. [We should] rise to the challenges
facing us and seize opportunities for peace.”
Two of Reagan’s three strategies for realizing cooperation and understanding with
the Soviet Union later played a monumental part in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics
becoming intertwined with the administration’s foreign policy.

119

Reagan first declared

an immediate need for improved dialogue between the two superpowers, insisting “we
must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as constructive as possible,” and that, “we
seek genuine cooperation, [and] cooperation begins with communication.” Further,
Reagan made the case that “the fact that neither of us like the other’s system is no reason
not to talk.” Second, Reagan sought any measures that could build confidence between
the two countries.

120

Reagan’s fellow Republicans largely praised the speech while it was widely
panned by the Democratic Party – especially those seeking the Democratic nomination
for the approaching Presidential election. George McGovern, a Democratic presidential
candidate, declared, “Reagan is a good television performer, but a television production
is not a good substitute for sound foreign policy.” Senator Christopher Dodd, a Democrat
from Connecticut, felt that the timing of the speech was peculiar, arguing, “coming as it
did at the opening of the Presidential election year, one’s attention is immediately
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The one of least importance to the Olympic was Reagan’s call for an increased emphasis on reducing
the amount of nuclear arms maintained by each country.
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diverted from the substance of the speech to its political background noise.” On the other
side of the aisle, Republicans declared the speech flawless in its “balance between
sounding conciliatory and challenging.” Further, Republican Melvin Price of Illinois
boasted Reagan’s remarks as a “great speech that touched on the main thing that people
121

are thinking about.”

As well, the international community welcomed Reagan’s change

of stance. For example, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada remarked “there does
seem to be a different tone coming out of Washington,” and “[we certainly] welcome the
commitment that President Reagan made in his speech … a commitment to genuine
dialogue between East and West … this is welcome news, and we really hope the Soviet
Union responds in kind.”

122

Early indications from the Kremlin provided little hope for the Prime Minister’s
desire that the Soviet Union respond “in kind.” Roughly four hours after Reagan’s
speech, the Kremlin dismissed it as “propaganda,” maintaining that, “behind the
loquacious rhetoric about adherence to limiting the arms race and love of peace, was, in
effect, the known position of the United States administration. The whole speech is
keynoted by the thesis about the need for the United States to build up its strength. All
this shows that there is no indication of any positive changes in the Reagan
administration’s approach to the solution of problems of limiting and reducing arms, first
of all nuclear ones.” Believing the speech to be nothing more than election year
posturing by the American Chief, the Kremlin noted, “we are not giving up on the
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Reagan administration … we are dealing with things that are not possible to wave
123

away.”

The speech was a clear detour from President Reagan’s earlier harsh and
unforgiving stance against the Soviet Union and the communist world. While Reagan
portrayed his belief that a pragmatic shift in relations was needed to secure the world
from nuclear disaster, the Soviets believed the speech to be nothing more than Reagan
attempting to win over moderate-to-conservative Americans frightened by Reagan’s
fanatical views on Cold War policy. As well, the ongoing planning and organizing of the
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games stood as another anomaly to Reagan’s
previous approach to the Soviet Union.
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Chapter 4 – A Red Carpet for the Soviets
“I have seen what men can do for each other and to each other. I’ve seen
war and peace, feast and famine, depression and prosperity, sickness and
health. I’ve seen the depth of suffering and the peaks of triumph. And I
know in my heart that man is good; that what is right will always
eventually triumph; and that there is purpose and worth to each and every
1
life.”
4.1 Reagan and the Olympics
Ronald Reagan was no stranger to the mingling of sport and politics prior to the
buildup of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Indeed, during the battle for the
presidency in 1980, Reagan often used President Jimmy Carter’s decision to boycott the
1980 Moscow Olympics as an example to magnify Carter’s weak understanding of
international politics and mishandling of a policy-shifting epoch. However, Carter was
quick to discern that Reagan was a staunch supporter of the boycott effort prior to
utilizing it as campaign ammunition to lure voters to the Republican ticket. In his 1980
Presidential nomination speech, Carter remarked:
When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, we moved quickly to take
action. I suspended some grain sales to the Soviet Union; I called for the
draft registration and I joined wholeheartedly with the Congress and with
the U.S. Olympic Committee and led more than 60 other nations in
2

boycotting the big propaganda show in Russia – the Moscow Olympics.

1

An excerpt from Ronald Reagan’s 4 November 1991 speech at the dedication of his Presidential Library
and Museum. For the entirety of the speech see, Peter Hannaford and Charles Dobbs, Remembering
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California.
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Carter then publically addressed Reagan’s “flip-flopping” on the Olympic matter,
concluding that:
The Republican leader [Reagan] opposed two of these forceful but
peaceful actions, and he waffled on the third. But when we asked him
what he would do about aggression in Southwest Asia, he suggested
blockading Cuba. Even his running mate wouldn’t go along with that. He
doesn’t seem to know what to do with the Russians. He’s not sure if he
3

wants to feed them or play with them or fight with them.

Carter’s accusations were not far-fetched. It was noted that on 8 April 1980, Reagan
informed the American Society of Newspaper Editors that he “could not bring himself to
support a government order to a private citizen not to travel abroad.” Two days later,
Reagan reversed himself. At a news conference in Pittsburgh, Reagan announced that “I
support the boycott today, I supported it yesterday and I supported it when the President
4

first called it.” In defense of his wavering, Reagan expressed sympathy for the athletes
who would be harmed by Carter’s executive decision, saying he found himself “worrying
5

about the young people who’ve worked so hard, who’ve trained hard.” In a separate
interview, Reagan insisted that he could leave the attendance issue “to the athletes
themselves” and that he did not “believe our government should be in the position of
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114

saying you can’t have a visa, you can’t leave the country or go. There’s something about
our government telling our people that can’t leave our shores that I can’t buy.”

6

During his own Presidency, Reagan faced a time of change within the Soviet
Union. Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1964, suffered a fatal heart attack on 10
November 1982. As the Communist leader, Brezhnev was largely favorable to the
Western world. He is partly credited with the advent of détente. As well, he generally
improved East-West relations through the inclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the
Helsinki Accords, and the installation of a direct telephone line between the White House
and the Kremlin. Brezhnev’s passing would not be the last Soviet leadership death in the
lead-up to the 1984 Olympic Games. Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov, the General
Secretary of the Central Committee from 12 November 1981 succumbed to total renal
failure on 9 February 1984.
The election of Andropov shortly after Brezhnev’s death was cause for concern in
the West as Andropov was the first KGB agent to ascend to the leadership of the
Communist world. His ruthlessness against those who dissented was legendary. He was
calculating and in complete control. Alexander Yakovlev – later an advisor to Mikhail
Gorbachev – felt that, out of all the Communist leaders, “Andropov was the most

6

Ibid. The original publication was in the 1 April 1980 edition of The Washington Post. Reagan also
made it clear that the United States – and Carter – needed other countries to participate in the boycott.
Reagan felt that “if just one country doesn’t show up, I think the Soviet propaganda machine probably
grinds out something like the United States didn’t come because they were afraid of getting beaten.”
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dangerous … simply because he was smarter than the rest.” In the West, Andropov’s
legacy was largely that of planning the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and as the man
8

who “substituted the KGB for the Communist party in governing the Soviet Union.”

It was ultimately Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov’s successor, who parlayed
with the Reagan administration and the LAOOC in the Olympic boycott mêlée after
Reagan’s change of heart towards the Communist world. Serving from 13 February 1984
until his death on 10 March 1985, Chernenko allowed for the continued escalation of the
9

Cold War after the rapid evaporation of détente during the Andropov years. Reagan’s
four years in office saw three Soviet leaders die in office. Reagan’s belief that all three
were “tough, old-line Communists addicted to Lenin’s secular religion of expansionism
and world domination” made any potentially progressive talks difficult. When pressed
on not yet visiting or hosting a Soviet leader in 1984, Reagan quipped: “How am I
10

supposed to get anyplace with Russians if they keep dying on me?”

Nevertheless, the leadership of the Soviet Union continuously in flux with the
deaths of its leaders, the Reagan administration continued to seek ways to improve USSoviet relations. In early 1983 – shortly after Reagan’s substantial foreign policy speech
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in January – Secretary of State George Shultz substantiated to Reagan that “bilateral
dialogue with the Soviets” maintained an ever-increasing importance in the nation’s
“overall strategy.”

11

There was reason to hope, Shultz felt, for a “more stable” US-Soviet

relationship because the foundation was beginning to develop.

12

Indeed, even as Shultz

wrote his recommendations to Reagan, several bilateral agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union were already agreed to or being considered. In February of
1983, the two countries agreed on Pacific maritime boundaries as well as regulating the
Law of the Sea in respect to deep seabed mining. As well, the Soviet Union and the
United States agreed on the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York City, and
13

several agreements on cooperation in the field of energy.

Cultural exchanges – especially after Stalin’s death in 1953 – continued to be an
initiative welcomed by both countries. The leadership of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s
death crafted a program of cultural exchanges that saw a stream of Soviets artists,
athletes, musicians, and dancers visit and perform in the West. An official agreement on
cultural exchanges between the two countries was reached in December 1957.
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Following the official agreement came even further cultural exchanges: students,
14

teachers, movies, and television programs.

The ongoing cultural exchanges between

the Soviet Union and the United States came to an abrupt halt on 1 September 1983 when
the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007 over the USSR’s Sakhalin Island. Shortly after, a
planned Soviet basketball tour against seven American colleges was cancelled when all
seven institutions vehemently argued against competing with the Soviets.

15

Bill Wall,

the President of the United States Amateur Basketball Association, stated that despite
believing that politics had no place in sport, there “was no option other than calling off
the series because of the outrage and demand of the U.S. public.” Further, the LAOOC
announced that the Soviet Union decided against sending its team to the pre-Olympic
rowing and canoeing competition to be held in the United States just a few weeks later
16

“due to [the] existing conditions.”

The end of the exchanges floored the United States

Olympic Committee’s Executive Director Donald Miller, who remarked, “It’s a sorry
state of affairs that we do not have men with enough intellect to develop a foreign policy
with some meat in it, but go back to the same thing again and again. Isn’t there more to
17

our foreign policy than amateur sports?”
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Despite the savagery of the incident, the Reagan administration eventually
realized it to be an excellent opportunity to display the President’s new willingness to
reach compromise and diplomacy with the Soviet Union. But first, the administration
faced a monumental struggle in appeasing American thirst for a swift and tactical
response to the Soviet action.

4.2 The Olympics and KAL 007
The Soviets made their specific requests in turn for their guaranteed attendance at
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games prior to the KAL 007 incident – that is, the right
for Aeroflot flights to land at Los Angeles International Airport and to stop at Cuba en
route, the docking of a Soviet vessel at Long Beach Harbor, and an unprecedented
amount of security at the Olympics.

18

Even in early 1983, Peter Ueberroth – the

President of the LAOOC – claimed to believe that the Soviets would be in attendance
“without question.”

19

The Soviets generally muted their criticism of Los Angeles’ smog,

crime, costs, and lack of transport. There was no reason to believe that the Kremlin’s
bellicose statements regarding American society – and Los Angeles’ Olympics planning
in general – were anything more than the usual Cold War posturing.
Amid these easing tensions Ueberroth attended Spartakiad – an enormous Soviet
domestic sporting festival – in the summer of 1983.

20

Ueberroth, and the entire
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The first Spartakiad was held in 1923 within the ranks of the Soviet’s Red Army.
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International Olympic Committee, were largely pleased with the proceedings – especially
the Soviet agreement to sign a $3 million contract for television coverage of the
upcoming Summer Olympic Games. With the threat of a Soviet retaliatory boycott an
ever-present source of discussion, Ueberroth confirmed that he and Soviet sport leaders
“discussed everything from transportation to security, to officials, to housing, to every
part of the Games. We are proceeding to work close together for a solution of problems.
To my knowledge, there is no official request from the Soviet organizing committee that
has not yet been met.”

21

As well, Ueberroth suggested that a boycott of the 1984

Olympic Games was not going to happen, after discussing it “in a sense” with the Soviet
leaders. He explained that both involved groups agreed, “The 1980 U.S. boycott of the
22

Moscow Olympics was an incorrect political tool that was improper.”

Marat Gramov, the leader of the Soviet’s State Sports Committee, was less
conciliatory in his remarks regarding the potential of a Soviet Olympic boycott, stating:
Los Angeles has many problems. We are concerned mainly about three
things – security, transportation and the small number of foreign referees.
Los Angeles decided not to spend money to bring referees from other
countries. We are worried about that. In America, to win the Olympics is
a national priority, even if by foul means. The problem of the referees
23

sharpens the problem.
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The Moscow government’s daily Izvestia portrayed for Moscow readers that Los Angeles
24

was a city “plagued by murders and deadly smog”

– this despite Kremlin trepidations

being alleviated. There also existed substantial concern over the LAOOC’s ability to
provide adequate facilities for the athletes. For instance, Soviet leaders proclaimed that
the promises from the LAOOC were “clearly just a smokescreen of promises and
assurances.” It was argued that the gymnasts performing at the Olympics “have no
tunnel to walk through … but would have to walk several hundred yards under the open
25

sky” both before and after their routines.

The Soviets also complained about the commercialization of the Olympic Games.
It was felt that the LAOOC was “perverting the Olympic ideals” and that “American big
business [had] seized control of the Games.” This was no better symbolized, the Soviets
argued, then by the control of the Los Angeles Olympics by “millionaire Peter
26

Ueberroth.”

The Soviets still brought forth more concerns. In mid-June of 1982, Sergi

Pavlov – the chair of the Soviet National Olympic Committee – claimed that the Reagan
administration had not yet “given written guarantee that the Olympic Charter” would be
27

obeyed during the Los Angeles Olympics.

24
25

Pavlov continued that Soviet participation
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was only possible on the condition that “the necessary guarantee[s] are not only provided
by the U.S. government but also undeviatingly observed.”

28

The quarantine of Soviet visitors in America also bothered the Kremlin. Many
places in America were off limits to any visiting communist. Disneyland, for example,
was location non grata to those visitors from the Eastern Bloc. It was noted by the
Soviets that “only Rhode Island is wide open.”

29

Soviet complaints were largely

unsubstantiated as three years of work was already completed by the United States
Department of State by the time the Kremlin voiced its displeasure to the media about
further constraints on Soviet travel within the country. This point of contention from the
Soviets was incongruous, as the Kremlin was well aware of the work being done to lessen
travel restrictions. In an undated letter,

30

the US Department of State explained:

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel
restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After attempts to secure the abolition
of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States
reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on
January 3, 1955. Since then, the United States has on many occasions
proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. The

28

Ibid. The phrase “undeviatingly observed” is likely a request by the Soviets for the Americans to jail
any dissidents during and prior to the Olympic Games.
29
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The draft of the letter was written in late 1980. It can be assumed that the Kremlin received the letter by
the New Year.
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United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish
31

or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.

The map of closed areas had not been revised since 1967, and there had been “substantial
changes in the areas which” the American government wished to provide “access to [for]
32

Soviet travelers.”
Affairs

33

The work of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet

was a response met to “match the reductions in percentage of closed territory

made by the Soviets in 1978.”

34

Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, the United States

wished to “emphasize again that its firm preference [was] to abolish all restrictions on
free travel, and repeat its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any
proposal to this end.”

35

The United States followed through with its desire. In a 25

November 1982 telex to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, Serguei
Pavlov – the President of the USSR Olympic Committee – wanted further information
36

“regarding [the] restriction of Soviet tourists wishing to attend [the] 1984 Games.”

The

Department of State informed William Hussey, the Director of International Relations for
the LAOOC, that the “[United States government has no plans or intentions of imposing
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a quota on Soviet tourism during the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. Standard visa
application and review procedures for Soviet nationals will be in effect.”

37

The Soviets were not the only one hurling complaints and accusations. Los
Angeles police chief Daryl Gates released an “unvarnished” report “alleging the
existence of a Soviet plot to disrupt the 1984 [G]ames with criminals and terrorists
38

disguised as Russian Jewish immigrants.

Specifically, the report authored by the Los

Angeles Police Department suggested:
Due to the advanced state of forensic psychology and psychiatry in the
Soviet Union, many knowledgeable people are of the opinion that the
Soviets are selecting dangerous criminals and sending them to the United
States as refugees via the Jewish Immigration Quota … Intelligence agents
39

and spies are infiltrating in the same way.

The Jewish community responded with swift and harsh criticism of the police chief.
Peter Ueberroth lambasted Gates for expressing an unfounded concerned that could cause
“a whole damper [to fall] on our committee’s relations with the Soviets.”

40

International Olympic President Juan Antonio Samaranch came to the defense of
the LAOOC three days after Gramov’s remarks. Samaranch assured the New York Times
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“I know Soviet Union, and I know sports in this country, and I know the word boycott
41

does not exist in this country.”

Of all the remarks made, the most questionable was that

of Ueberroth declaring that not one Soviet request had gone unmet. To this point, it was
simply not true. The federal government had not yet approved Soviet flights. The local
port authority had not yet received approval to allow a Soviet vessel to dock at Long
Beach Harbor. And, finally, the funding for unprecedented security had not yet been
secured – nor the manpower – from either the state or federal government. The downing
of KAL 007 made meeting those tasks even more difficult. If Reagan was indeed set on
bettering relations with the Soviet Union as outlined in his 16 January speech, the
proceeding months of Olympic planning would test his personal and his administration’s
resolve.
Only hours after the attack on KAL 007 took place, Reagan received a memo on
official White House letterhead signed by “Jus.” Calling the President by his first name,
the colleague wrote:
This is no time for sanctions; no way you can get even on this dastardly
act. Let the act itself stand as the punishment. Make use of this tragic
incident, it substantiates everything you have been saying all these years
about the Russians – that they are bastards and sons of bitches not to be
trusted, and that we must increase our military strength or they will
42

continue such reckless abuses.
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All told, by noon on 2 September – less than 24 hours after the KAL 007 incident – the
White House received 1,900 telephone calls, and 1,800 telegrams and mailgrams.

43

Anne Higgins, serving as the Director of Reagan’s Office of Correspondence, was
responsible for organizing the incoming calls and letters and passing along the most
pressing to the President. The first telegram she presented to the President grasped the
solemnity of the matter immediately. The telegram, written by the parents of Irene
Steckler – a passenger aboard KAL 007 – argued that the deaths of Steckler, and her
husband Stuart, “were the result of the Soviet Union violating every concept of human
rights” and that it was “an act of murder that cannot remain unpunished.” A swift and
firm response to the Soviets was not an act of personnel revenge for the distraught
parents. Rather, they asked that Reagan’s reaction “deter the Soviet Union from further
committing such wanton murder.”

44

Another prominent telegram was received from John Noble of Muncy,
Pennsylvania. Noble began with no pleasantries to the President, starting, “ … having
been a prisoner of the Soviets for 10 years, I want to encourage you to take the firmest
possible stand against the Soviets for their latest act of inhumanity in shooting down a
civilian airliner.”

45

Remembering his experience as a Soviet prisoner, Noble insisted to
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Reagan that “only the strongest retaliation will be understood by the Godless
46

communists.”

Not all American citizens called for the “strongest retaliation” possible from
Reagan. Some calmly asked the President how he could “justify selling grain to
murdering Russians” and that the United States could not “sit back silently for the sake of
47

foreign exchange.”

Others upset by the American government providing grain to the

Soviets insisted that they would be willing to “pay $4 for a loaf of bread” if the grain deal
48

came to a screeching halt and further retaliation fell upon the Soviet Union.

Others

provided an even further detailed analysis of how Reagan should react to the Soviet’s
actions. Douglas and Cathy Albrecht insisted that Reagan close all “Aeroflot offices in
the U.S.” and expel all “Soviet personnel” and cancel all “Aeroflot landing rights under
49

the U.S. jurisdiction” with the caveat of permitting declared emergency landings.

The

suggestions continued. The “immediate revocation” of the “hundreds of licenses issued
to Soviet fishing vessels entitling them to the privilege of fishing within” 200 miles of the

prisoner with mailing privileges.” Douglas Martin, “John Noble, Gulag Survivor, Dies at 84,” The New
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United States was another argument offered.

As well, other potential repercussions

included the “halting [of] U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union … with an eye toward
finding alternative buyers to protect [American] farmers” and to “immediately cancel all
51

U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchanges.”

For the time being, the American government was vastly more concerned about
gathering the facts and creating a plan of action. An official response to the attack on
KAL 007 would come soon enough. Even more troubling for the administration was a
history of the same behavior from the Soviets. It was noted by William Clark – one of
Reagan’s national security advisors – that the Soviets maintained a “long history,
beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders” and that they
also maintained a “policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have
52

lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down.”

Clark’s main cause for

concern was an appropriate response to the disaster. He was sure that the “decision to
attack the airliner was made at a very high level” in the Kremlin – it was no accident.
Clark warned “in past cases where the Soviets … committed egregious crimes they and
their apologists … attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the force away from
their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they
53

will try to put us on the defensive.”
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Clark implored the President to reach a response
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that signified “meaningful actions without making it appear that we [the United States]
54

are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself.”

Only hours after the incident occurred, Secretary of State Shultz supplied
President Reagan with a list of diplomatic responses the American government was
already implementing. Shultz explained to Reagan that the “U.S. response must involve
both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a
55

strong international response.”

Despite there being several “gaps in knowledge of the

events leading up to the attack,” Shultz informed Reagan that the American government
had already dictated to the Kremlin that it was ending any future discussion on the
“planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in transportation.”

56

However, it was a specific “initiative” that Shultz suggested that would prove to have
grave implications for the LAOOC’s planning process, as well as providing President
Reagan with the opportunity to deal “in good faith” with the Soviet Union as his new
foreign policy dictated. Shultz further informed Reagan:
We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international
action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot
international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet
Union. For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country
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agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flights plans for a specified period.
We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to
be done in bilateral consultations with other nations. In this connection,
we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet
attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots
Association.

57

The Soviet side of the story was vastly different than the American version.
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko provided to the State Department the Soviet
explanation of KAL 007. Gromyko stated that the “plane did not have navigation lights,
did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the radio control service.”

58

As well, Gromyko insisted that the jets of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Defense system “tried
to give … assistance in directing [KAL 007] to the nearest airfield … but the intruder
plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its
59

flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan.”

The story as told by TASS to the Soviet people altered widely from the American
perspective as well. The news service claimed that the “frantic anti-Soviet hysteria
around the disappearance of the South Korean aircraft that carried out a provocative
flight over Soviet territory … is taking on increasingly unbridled and coarse forms.”
Further, TASS insisted:
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The coordinated and deliberate character of both the provocative flight
itself and the broad anti-Soviet campaign subsequently unleashed by the
U.S. administration is worthy of attention. It is evident that the ‘incident’
was prepared in advance and that – judging by what followed – it was
expected. It is also indicative that the first report about the disappearance
60

of the aircraft came from the CIA.

The Soviets also complained bitterly about the Reagan administration’s “crusade against
Socialism” and its clearly “calculated” attempts to “raise a new wave of anti-Sovietism
and anti-Communism by any means and discredit the Soviet Union.” The Soviets
61

considered it nothing short of American “propaganda.”

Indeed, American media

coverage of the KAL 007 incident was, in some aspects, sensationalist. Time Magazine,
for example, portrayed on its 12 September 1983 cover three Soviet fighters exploding
the passenger aircraft in midair. The actual attack was less brutal, though no less
terrifying. The investigation into KAL 007 concluded that after the missile exploded on
KAL 007, the passengers had upwards of 12 minutes to don oxygen masks before impact
62

into the ocean. They were conscious throughout the ordeal.
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Figure 4.1 - Time Magazine’s depiction of three Soviet fighters
shooting down KAL 007 was a prime example of “American
propaganda” that the Kremlin was upset about. The cover is part of
the Smithsonian Institute’s digital collections.
The Soviet response was an angry retort focused on answering Reagan’s
comments made earlier the same day. The President sat before the cameras for a national
television office at nine in the morning, censuring the Soviets for not admitting to the
atrocity:
But despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it,
and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the
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truth. They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the
Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told the Russian people that a
plane was shot down. The Soviet Government calls the whole thing an
accident. I call it murder. Let me repeat the stark words of the Soviet
pilot himself after signaling that his missile warheads were locked on the
airliner: ‘I have executed the launch. The target is destroyed. I am
breaking off attack.’

63

The shooting down of KAL 007 was just one piece of the puzzle that shifted
Reagan’s beliefs on how to shape foreign policy with the Soviet Union. In just over a
month from his address on KAL 007, Reagan had a private viewing of the apocalyptic
“The Day After.” The nuclear scare as a result of ‘Able Archer 83’ was still two months
away. But, even in the first week of September 1983, Reagan’s address hinted at the
possibility of a more reconciliatory approach to the Soviet Union. Near the end of his
address, Reagan made the plea that:
Realism and strength are essential. But, if we are to succeed in our longterm effort to bring the Soviets into the world community of nations, we
must also talk to them. We must tell them what the world expects from
them: The world expects their cooperation in building a safer place to
64

live.

63

Presidential Television Address: Flight 007, 5 September 1983, folder “KAL (2),” Box 28, Jack Matlock
Files, RRL. Reagan made generous use of historical presidencies in his address. Speaking of
understanding who the Soviets truly were, Reagan urged the country to “steadfastly gird ourselves for what
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But like Americans who began this country and brought forth this last, best hope of mankind, history has
asked much of the Americans of our own time. Much we have already given. Much more we must be
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The Kremlin’s further response to Reagan’s television appearance was no less
hostile, calling it an “aggressive, hateful speech and that, again, any United States’ proof
was “just another fabrication.”

65

More damaging to the Los Angeles Olympics than

Reagan rhetoric was the President’s swift and decisive action against the Soviet Union
and Aeroflot. In his speech, Reagan noted that his administration was “suspending
negotiations on several bilateral agreements” that were under consideration prior to the
incident.

66

Reagan’s actions were even more severe than those the speech outlined. In a
personal letter to the Civil Aeronautics Board, Reagan wrote:
The Soviet attack on Korean Air Line Flight 7 on Sept. 1, 1983, which
results in the loss of 269 innocent lives, calls for a united, firm, and
measured response from the international community. Toward this end, I
have initiated a number of measures in coordination with other nations …
to insure that measures are taken against the Soviet Union to secure
appropriate redress for this tragic loss of lives and property. I … have
determined that it is in the essential foreign policy interest of the United
States to take resolute action against the Soviet air carrier Aeroflot. I have
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Olympics. Regardless, the suspension of future agreements was an issue of serious concern for the
LAOOC.
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determined that it would be appropriate to reaffirm the suspension of
67

Aeroflot flights to and from the United States.

Rather than simply restricting Soviet airlines from entering American airspace, the
President opted to forbid U.S. carriers from booking connecting flights with Aeroflot –
even those away from American soil – and to sever any and all ties with the Soviet
company. Further, Reagan ordered the closing of Aeroflot offices in both New York and
Washington, D.C. and stipulated that the Soviet employees of both offices be expelled
from the country.

68

White House spokesperson Larry Speakes announced that the

President planned to continue enforcing the sanctions “for a period of time, in part
dependent upon the extent to which the U.S.S.R. demonstrates its willingness to honor
essential standards of civil aviation, makes a full account of the downing of the airliner,
and issues an apology as well as compensation to aggrieved parties.”

69

The barring of Soviet aircraft from American airspace raised other issues. For
instance, nearly a year before the KAL 007 incident, the Los Angeles Organizing
Committee reached a deal with the East German airline Interflug to fly a Berlin-GanerLos Angeles route to transport athletes and cargo. Further, the security for the flights was
to be provided by both the LAOOC and the regional Airport Authority. Questions were
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sure to proliferate about the legality of other communists controlled countries landing
their aircraft at Los Angeles International for the Olympics.

70

Outrage over the Soviets’ action drew public response from America’s allied
countries. In England, the Times of London newspaper noted “public revulsion” over the
Soviets. The Daily Mail dubbed it nothing short of a “massacre in the sky.” Paris
television made KAL 007 the lead story. The disaster dominated the main newspaper
headlines for several days. Quotidien de Paris ran the headline “USSR Owes
Explanation to the World.” Rome’s Il Tempo called the incident “a deliberate mass
murder.” Oslo’s Dagbladet considered it “coldblooded murder.”

71

The French

government wished to “study Reagan’s proposals” and opted to “see what might emerge
from” the scenario. As well, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe said it was
important “for humanity to find a way of responding which will prevent such a thing
from ever happening again,” but deferred any discussion on whether London would halt
Aeroflot flights and argued that any such treatment should be “taken collectively, not just
72

on the basis of one nation’s decision.”

Reagan’s resolution on Aeroflot operations in the United States clearly obstructed
the preparations being completed by the LAOOC. In a 9 December 1983 memorandum,
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Richard Levine – a member of Reagan’s National Security Council – wrote that because
of the “President’s KAL decision” all “Soviet proposals” regarding Aeroflot flights and
vessels in Long Beach Harbor were to be rejected by both the State Department and
73

“other concerned agencies.”

Shortly after Reagan’s decision, the Soviets attempted to circumvent the
American government entirely. Soviet requests for special Aeroflot flights to the United
States and the berthing of a ship were forwarded directly to the LAOOC. The LAOOC
then forwarded the request on to the White House. In effect, the LAOOC was acting as a
middleman for the Soviets. Kenneth Hill – the Federal Security Coordinator for the 1984
Olympics – wrote to Reagan’s Chief of Staff to express concern over the issue:
Several officers at State have expressed skepticism with the proposed
procedure of having these requests filtered through the LAOOC. They
were not objecting to the fact that you would be making the final decision,
only that the interjection of the LAOOC circumvents normal established
procedures. They correctly indicated that the LAOOC would be, in effect,
a broker for the Soviets and would not necessarily have the best interests
of the U.S. Government at heart. The concern the LAOOC has over
whether the U.S.S.R. will boycott or not, manifests itself in their doing
everything possible to placate the Soviets. Consequently, one must remain
wary of the LAOOC’s motives.
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USSR (2),” Box 30, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.
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In a 23 December 1983

memorandum to Michael K. Deaver – Reagan’s

Deputy Chief of Staff and the official White House Liaison to the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympics – it was noted that “Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the
US Government.” Further, Derwinski was greatly concerned that the Soviets were
attempting to bypass Reagan’s stance on Aeroflot flights as a result of KAL 007 by
seeking to get “clearance” directly from the LAOOC.

76

To that end, Derwinski wished

for Deaver to inform the LAOOC that “the [State] Department” would “accept only those
Soviet … requests that are submitted in these official channels” and that it would “not
accept requests submitted through the LAOOC.” Finally, Derwinski wanted to inform
the LAOOC that such requests were “properly government-to-government matters” and
that the Los Angeles group needed to decline any requests to “act as a middleman” for
77

the Soviets.

Deaver’s role in the Reagan administration went much deeper than just being
Deputy Chief of Staff. It is said that Deaver was the “modern-day equivalent of a
courtier to the king.”

78

The Deputy Chief of Staff was small and quiet but maintained an

intense passion for his work and for Reagan, whom he worked for in various capacities
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for nearly twenty years by the time Reagan entered the Oval Office. Deaver “revered
79

Reagan and … drew intense pleasure from working for him.”

After two decades of

serving Reagan’s political needs, Deaver inherently knew what the President valued,
what he wanted, and how he desired to get there. Born on 11 April 1938 in Bakersfield,
California, Deaver had a long association with President Reagan dating back to 1967
when he joined Governor Reagan’s staff as the coordinator of state administrative
activities. Within Reagan’s White House administration, Deaver was considered a
80

“conciliator, a facilitator and a bearer of vital messages to the president.”

That is likely

an understatement for what Deaver really was to the President. One commentator was
more correct in deciphering the relationship, arguing that Deaver was a “shadow, a
surrogate son, a confidante and comforter for the President.”

81

Deaver was an “uncritical

admirer of Reagan” and seemed to operate “without an existence of his own” as if he
82

thought “in terms of Reagan … [not] in terms of Mike Deaver.”

Near the end of the

1980 Presidential campaign, Deaver turned to another campaign worker and informed
how he accomplished a successful relationship with the soon-to-be-President, saying, “I
am Ronald Reagan. Where do you think he got most of those ideas over the years?
Every morning after I get up I make believe I am him and ask what should he do and
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where should he go.”

83

The advice that Deaver doled out became highly valued by the

President. Deaver also had the penultimate blessing of Nancy Reagan, whose opinion of
people President Reagan prized more than anything.

84

After Deaver succumbed to

pancreatic cancer in 2007, the former First Lady recapped that Deaver “was the closest of
friends to both Ronnie and me in many ways, and he was like a son to Ronnie. We met
85

great challenges together.”

Deaver was certainly a man of intense influence as the Soviet Union Olympic
matter began to come to a head. However, other members of the Reagan administration
saw the potential damage that not working with the Soviets could create just as well.
Robert McFarlane, writing directly to the President, stated:
While our intelligence community believes that the Soviets want to
participate, there is a distinct risk that if we fail to suspend our sanction
and some of our normal restrictions on Soviet officials in order to permit
them to support their team on a non-discriminatory basis, they will refuse
to come and charge us with reneging on commitments to deal with
participants on an equal basis. Given the high profile of the Olympics
throughout the world, our decisions have the potential to create a major
public stir if they are seen as unfairly handicapping Soviet participation
86

and thus precipitating a Soviet refusal to attend.
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The issue of allowing Aeroflot flights to enter American airspace for the Olympics was
not the only ailment facing the LAOOC. Indeed, the unfortunate incident did eventually
help lead President Reagan to a friendlier stance towards the Soviets. But that was still
nearly four months away. In the time preceding Reagan’s 1984 January reversal, the
LAOOC and the American government faced challenges from both the Soviets – who
still desired to berth a vessel for the Olympics and from a group named the Ban The
Soviets Coalition. It was this group that led to other difficulties, including the Soviet
demand to place extra financial and manpower emphasis on protecting the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympic Games.

4.3 The Ban The Soviets Coalition (BTSC), The Gruzia, and Olympic Safety
87

In a 16 December 1983 memorandum to Michael McManus, Jay Moorhead

laid

out the scenarios, background, and needs for the White House to fulfill the Soviet
requests. First and foremost, Moorhead asked that the “Soviets requests … be viewed as
consistent with the Olympic Charter” and that “any country making a similar request to
88

the U.S. government … be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.”

Moorhead

also informed McManus that the President’s administration had to understand that any
policy enacted that restricted the use of the “Soviet ship and airplanes” would likely
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“create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government” and, in doing
so, “create the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.”

89

Doing what was necessary to

accommodate Soviet requests, Moorhead argued, would show a “U.S. willingness to
abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic
teams.” However, Moorhead made one point to McManus that cut to the root of the Los
Angeles Olympic problem. Moorhead felt that “U.S. policy regarding the Olympics
(including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets
should be viewed as two distinct policies.”

90

Moorhead was arguing that the shooting

down of KAL 007 was a State Department problem – not an Olympic problem.
Moorhead saw no reason why the KAL 007 incident should have a bearing on the
planning and hosting of the Los Angeles Olympic Games.
Further, in a 23 September 1983 letter from Derwinski to Lawrence
Eagleburger,

91

it was noted that the California legislature passed a “resolution urging

President Reagan and Congress to bar the Soviet from the 1984 Olympics” as a measure
92

of punishment for the shooting of KAL 007.

Derwinski urged Eagleburger to help steer

the State Department toward abiding by the Olympic Charter, similar to what the
LAOOC was resigned to doing. That is, for Los Angeles to host the Games, both the
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LAOOC and the American government had to “abide by the International Olympic
93

Committee rules and bylaws.”

In doing so, Derwinski asked Eagleburger to lead the

charge to separate sport and politics and to “not bar Soviet or other athletic participants
otherwise eligible to enter the United States for the Olympics.”

94

With the American government not budging from its convient Olympic Charter
stance, those American citizens against Soviet participation in the Olympic Games were
forced to show the Russians that they would not be welcomed on American soil.
American dissent was evident to the Russians when Soviet-flagged cargo ships were
boycotted – sometimes on the verge of violence – at harbors as a way for American
citizens to voice their dissatisfaction over the Gruzia potentially docking in Long Beach
Harbor for the duration of the Olympics
The docking of the Soviet vessel at Long Beach Harbor inherently created loftier
logistical complications than the acceptance of Aeroflot flights into Los Angeles
International Airport, particularly as the ship was scheduled to “arrive in port [between]
July 15-20 and remain there” until the Olympic flame was extinguished above the Los
Angeles Coliseum.
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With berths for 480 passengers, the vessel became a hotbed of

discussion with American government officials, particularly on the subject of providing
adequate security for those aboard and protecting American interests from possible high-
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USSR (2),” Box 30, John Matlock Files, RRL.
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tech espionage operations originating from the ship. The White House was informed that
“state and all concerned agencies, including Coast Guard [representatives from] the port
security committee” were adamantly “opposed to any port call by a Soviet vessel,
passenger or otherwise, during the Olympics that would involve the vessel berthing in
96

Los Angeles/Long Beach for an extended period of time.”

This position changed little

since 1982, when James D. Phillips, the Director for Communications and UNESCO
Affairs, informed William Hussey of the LAOOC that, according to the Pentagon, the
docking of a Soviet vessel set a “bad precedent for other countries who may make similar
requests and [would undermine] the fraternal interaction which is part of the Olympic
Village concept.”
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As well, Phillips argued that the ship created “national security

considerations in the region which would pose obstacles for a [United States government]
98

approval of the request.”
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Figure 4.2 – Upset Americans protested the arrival in Los Angeles
Harbor the Soviet freighter Novokuibyshevsk. From The Los Angeles
Times, 7 September 1983.
Indeed, the securing of the Soviet ship was going to be both a logistical and financial
nightmare. This was no more apparent than seven days after KAL 007 was shot from the
sky. The Soviet cargo ship, Novokuibyshevsk, was forced to anchor in a channel just
short of the Los Angeles Harbor “after a telephone threat was made against the ship in the
99

wake of the Soviet attack on a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 that killed 269 people.”

Kenneth Cho, one of the many protestors of Korean descent, argued that, “like a grown
adult who plays with a 3-year-old, the Soviets … attacked a defenseless jet plane, and
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they should be punished.”

Valdis Pavlovskis, the president of the Baltic American

Freedom League, swept up in the “groundswell of anger and disgust in [the] country”
over the attack on KAL 007, announced his organization would “not rest until President
Reagan” banned “all Soviet goods from our shores, and closes the Soviet Consulate in
San Francisco.”

101

The Baltic American Freedom League later called the Soviet Union

an “outlaw nation” and organized a semi-successful vodka boycott throughout the United
102

States.

With the assistance and protection of the United States Coast Guard which
declared a 100-yard “safety zone” around the vessel, Novokuibyshevsk steamed into Los
Angeles Harbor. However, the problems were not yet over. The harbor’s longshoremen
– citing concerns of personal safety – refused to unload the ship’s cargo of lumber and
vodka. Amid the protestor’s signs – some of which read “Communists Make Lousy
Neighbors” and “Damn Russian Savagery” – Sergeant Robert Leventhal of the Los
Angeles Harbor Department made it clear that it was likely the vessel would have to
leave the “wharf without being unloaded.”
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The protection of the vessel, its cargo, and
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its crew required the services of dozen of armed police officers and several Coast Guard
and Harbor Patrol boats.

104

After an eight-day ordeal, the protestors finally claimed victory. With its lumber
and vodka still aboard, the Soviet vessel departed from Los Angeles in search of a
friendlier port. The ordeal further underscored the need for tight security at the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympic Games. As well, it helped to drive attention to another pressing issue
that both the Reagan administration and the LAOOC were facing – the Ban the Soviets
Coalition.
In response to the shooting of KAL 007, four California businessmen, led by
105

David Balsiger, formed the Ban the Soviets Coalition

on 26 September 1983. In his

autobiographical sketch, Balsiger refers to himself as an “investigative researcher and
author of 18 non-fiction books.”

106

His creation, the BTSC, was a right-wing faction

composed largely of evangelical Christians and East European émigrés. It was a small
but vociferous group. Balsiger, currently serving as an advertising executive who
previously campaigned unsuccessfully for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives,
felt that the Olympics were a chief part of Soviet foreign policy, culture, and society.
The BTSC’s goal to stop the Soviets from coming to Los Angeles would be considered a
damaging blow to Soviet prestige and honor.
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Balsiger started a media onslaught. Resurrecting the ghastly images of KAL 007,
Balsiger argued, “those who say we would be punishing the Soviet athletes for something
they didn’t do have completely forgotten that 269 civilians aboard Flight 007 were
107

punished with death for something they didn’t do.”

The BTSC’s activities quickly

gained the attention of the LAOOC and Ueberroth. Responding to the Coalition’s desires
to ban the Soviets from the Games, Ueberroth reiterated that the LAOOC remained
“opposed to any efforts to punish athletes for political purposes” and that “history has
proven that the use and abuse of athletes for political purposes only hurts young
108

individuals rather than achieving any political gain.”

Balsiger and his group also obtained the assistance of California Senator John T.
Doolittle, who Balsiger announced as a “national co-organizer” in a 19 October 1983
109

press release.

Senator Doolittle successfully sponsored a resolution in the California

Legislature that asked President Reagan and Congress to “take appropriate actions to ban
110

the Soviets from the 1984 Olympic Games.”

On the passage of the resolution,

Balsiger remarked, “Considering that California is the host state of the 1984 Olympic
Games, it took tremendous courage by Senator Doolittle and his colleagues to pass this
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resolution which we hope will become the model for other states.”

111

However, the

assistance from the California state government rapidly eroded. Shortly after approving
the resolution, the same lawmakers revoked it, arguing that they were “unaware of the
proposed sanctions against the Soviet Union” written into the document.

112

Balsiger

considered the backtracking legislature “sucked into becoming Soviet apologists at the
113

beckoning of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.”

Failing to succeed at the state legislative level, Balsiger turned his attention to
writing letters to those in the federal government. In one such letter to Kenneth Hill – the
Federal Security Coordinator for the Los Angeles Olympics – Balsiger explained:
Our Coalition efforts are focusing on getting the Soviets to voluntarily
withdraw from the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, as well as encouraging
the International Olympic Committee to ban them to prevent any potential
outside acts of violence and terrorism that could injure or kill innocent
athletes and spectators. Based on reliable information, we are concerned
about the distinct possibility that the Soviets will inspire and orchestrate
various terrorist activities both during and after the Games.
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Balsiger contended that the “various terrorist activities” would likely be carried out by
the “5,000 KGB agents and operatives” that would be descending on “Southern
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California disguised as Olympic spectators, with assignments to include spying,
subversion, and recruitment of agents to buy, steal, or search out U.S. high technology
secrets.”

115

Balsiger ended his letter by criticizing American foreign policy for letting

the Soviets succeed “in keeping Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from covering the
Sarajevo Games” and for “now [being] ready to grant unrestricted travel privileges to
Soviet Olympic journalists, most of which are actually KGB agents wanting open access
116

to high tech manufacturing areas of Southern California.”

To achieve its goal, the BTSC announced a petition campaign to get 1,000,000
signatures from American citizens who wholly supported the idea of banning the Soviets
from the Los Angeles Olympics. One month after the petition drive began, the BTSC
had obtained only 10,000 signatures. Realizing that the swell of public opinion, partially
roused by the BTSC, was not sufficient to topple Olympic plans, Balsiger again turned
his indignation to those in the White House. Writing to Michael Deaver – Reagan’s
Deputy Chief of Staff – Balsiger claimed that the “ethnic, religious, political, social,
education, and veterans organizations” that made up the BTSC maintained “a sphere of
influence that extends to 30 to 40 million people – the good people of America who still
believe that principle and the value of human life takes precedence over sporting
117

events.”
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Balsiger then got to the thrust of his letter, foreboding:
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Needless to say, nearly all of our Coalition support groups are the same
groups that made the difference in Ronald Reagan’s going to the White
House in 1980. They not only voted for him but were the activists who
worked to turn the votes out for him at the polls. These groups supported
Mr. Reagan because of his strong anti-Communist stand, his conservative
platform, and his firm position on moral, family, and Judeo-Christian
issues … However, if our Coalition, its support organizations, and the
millions of Americans supportive of our “ban the Soviets from the
Olympics” are totally ignored and alienated by the White House, there will
be a significant loss of support for the President’s reelection among those
grass-roots movers and shakers that really made it happen in 1980 and can
make it happen again in 1984.

118

Deaver took his time in sending his reply to Balsiger and the Coalition. Largely
ignoring the BTSC’s concerns, and completely avoiding the veiled threats regarding
Reagan’s reelection as President, Deaver remained steadfast that the Olympic Charter
was the deciding factor in American relations with the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the 1984
Olympics, writing:
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the body which governs all
Olympic activity, awarded the 1984 Summer Olympic Games to Los
Angeles on the condition required by the International Olympic Charter
that all national participants recognized by the IOC be admitted to the
Games. Should the United States, as host government, bar any team from
participating, it could no longer be the host … I can assure you that
Federal officials plan to be completely even-handed in dealing with all
participating teams, neither giving special treatment to nor imposing
special conditions on any team … We are currently studying the question
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of travel by Soviet journalists in areas we have designated as closed to
travel by Soviet official personnel in light of Olympic hosts commitments
119

as well as of policy and security considerations.

Figure 4.3 - Highwayman Willie Nelson was but one of high-profile
Americans who took a stance against potential Soviet participation in
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. His shirt reads "Let The
Russians Play With Themselves."
The Reagan administration had no recourse in quelling the BTSC. Protected by
Constitutional rights, Balsiger and his group were free to demonstrate and protest as they
pleased. The BTSC, deemed a “group of nobodies” by Ueberroth, started mailing leaflets
and letters directly to Gramov, the leader of the Soviet’s state sports committee in
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Moscow. As Ueberroth later recalled, “the literature used inflammatory language and
promised to greet the Soviet athletes with anti-Soviet demonstration.” Further, “one
handout … graphically depicted an American eagle clawing the back of a Russian
bear.”

120

The BTSC claimed it was only the “first of several aggressive actions” and

that the group planned to continue its attempt to “directly and indirectly influence the
121

Soviets to scuttle their Olympic participation plans.”

Balsiger claimed that he was

attempting “to tell the Soviets that they’re not really welcome here but if you do come,
don’t blame us if you reap the whirlwind.”
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Figure 4.4 - David Balsiger was the face of the Ban The Soviets
Coalition, a collection of people dubbed by Peter Ueberroth as
"nutty." From the USA Today, 1 May 1984.
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Balsiger and the BTSC’s brash statements were worrisome for both the Reagan
administration and the Soviet Olympic delegation. Soviets concerns over the actions of
the Coalition only increased when Balsiger announced that his group planned on aiding
Soviet defectors during the Olympics. The BTSC planned to post “between 25 and 50
billboards around the city, written in Russian and German, touting a toll-free telephone
123

number for defectors to call.”

The Coalition claimed to have hundreds of safe houses

around Los Angeles where defectors could be “sprinted away until a press conference”
was organized. As well, Balsiger claimed that members of the BTSC “infiltrated the
LAOOC at the lower levels” where they could easily contact “Eastern-bloc athletes,
spectators, and, to a lesser degree, journalists and security officers.”

124

With the uproar

over their cargo ship still a vivid memory, the Soviets requested an unprecedented
amount of security to protect the ship and its athletes, but also to actively assist in
avoiding Soviet defections to the West.
While the Reagan administration would soon prove to be more than hospitable in
providing adequate security for the Soviet vessel, there were plans already in place to
insure the safe and dignified treatment of any Eastern-bloc athlete wishing to defect. No
such mention of these established procedures were public knowledge to the Soviets. In a
State Department memo, Chief William DeCourcy noted that:
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We believe a State Department representative should be present during
any interrogation or de-briefing of a potential defector or asylee in
conjunction with the Olympics. This would allow the State Department to
determine whether or not we have an interest in a particular case and to
protect those interests at a very early stage. This would also allow us to
make an independent assessment of the situation in an expeditious manner
and to relay information to the decision makers in the State
Department.

125

As the Olympics neared, further details were provided to those working the Games.
Specifically, it was instructed that “upon arrival [of the defector], the FBI should be
notified” and “defectors are given a high priority and an agent” would respond nearly
immediately. As well, it is highlighted that “under no circumstances should a defector be
released to a representative of his country.”
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Special interests groups also wrote to the LAOOC to insist that the organizing
committee not infringe on the rights of athletes who desired to seek information
regarding political asylum. In one such case, Agrupación Abdala – an anti-communist
organization of primarily Cuban-born students founded in the United States in 1968 with
chapters at several universities across the United States – wrote to the organizing
committee to voice its concerns. Eduardo Navarro, the Attorney at Law representing
Abdala, asserted that “experience has shown that frequent asylum requests have been
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made by Cuban athletes during visits abroad.”

Navarro then extended the concerns of

Abdala:
The Cuban exile community is very concerned not only for the safety of Cuban
athletes but also for potential infringement on their right while in the U.S. to seek
information regarding political asylum request and the honoring of such requests.
Specifically we would like to know whether any organization or agency to your
knowledge or under your control has made or is in the process of making any
agreement with the Cuban government, or any other government or agency acting
in its behalf, for the purpose of attempting to regulate said requests for political
asylum.

128

While the Kremlin had its own concerns over Eastern European and other athletes
under the Soviet sphere of influence seeking political asylum, a more overt issue at the
moment was the safety and security of the Gruzia while docked in Long Beach Harbor.
After the situation regarding Novokuibyshevsk, any concern emanating from the Kremlin
was valid. The Gruzia was originally scheduled to utilize Berth 53 at Pier 2. The Coast
Guard quickly rescinded these accommodations, arguing that Berth 52 was “easier to
protect seaward, and probably more easily protected landward as well.” Further, the
Coast Guard felt that Berth 52 was capable of being “completely isolated from other,
129

ongoing commercial activities.”

Security personnel remained an issue. The Coast

Guard recommended a security force comprised of members of the Long Beach Police
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Department, a SWAT team, and Coast Guard patrol boats.

130

The additional manpower

to adequately secure the Gruzia was likely to be in excess of “$250,000 for a 30 day
131

stay.”

While the LAOOC was open to handling the additional expenses, the Reagan

administration used the opportunity to provide the funding for the necessary security to
the protect the Soviet Union and its interests at the Olympic Games.

132

Reagan’s

willingness to fund the security operations to protect Gruzia and Soviet athletes was yet
another visible sign of his desire to reach rapprochement with the Kremlin.

4.4 Reaching Compromise and Quiet Diplomacy
In a 31 January 1984 official action memorandum for the President, McFarlane
outlined all the Soviet Olympic requests for the President’s final decisions. The opening
of the memorandum explained to the President that all involved governmental agencies
arrived at a consensus regarding the Soviet issue. First and foremost, McFarlane stated,
“granting the requests for Aeroflot flights would require suspending application of
sanctions applied to the Soviets following the KAL shoot-down.”
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Additionally,

McFarlane instructed the President that all involved agencies agreed that the Soviet
requests raised “national security concerns.”
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Despite the apprehensions, the inter-agency consortium agreed on two substantial
decisions. First, McFarlane expressed to the President that “all agencies recommend”
that the Aeroflot flights “be granted for the specific purpose of bringing the Soviet
‘Olympic family’ to Los Angeles, but without the right to land elsewhere in the U.S. or to
carry third-country passengers.” Second, the multitude of governmental agencies had no
objections to “brief calls” by a Soviet vessel to “deliver and, subsequently, pick up
equipment and passengers.”

134

McFarlane informed Reagan that the agencies were

“strongly opposed to allowing the ship to stay at the pier in Long Beach Harbor during
the Games, primarily because of the potential for electronic eavesdropping.” McFarlane
provided Reagan with a counter-point to the Soviet requests, correctly stating that “no
other country” had been granted “permission to keep a ship in port during the Olympics,
and so long as we allow no one else in port during the Olympics … we should be able to
defend refusal of this request as non-discriminatory. Although the Soviets are likely to
135

press the point, we believe that permission should not be granted.”

Directly after McFarlane presented his case, four recommendations were
presented to President Reagan to either approve or disapprove with a simple checkmark
and his initials. Reagan’s decisions on these recommendations undoubtedly indicate that
“compromise and quiet diplomacy” weighed favorably in his thinking regarding Los
Angeles Olympic matters. The recommendations, provided in their entirety, along with
Reagan’s decisions and hand-written notes are as follows:
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That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which
every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis,
136

unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.
Reagan check-marked and initialed “OK.” However, those with knowledge of the

Olympic Games will certainly be aware that McFarlane’s first recommendation is loosely
bound to the Olympic Charter in regard to the non-discrimination of any country or
athlete. Reagan had already publically declared his intentions of following the Olympic
Charter throughout the planning stages of the Los Angeles Olympics. Thus, it would
have been highly unorthodox for Reagan to veto McFarlane’s first recommendation.
Reagan also approved McFarlane’s second recommendation, which read:
That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team,
but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate
137

stops in the U.S.

Reagan’s approval of Soviet athletes being allowed air voyage to Los Angeles via
Aeroflot, despite the international sanction in place as a result of KAL 007, was a prime
example of his deploying “compromise and quiet diplomacy” with the Soviet Union.
Reagan’s decision on McFarlane’s third recommendation called for further cooperation
with the Soviet Union. The original third recommendation read:
That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the
Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is
granted to other countries.
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159

Reagan did not approve the recommendation as written. In his handwriting, Reagan
edited the proposal to read:
That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the
Games, but not and to remain at the pier during the Games subject to the
establishment of all possible measures designed to minimize intelligence loss,
139

unless and that such privilege is granted to other countries.

Reagan’s decision – and subsequent edits to the recommendation – went against the
advice of his administration as outlined in the introduction to the action memorandum.
With the caveat of providing measures to counter intelligence loss, Reagan provided yet
another compromise to the Soviet Union. Reagan’s decision denied the requests made by
the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Coast Guard, and local Los Angeles
law enforcement to reject the Soviet ship a stay in the Long Beach.
Despite the trepidations of his administration, Reagan made every possible effort
to assure that the Soviet Union’s requests were addressed and in large measure satisfied.
However, Reagan’s response to McFarlane’s fourth recommendation is perhaps the most
telling political action taken by the President to illustrate his aim for “compromise and
quiet diplomacy” through the lens of the Olympic Games. The final recommendation of
the memorandum read:
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That the LAOC[sic] be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests
through normal diplomatic channels.

140

Reagan check-marked and initialed “no” on the recommendation. While Reagan
provided no explanation, his decision to allow the Soviet Union to deal directly with the
LAOOC rather than through “normal diplomatic channels,” such as the State Department,
says much about the sense of trust Reagan was attempting to build with the Kremlin.
Reagan further cemented his desire to reconcile with his signing of National Security
141

Decision Directive Number 135

approximately two months later. The main object of

NSDD 135 read:
The United States desires the complete success of the 1984 Summer
Olympic Games and seeks to ensure the full and equitable participation of
all accredited members of the Olympic Family in accordance with
Olympic rules and applicable laws of the United States. We will also
ensure the safe passage of Soviet Aeroflot flights to and from our country
142

and the visit of the Soviet vessel Gruzia to the Long Beach Harbor area.

Reagan’s friendly signals were not without stipulations. In the case of Aeroflot flights, it
was required that the aircraft “be subject to boarding for Customs and other inspections
as a condition for entry to the United States” and that “US Escort crews for each Aeroflot
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flight” to “ensure Soviet compliance with all US routing procedures.”

In the case of

Gruzia, it was to be treated as a “commercial … not a public vessel” and “subject to
boarding and searches at such times as necessary by the Coast Guard or other
authorities.”

144

As well, “radio transmission from the Gruzia” was to be highly

prohibited while it was “berthed in Long Beach Harbor.”
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On 14 March 1984, Deaver wrote to Ueberroth to deliver the news. Deaver
started the letter notifying it was written on behalf of President Reagan, and that he
wanted to “reiterate the United State Government’s firm commitment to the complete
success of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games to be held in Los Angeles.”

146

Deaver then

informed Ueberroth that he was “pleased to inform … that the United States Government
is agreeable to a reasonable number of Olympic-related charter flights by the Soviet
airlines ‘Aeroflot’ and to the berthing of the Soviet passenger vessel ‘Gruzia’ in Long
Beach Harbor during the Games.”
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Even with the quite understandable stipulations attached, Reagan’s compliance
marked a significant change in position. Reagan’s decision to allow Aeroflot flights, the
berthing of a Soviet vessel, including supplying the necessary funding to maintain its
security, and allowing the LAOOC direct communication with the Soviet Union went
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wholly against the wishes of several of his closest administration figures, thus further
accenting his quest for compromise, understanding, and quiet diplomacy with the Soviet
Union after years of extended defiance, mistrust, and misunderstanding between the two
world superpowers. However, the Reagan administration’s dealings with the Olympic
Games – and conceding to Soviet demands – stood in evident contrast to Reagan’s longheld beliefs regarding the Soviet world. And, it should be recognized that Reagan
returned to a harsh view of the Soviets after the Olympic Games were concluded. Near
the end of his Presidency in May 1988, Reagan spoke:
Freedom is the right to question and change established ways of doings
things. It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace. It is the
understanding that allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek
solutions. It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts and
watch it catch fire among the people. It is the right to dream – to follow
your dream or stick to your conscience even if you are the only one in a
sea of doubters. Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no
single authority or government, has a monopoly on the truth, but that
every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put on this
world has been here for a reason and has something to offer.
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Without directly condemning the Soviets, Reagan implicitly made it clear that the Soviet
Union lacked the basic rights and freedoms found in the West. Reagan’s unfettered postOlympics rhetoric reached its apex at Berlin’s Brandenberg Gate three years after the
Soviets announced their ultimate boycott of the Olympic Games. In hindsight, it is clear
that despite Reagan’s earlier remarks on 16 January 1983, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic
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Summer Games remained an extreme anomaly in Reagan’s overall approach to the Soviet
Union. After years of doing all that he could to do bring harm to the Soviet Union
politically and economically, the President suddenly conceded to all the demands
requested by the Kremlin in order for the Soviet Bloc to attend the international sporting
festival.
There are two likely scenarios that explain why Reagan’s decision regarding the
1984 Olympics largely go against the tide of his anti-communist beliefs. First and
foremost, the Olympic Charter fundamentally dictates that neither country nor athlete can
be discriminated against. More importantly, the Olympic Charter also states that there is
to be absolutely no political interference within the Olympic Games. Despite the
altruistic rhetoric of the Charter, the Reagan administration’s eventual intrusion into
Romanian politics in order to secure the country’s attendance at the Olympic Games
shows a general lack of caring for the Olympic Charter by Reagan and his men. A more
likely explanation for Reagan’s about-face in Soviet Union foreign policy was his sincere
desire to witness California – the state that he governed prior to becoming President –
host a successful Olympic festival after Jimmy Carter’s Olympic boycott movement of
1980 and the financial disaster of the 1976 Montreal Olympics. It was, ultimately,
Reagan who, as Governor of California, provided much more support for Los Angeles’
bid for the 1976 Olympics than had President Carter at the time of the bid process. Wrote
Reagan:
Thanks to its topography and climate, California has long been an
international sports center. Los Angeles has the facilities and experience
necessary for mounting a global athletic event of the scale of the
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Olympics, and it has the population and resources to insure its success.
We Californians are fully cognizant of the honor that would be accorded if
Los Angeles is selected as the setting for the International Games, and
sincerely hope you will extend this honor and responsibility to Los
149

Angeles.

Regardless of President Reagan’s reasoning, his handling of the Soviet demands provided
the opportunity for the ideals of the Olympic Movement to rise above the Cold War
ranker and rhetoric. However, it was now the Kremlin’s turn to accept Reagan generosity
and attend the Olympics.
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Chapter 5 – And The Games Go On
“Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between
our two societies and our philosophies, but we should always remember
that we do have common interests and the foremost among them is to
avoid war … If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be
peace. Together we can strengthen peace … and know in doing so that we
have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and,
1
indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin now.”
5.1 Awaiting Soviet Response
The Reagan administration laid the groundwork for the Soviet Union to attend the
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games. Reagan permitted the entry of Aeroflot
flights into Los Angeles despite the strict sanctions developed over the Soviet downing of
KAL 007. A Soviet vessel was allowed to dock at Long Beach Harbor despite public
outcry and governmental hand wringing over the possibility of Soviet espionage systems
operating from the bowels of the ship. Finally, an unprecedented amount of security was
projected to protect Soviet athletes from such radical groups as the Ban The Soviets
Coalition. The Reagan administration could only wait and see if the Kremlin accepted
Reagan’s olive branch and attend the Los Angeles Olympics.
Indeed, much was being said about the potential of a Soviet boycott. International
Olympic Committee President Juan Antonio Samaranch was satisfied in his belief that
there would not be another political disturbance during the Los Angeles Games, saying
that the Soviet “sports leaders have shown extraordinary leadership to date in not mixing

1
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2

sports and politics.” Vladimir Mikoyam, the press officer of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, D.C., mirrored this sentiment, informing the public that the “boycott rumors
3

are false. The Russian people … do not mix sports with politics.” However, when the
Soviet Central Committee named Oleg Yerimishkin as the official Soviet Olympic
attaché and submitted his credentials to Washington, they were shocked when his visa
was denied on the grounds that he was a known KGB agent. Ueberroth remarked on the
situation:
Most committee officials thought it should not have been at all surprising
or shocking that the Soviets, who have been expressing such concern
about security, would want to have an experienced security man in charge
of their preparations. After all, the Israelis and Turks also had intelligence
4

men deeply involved in the preparation of their teams.

Despite the blunder on the part of the State Department, there remained optimism
that the Soviets would still attend the Olympic Games – especially after receiving
unilateral approval of their requests by the Reagan administration. In some cases, it was
thought the Soviets would attend not because of Reagan’s overtures, but because “no
Strasbourg goose intended to yield foie gras suitable for royal tables was ever force-fed

2
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more copiously, or more carefully, than the Soviet athletes. If he does not win the gold
medal, or score right up there, it is simply a failure of Russian biology.”

5

Marat Gramov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee for Physical Culture and
Sports, however, mounted a campaign of “Russian railing” over the barring of the
Olympic attaché, as well as saying that the Olympic were generating nothing but “anti6

Soviet propagandistic hysteria” in the Western world. The tensions between the two
countries reached a climax in early April of 1984 when the Soviet National Olympic
Committee called for “an emergency meeting of the International Olympic Committee”
7

to review what it called “gross violations” of the Olympic Charter. The Soviets
continued to complain that their athletes were likely to be “persuaded to defect” and that
8

Los Angeles was a “center of crime and pornography unsafe for Soviet citizens.” As
well, the Kremlin remained insulted over Yermishkin’s denied visa, arguing that the State
Department was “refusing entry to those they considered undesirable.” And, finally, the
Soviets remained convinced that “various reactionary political, émigré and religious

5
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groups had teamed up to organize provocations and even to physically victimize Soviet
9

officials and sportsmen.”

Gramov continued to claim that a Soviet boycott of the Games was unlikely,
arguing that the Soviets were “not going to boycott the Olympic Games” and the main
concern of the Kremlin was “the creation of normal conditions for Soviet athletes and
strict compliance with the rules of the Olympic Charter.”

10

Despite his claims to the

contrary, Gramov announced the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Games on 8 May
1984. The official Soviet proclamation began:
The National Olympic Committee of the USSR made an all-around
analysis of the situation around the Games of the 23rd Olympiad in Los
Angeles and studied the question of the participation of the Soviet sports
delegation team … the National Olympic Committee of the USSR voiced
serious concern over the rude violations by the organizers of the Games of
the rules of the Olympic Charter and the anti-Soviet campaign launched
by reactionary circles in the United States with the connivance of the
11

official authorities.

The Soviet press release continued, saying, “the cavalier attitude of the U.S. authorities to
the Olympic Charter, the gross flouting of the ideals and traditions of the Olympic
Movement are aimed directly at undermining it.”

9

12

The final Soviet declaration on the
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boycott issue was both historic and abrupt: “in these conditions the National Olympic
Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in
the Games of the 23rd Olympic in Los Angeles is impossible.”

13

The official Soviet announcement was released through TASS at 10:00 am
Eastern Standard Time. Only hours after the Soviet boycott was announced, IOC
President Samaranch met with President Reagan in a previously scheduled meeting. The
President handed Samaranch a letter to hand-deliver to Chernenko, then Soviet Premier.
Reagan attempted to sway Chernenko on the issue of attending the Games, writing:
I have personally assured President Samaranch and Mr. Peter V.
Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee,
that the government of the United States is thoroughly committed to
upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the
host nation of the Games of the XXIII Olympiad. I know that you share
my enthusiasm for this great sporting event, and I am looking forward to
seeing all the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags
in Los Angeles on July 28. I consider sport to be one of the finest
opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand
each other. The American people look forward to serving as hosts for the
Olympic Games and to providing an hospitable climate in which the
athletes can perform to the best of their abilities.

13
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Ronald Reagan to Konstantin Chernenko, 2 May 1984, Executive Secretariat, Head of State Files, Box
39, RRL.
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Figure 5.1 - President Reagan meets with IOC President Samaranch.
Peter Ueberroth sits to the left of Samaranch. Deputy Chief of Staff
Michael Deaver is to Reagan’s right. From the Los Angeles Times, 8
May 1984.
The letter was clearly a formality at this point. Despite Reagan accommodating each and
every one of their requests, the Soviets decided not to attend the Olympics largely based
on the issues of security and safety. Years later, Vitaly Smirnov, one of the two Soviet
members of the IOC, reminisced:
By 1984, we were at liberty to express an opinion to a degree … My
opinion was that we should go to Los Angeles. I said, ‘If we don’t go,
we’ll win nothing. If we want to achieve the political effect of sporting
success, we should send our athletes.’ I have to say that in Russia, the
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security scare was genuine. Even my mother said to me, ‘Why are you
15

going to America?’ Yet, I still believe we ought to be there.

The U.S. State Department quickly countered the Soviet decision. John Hughes,
speaking on behalf of the State Department, argued, “Our conscience is very clear … the
United States clearly regrets the Soviet disregard of public opinion around the world, and
16

the charges made in the TASS statement are utterly without merit.”

Michael Deaver

solidified these claims in a letter to Peter Ueberroth that informed “details of [the]
arrangements” regarding Aeroflot flights and other Soviet requests “were conveyed to
Soviet Olympic and Soviet Government officials on several occasions in March and
April, 1984. These Soviet officials were also invited to discuss further any specific
questions or problems the Soviets might have about these arrangements. They expressed
none.”

17

Reagan, meeting informally with the White House press corps, provided his
reaction to the Soviet withdrawal, saying:
Well, now, I am not supposed to answer any question here in this photo
opportunity, but I think I can’t let that go by with saying that, like so
many, I have a great feeling of disappointment. I’m sorry that they feel
that way, and I think it’s unfair to the young people that have been waiting
so long to participate in those Games. And it ought to be remembered by
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all of us that the Games more than 2,000 years ago started as a means of
bringing peace between Greek city-states. And in those days, even if a
war was going on, when an Olympic year came, they called off the war in
order to hold the Games. I wish we were still as civilized.

18

Secretary of State George Shultz largely agreed with Reagan’s thoughts on the matter,
writing:
We had, in fact, bent over backward to meet all Soviet concerns and had
developed a plan for 17,000 people to be involved in Olympic security.
We were prepared to spend up to $50 million to assure security, $1 million
of which was for the Soviet delegation, including $500,000 to be certain
that the Soviet ship that was to house their officials and supporters would
have the utmost security. The Soviets knew all this. Nevertheless,
claiming inadequate security for their athletes, they announced that they
would not attend the Olympics … We knew security was not the problem:
the Soviet action was their way of retaliating against Jimmy Carter’s
decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow … The Soviet
statement implied that Moscow hoped to heighten tensions and hurt
President Reagan’s chances for reelection. That didn’t pan out for
Moscow.
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The continued media campaign on the American side further commented that the
government had done everything possible to avoid such a boycott scenario, including
fulfilling Soviet demands. Michael Deaver, in a letter to LAOOC President Peter
Ueberroth, explained that the American government kept in constant contact with the
Soviets in order to dispel any myths or misunderstandings the Kremlin maintained about
the hosting of the Los Angeles Olympic Games. Deaver detailed to Ueberroth in the
letter that on 27 April 1984, Ed Derwinski met with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov “to
give the Soviet Government official and direct assurances of what we were prepared to
do for Soviet visitors.” It was highlighted to Isakov that “several of the proposed actions
constituted major exceptions to the procedures normally followed for Soviets nationals –
procedures which are instituted by the U.S. Government in reciprocity for Soviet
restrictions on Americans in the USSR.”

20

Ueberroth was aware of the work the

American government did to meet the demands of the Los Angeles Olympic Games. In a
letter to Secretary of State George Shultz after the ceremonies concluded at the Los
Angeles Coliseum, Uberroth praised that the work of the White House and the
21

Department of State “set a policy guideline for others to follow.”

While it is difficult to single out individuals for praise in what was
essentially a “team” effort, I do particularly wish to mention Ed Derwinski
… who together with staff members John Kimball and Susan Clark
provided sensitive political estimates and advice as needed; established a
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network of Olympic Contact Officers at Foreign Service Posts on whom
we could rely for assistance around the clock; provided essential back
stopping against Soviet moves to encourage more nations to join the
boycott; and last July established an Operations Center in Los Angeles to
ensure that the Department could respond on the spot to pertinent
problems.

22

In public, the story was much the same: the Soviet decision was inexplicable. In a
press guidance sheet regarding the Soviet boycott, White House administrators were
given speaking points to the most likely questions to be asked. Regarding general
comments on the Soviet announcement, the official stance of the White House remained:
We regret that the Soviets have chosen to make a decision for which there
is absolutely no justification. It has disappointed hundreds of millions of
people around the world. President Reagan had committed the United
States to live up fully to its obligations under the Olympic Charter as host
country. The vague allegations contained in the Soviet statement provide
absolutely no support for charges that the United States has not met is
obligations.

23

The White House was to hold firm that the Soviet charges were “wholly without
foundation,” commenting that, “in recent months, we have made exhaustive efforts to
meet Soviet concerns about their participation in Los Angeles, and we have met those
24

concerns.”
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Indeed, Reagan had unilaterally approved the entry of Aeroflot flights and
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the docking of a Soviet vessel, as well as authorizing a staggering sum of money to fund
the security forces needed to protect Soviet athletes and interest. Because of this, the
White House argued, “the Soviets have not been hindered by the United States or
hampered from participating freely in the Olympics.” As well, members of the
administration received instruction to remind the media of the other steps required to
approve the Soviet requests, such as authorizing “entry of Aeroflot and shipping
personnel in advance of the Games to do preparatory work” and undertaking “full
responsibility for security of the Soviet ship at a preliminarily estimated cost of
25

$500,000.”

Lastly, the White House desired to emphasize that agreeing to Soviet

requests was part of a greater goal of improving Cold War relations. On this topic, the
general discussion points read:
It is not new for the Soviets to have done something that disappoints and
shocks millions of people all over the world. We will continue our efforts
to put relations with the Soviet Union on a more constructive basis for the
long term. We hope they will respond. If they do not, it will be because,
as with their decision to walk out of the Geneva Arms Control Talks, they
have chosen the path of self-isolation and raising tensions.

26

The Soviet decision not to attend the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games placed
the onus of examination on the Olympic Movement. Political intrusions on the Olympic
Games were not new occurrences. The 1936 Olympics were largely a festival for Nazi
propaganda. In 1956, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon all boycotted the Games in protest of the
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Israeli-led takeover of the Suez Canal. At the same Games, Spain, Holland, and
Switzerland declined to attend in an act of solidarity against the Soviet’s wanton invasion
of Hungary. In 1972, Palestinian terrorists massacred Israeli athletes in order to make a
political statement. In 1976, several African nations boycotted after failing to get New
Zealand expelled over its association with the apartheid system in South Africa.
However, as noted by The Christian Science Monitor’s Larry Elridge, “ … now that the
major powers are getting into the act … one can’t help wondering where it will all
end.”

27

If the process of political implications continued to intrude on the Olympic

Movement, Eldridge questioned if the Games could “survive” being treated as a “political
ping-pong ball.”

28

David Casstevens, of the Dallas Morning News, largely concurred

with Eldridge. In an “open letter” to Chernenko, Casstevens concluded that, “the
Olympics have become little more than a showcase for nationalistic bluster and political
strife. The Games may not be worth saving. They’re certainly not worth begging you,
Mr. Chernenko, to reconsider.”

29

The Soviets continued to insist that the decision not to attend was based on
“inadequate security arrangements” and the U.S. Government’s continued encouragement
of “extremist organizations to create unbearable conditions for Soviet athletes.” The
Central Intelligence Agency disagreed with that sentiment. Along with several
individuals from the State Department, the CIA concluded that the Soviets planned to
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boycott regardless of what Reagan approved, “partly in retaliation for the American
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games.”

30

Meanwhile, others in the administration felt that

Reagan’s generosity and approval of all Soviet requests placed the Kremlin in a
compromising situation. By attending the Games, the Soviets could have been helping
the President’s reelection effort.”

31

Nonetheless, the speculation of the Olympic Movement’s demise was altogether
misplaced. Hours before the Opening Ceremonies of the Los Angeles Olympic Games,
President Reagan addressed American athletes at 1:52pm Pacific Standard Time at
Heritage Hall on the campus of the University of Southern California. In his address,
Reagan explained, “I want you to know just how proud all of us are to have you
representing us. And when you see us out on the stands waving Old Glory, you know
32

that we’re waving it for you.”

Reagan continued:

… this year’s Fourth of July celebrations were extraordinarily joyous
occasions. There is a new patriotism spreading across our country. It’s
affection for our way of life, expressed by people who represent the width
and breadth of our culturally diverse society. And the new patriotism is
not a negative force that excludes, but a positive force, an attitude toward
those things that are fundamental to America, that draws together our
freedom, our decency, our sense of fair play as a people. In so many
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ways, you represent this new spirit. I know I speak for all your fellow
citizens – no matter what political persuasion, no matter what race or
religion, no matter if poor, middle class, or affluent – when I tell you that
you are our team.

33

Reagan concluded his speech by reprising one of his most recognizable film roles during
his years in Hollywood – legendary Notre Dame All-American George Gipp. He asked
the American athletes to set their “sights high, and then go for it” and do it “for
yourselves, for your families, for your country – and will you forgive me if I just be a
34

little presumptuous – do it for the Gipper.”

After his speech, the President traveled to

the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum to open officially the Los Angeles Olympics. In
doing so, Reagan became the first American President to do the honor. Afterwards, the
President traveled to his ranch in Santa Barbara, California for a three-week vacation.
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Figure 5.2 - President Ronald Reagan officially opening the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympic Summer Games with wife Nancy at his side. From
the Official Report of the XXIIIth Olympiad.
Without the Soviet and East German athletes in attendance at the Olympics,
American athletes won an enormous number of medals – just as the Soviets did when
American athletes were not competing in Moscow four years earlier. The Americans
especially dominated the swimming competitions. The men’s team won nine of the
fifteen gold medals while the women won eleven of the fourteen. In total, the United
States won a combined 174 medals, 83 of them being gold.
Aside from being yet another political intrusion on the Olympic Movement, the
Los Angeles Games played a much more important – and pivotal – role in Olympic
history. After being the only city to bid for the right to host the 1984 Olympics, Peter
Ueberroth and his Committee were able to turn a profit off of hosting the Olympics – the
first in modern history. The Olympic torch relay alone netted $10.9 million after
telecommunications company AT&T provided a “substantial sponsorship fee covering all
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costs.”

35

The finances from the torch relay were then donated to the YMCA, Boys Clubs
36

of America, Girls Clubs of America, and the Special Olympics.

As well, the city of

Los Angeles was left with millions of dollars’ worth of new and majorly upgraded
athletic facilities. Several of these facilities directly influenced major colleges and
universities, such as the velodrome at California State College and the Olympic swim
stadium at the University of Southern California. But, what interested other cities the
most was the profit turned. Three months after the closing of the Games, Ueberroth
announced that the Olympics made a profit of $215 million. As he noted, “the surplus
37

shocked the world.”

And, despite the Soviet-led boycott, 140 nations participated at

Los Angeles – the most to that point in the history of the Olympic Games.
The success – and profit earned – spurred a rejuvenated interest in hosting the
Olympic Games. In 1986, the IOC was able to pick from six cities. The list of hosting
aspirants continued to increase. Eleven cities vied for the right to host the 2004
Olympics. Despite the growing profits and popularity of the Olympics, it became
abundantly clear by the perceived failure of the Soviet-led boycott that these intrusions of
foreign policy and relations on the Olympic Movement mattered little in world affairs.
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5.2 On Reagan, Foreign Policy, and the Olympics
It is now clear that President Reagan made the decision to approve all Soviet
requests for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics despite preexisting sanctions that normally
would have denied such ventures. However, much of the media coverage – and some of
the rhetoric emanating from the other governmental departments – argued that much of
the work being done by the White House and the President complied with the Olympic
Charter. It was a sound – and convenient – way to explain why Reagan was
accommodating the Soviets so shortly after the Kremlin ordered KAL 007 shot out of the
sky.
However, Reagan’s decisions and actions immediately following the Soviet
boycott announcement lead one to believe that he and his administration cared little, if at
all, for the Olympic Charter. Rather, if the Kremlin could not be brought into discussions
regarding better relations with the West, Reagan would use the allure of the Olympics to
try to better relations with those smaller Communists countries, and those countries on
the verge of coming under the Soviet sphere of influence. On 22 May 1984, Robert C.
McFarlane wrote to President Reagan to get final approval on the letter to be sent to
Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. In his confidential letter to the President,
McFarlane explained that the letter was designed “to encourage Romanian Olympic
participation by stressing, in part, the progress achieved in various areas of the bilateral
relations” between the two countries. And, with Romania being the only Warsaw Pact
country yet to officially join the Soviet Union in its boycott, it was another chance to
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prove to the Kremlin that the White House was prepared to pursue better diplomacy and
38

relations with the Communists world.

In the letter, Reagan wrote:

Our governments have consulted regularly on important multilateral issues
such as various problems at the United Nations, the CDE conference in
Stockholm, INF, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. We have also kept
your able representative in Washington, Ambassador Malitza, informed on
our continuing efforts to improve relations with the new leadership of the
Soviet Union. We believe it is essential to the maintenance of peace and
security that we remain in close contact with the Soviet leadership, and
that the important negotiations in which we were engaged … We welcome
Romania’s support for these negotiations and hope that they can be
39

resumed soon and without preconditions.

Reagan could very well have written the same letter to the Kremlin. The shooting down
of KAL 007 brought an abrupt end to several bilateral agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union – one being, for example, cultural exchanges. If the Soviet
Union was not yet ready to enter reconciliatory discussions with Reagan, he was certainly
going to approach those other Communist countries that still had something to gain by
attending the Olympics as way to show the Kremlin – and the whole Communist world –
that there was a way for democracy and Communism to coexist. Reagan’s letter
concluded:
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Regarding the Olympics we are hosting in Los Angeles this summer, I
wish to inform you that Soviet concerns about the safety of their athletes
and other participants are groundless. As you may know, I have
personally assured the International Olympic Committee that the U.S. will
live up to the Olympic Charter. The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing
Committee, in close coordination with local, state and federal authorities,
is working with the utmost diligence to ensure that all legitimate
requirements for the comfort and safety of visiting athletes are fully met.
It is our hope that the Romanian Olympic Committee will concur in this
and that the Romanian Olympic team will have the opportunity to
40

participate in the Games this summer.

Peter Ueberroth and the LAOOC were eager for Romania’s attendance as well.
Ueberroth was also keenly aware that Romania was under tremendous pressure from the
Kremlin to toe the party line and participate in the Soviet-led boycott. In a press release
for newspaper distribution, Ueberroth informed that he believed, “despite assurances to
the contrary … that intense pressure continues to be applied on other countries to join the
Soviet boycott. If Romania and other countries pull out of the Games and cite the same
reason as the other Eastern bloc nations, the world sports community will know that the
Soviet Union has violated its hands-off pledge and is obviously intent on its
unconscionable drive to damage the Olympic Movement.”
In a 25 May 1984 letter to Secretary of State George Schultz, Ueberroth stated
that “at a meeting of Eastern bloc sports officials in Prague early today, Romania stood
tall in defense of the truth and reconfirmed its intention to participate in our Olympic
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Games. While all the other nations repeated the hollow allegations made so often in the
last two weeks by the Soviet Union, Romania defended the efforts of the Los Angeles
Olympic Organizing Committee.”

41

Ueberroth continued:

This was a courageous act that we praise and support. Through Olympic
channels, we are redoubling our efforts to provide encouragement and
assistance to the Romanian National Olympic Committee. All of us at the
LAOOC hope that our government will take similar action in recognition
of this bold and symbolic stroke of independence made by Romania. Mr.
Secretary, kindly offer them every possible support and assistance.

42

Reagan and Secretary Shultz offered plenty of political support in the President’s
attempt to lure Romania to the Games and prove to the Eastern Bloc – specifically the
Kremlin – that continued opportunities for diplomacy and cooperation were still “alive
and well” in the Cold War despite Reagan’s initial political stance on Communism. In
exchange for Romania’s attendance at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, Reagan was
prepared to give a year extension to Romania’s “Most Favored Nation” status, as well as
“extending the bilateral commercial agreement” for another three years.
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The

arrangements in turn for Romanian participation continued. Once Ceausescu announced
his intentions for his country to be at the Olympic Games, his case in the American
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Export Administration Review Board “was earmarked for special presidential
attention.”

44

Romania was not the sole country on the receiving end of Reagan’s attempt to
bring countries to the Olympic Games. In a memorandum from Jay Moorhead to
Michael Deaver, Moorhead provided a large list of countries yet to provide any answer
on whether or not they intended to participate in the Los Angeles Olympics. It was noted
that the White House was contemplating “making personal visits to their embassy in
45

Washington or to the U.N. Mission in New York.”

However, it was another memorandum between Moorhead and Deaver that
pointed towards a more telling strategy, particularly concerning African nations.
Moorhead provided Deaver a comprehensive list of all the countries in Africa that
maintained an eligible National Olympic Committee. Using an asterisk to “denote first
46

priority countries,” Moorhead marked: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon.

Of

the four main priority countries, Nigeria and Senegal attended while Ethiopia and
Cameroon did not. The selection of first priority countries was no coincidence; all
maintained an ongoing struggle to fend off the influences of communism within their
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borders. In a 14 February 1984 address to the Boston World Affairs Council, Secretary
Shultz explained the American government’s stance on the communist encroachment of
Africa:
There is no excuse for 40,000 Cuban combat troops – trained, equipped,
financed, and transported by the Soviet Union – to be inserting themselves
into local conflicts, thereby internationalizing local problems. This
Soviet/Cuban meddling has no precedent; it distorts Africa’s
nonalignment; it injects an East-West dimension where none should be,
making fair solutions harder to achieve. We do not view Africa through
the prism of East-West rivalry. On the other hand, Africa does not exist
on some other planet … We are not the gendarmes of Africa. But to stand
by and do nothing when friendly states are threatened by our own
adversaries would only erode our credibility as a bulwark against
aggression not only in Africa, but elsewhere. Therefore, we have been
ready, together with others, to provide training and arms to help our
friends defend themselves.

47

Shultz also informed in his speech that President Reagan had proposed the Economic
Policy Initiative for Africa in which he asked Congress for a five-year, $500 million
guarantee to fund the program. Schultz explained the functioning of the program, saying:
“the program will offer tangible support for those countries prepared to undertake the
policy reforms needed to improve productivity. We will not allocate these funds in
advance, but rather we will respond to constructive reforms where and when they are
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undertaken.”

48

Shultz did not expand on what sort of reforms the American government

envisioned, but it is likely that it was left open-ended for the government’s own purposes.
Indeed, the Reagan administration very clearly offered Romania enticing political
and economic assistance to gain the country’s attendance at the Los Angeles Olympic
Games. There is reason to believe that certain African nations were on the receiving end
49

of diplomatic entreaties from the Reagan administration as well.

The White House, for

example, had been working with several African countries in the years preceding the Los
Angeles Olympics in hopes of bettering trade relations. In a memorandum to Richard
Allen, Charles Wick – the head of the United States Information Agency, explained:
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny (President of the Ivory Coast) is the
most successful and eloquently outspoken prophet of capitalism and
opponent of Soviet expansion in the continent. He has met with every
President since Eisenhower, with the exception of Carter … We are today
misperceived in Black Africa as being pro-apartheid as a consequence of
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our efforts to reassure South Africa as we pursue the goal of independence
and free elections in Namibia. The misperception can damage our military
ties in East Africa and our economic ties with Black Africa and has
already widely benefited psychologically Moscow’s hope to lead the
50

continent toward a communist future.

Zick’s thoughts echoed the concerns that Allen – Reagan’s Assistant for National
Security – submitted to Secretary of State Alexander Haig only two months earlier.
Allen insisted to the Secretary that “there are strong reasons for sending a high-level trade
mission to Africa.”

51

Further, Allen explained to Haig:

Nigeria has recently announced a $150 billion 5-year development plan in
which emphasis will be given to agriculture, construction, and energy.
Clearly, U.S. technology can make significant contributions and help
reduce our $9.8 billion annual trade deficit with Nigeria (larger than our
52

deficit with Japan!).

As well, Allen informed that the “undertaking” of a “number of substantial projects using
capital which is accruing from a fast developing natural gas and petroleum industry” in
Cameroon led to the inevitable opportunity “for U.S. companies to become established at
53

an early point in the accelerated progress of this rich nation.”

Allen and Zick’s early

work regarding the African nations maintained the chance to be opportune as the post-

50

Memorandum, Charles Z. Wick to Richard V.Allen, 28 August 1981, Executive Secretariat, Country
Files, Africa, Box 1, RRL.
51

Memorandum, Richard V. Allen to Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 5 June 1981, Executive Secretariat, Country
Files, Africa, Box 1, RRL.
52
53

Ibid.
Ibid.

189

Olympic boycott effort constructed by the Reagan administration focused on several of
the same countries.
54

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa

remained vigilant of the USSR’s

boycott efforts and how it could harm the Olympic aspirations of several African
countries. The Secretary General of the SCSA, Amadou Lamine, crafted a letter to the
Los Angeles Organizing Committee to explain the SCSA’s fundamental belief in the
Olympic Movement, discoursing:
… in this turbulent world characterized by violence and areas of tension
which portend an apocalyptic future, Olympism is, in our opinion, one of
the rare domains in which there still can be found a glimmer of hope for a
world of peace, friendship, and brotherhood and a ray of light to shine
over the humankind reconciled with itself.

55

Lamine explained that the SCSA deplored the decision by the Soviet Union to boycott the
1984 Olympics and that the “Olympics without the participation of the Soviets and East
Germans … run the risk of not achieving its objectives in terms of sport performances
and stakes and this, notwithstanding their universal character which will be eroded
because of the absence of a large fraction of the Olympic Family.” In closing the letter,
Lamine asserted that the SCSA deduced that “Africa intends to participate massively in
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these Games barring any imponderable which may crop up between now and the date for
the closure of the registration.”

56

Reagan’s excursions into both Romania and Africa points to an overall lack of
care for following the rules of the Olympic Charter. Throughout the struggle to meet all
Soviet requests, the White House continually promised to abide by the Olympic Charter
and that all requests were to be granted because of it. Reagan’s main concern was
granting the requests as a way to start the process of bettering the long deteriorated
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist
world. This is, of course, not wholly against the Olympic Charter. Reagan was more
than amicable regarding providing the same rights to other countries as he was granting
to the Soviets. However, providing Romania with favorable trade and export conditions
in turn for their promise to attend the Olympic Games is a definitive mix of politics and
the Olympic Games and, thus, a gross violation of one of the main tenants of the the
Olympic Charter. Reagan and his administration could not feign ignorance about the
boundaries that were crossed – it was nothing less than a rationalized disregard for the
operating rules and standards of the Olympic Games.
Despite approving the Aeroflot flights, the berthing of a Soviet vessel, and
offering to finance Soviet security details upwards of $500,000, the Soviets still decided
not to attend the Games. But, the attempt to do so did have one lasting outcome. When
Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to the General Secretary position on 11 March 1985 upon
the death of Chernenko, he did so knowing fully well that Reagan was seeking
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reconciliation between the two countries as evidenced by his actions during the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympics.
The two world leaders met for the first time on 19 and 20 November 1985 in
Switzerland for what was termed the Geneva Summit. There was the general belief that
Gorbachev was no different than his predecessors, with Henry Kissinger arguing that “he
[Gorbachev] was a protégé of Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, and Mikhail
57

Suslov, then chief party ideologue.”

Gorbachev was another USSR leader raised in the

uncertain time of Stalin’s ‘Great Terror.’ Born on 2 March 1931, Gorbachev’s home
village of Privolnoye was “crude and poor” and had no basic accommodations, such as
58

roads or electricity.

In his early childhood, he witnessed a “murderous famine” in his

village where “thousands died, a disproportionate number of them young children.”
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Worse, Gorbachev witnessed his paternal grandfather carted off to Siberia to cut lumber.
The absence of his grandfather left a “tormented family that soon became destitute.” It
was later revealed that “half the family died of starvation.”

60

It was then no surprise as to

why “Gorbachev turned out to be such an unusual Soviet Communist.”

61

Despite the first meeting between the two leaders lasting more than an hour over
the time limit, little was accomplished. The second day of the meeting witnessed
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Gorbachev being “belligerent” and Reagan standing “firm.” However, the two simply
meeting was a sign of positive progress in the strained international relationship. The
two leaders met again on 11-12 October 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland for the Reykjavik
Summit. The meeting was, if anything, turbulent. Despite excellent progress throughout
the duration of the talks, all Soviet proposals hinged on one item: “that the United States
accept severe limits on the development of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.”

62

It

killed any progress the two leaders made at the Summit. However, the Reykjavik
Summit did alter the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. It was noted that at
the conclusion of the Summit, Gorbachev was absolutely convinced that it would “work
out” between Reagan and him. No longer did he believe that “the U.S. administration is
political scum that is liable to do anything.”
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Just a year later, in 1987, the two signed the historic intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, marking the first agreement between the two nuclear superpowers to
reduce their arms. And then, on 12 June 1987, Reagan provided one of the enduring
expressions of his desire to again provide the Western ideal of freedom and democracy to
the tightly-controlled citizens of Eastern Europe. Standing at the Brandenburg Gate in
the still divided Berlin, Reagan spoke to a massive gathering, and emphatically orated:
… we welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and
security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen
the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that
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would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of
freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if
you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek
liberalization: Come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr.
Gorbachev, tear down this wall.

64

The speech – while powerful – was one of Reagan’s many artfully crafted displays of
power. While making preparations for the speech, Reagan’s aides argued “aggressively”
for permission to use the 196-year-old Brandenburg Gate as the backdrop for the
television cameras. West German authorities were incredulous to the idea, deeming it
“too gimmicky, too provocative and perhaps too dangerous.” Reagan’s people got their
65

way, thanks in no small part to West German chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Two years later,

largely in part due to Gorbachev’s dedication to Glasnost and Perestroika, the Berlin
Wall fell. And eventually so, too, did the Soviet Union. Gorbachev never deviated from
his fundamental belief that the “Soviet Union could only solve its many problems if the
66

people of the country felt a stake in the way it is run.”

Gorbachev expanded on this

belief, saying:
This fulcrum is really to rouse people and to make use of the rich political,
cultural, and scientific potential that has accumulated in our society in the
years of Soviet power. In all spheres of life, including the spiritual sphere,
we will have to overcome a very basic factor – alienation, which,
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unfortunately, occurs under socialism when it is deformed by
authoritarian-bureaucratic distortions. Alienation … can be overcome
only [with] democratization and openness. A house can be put in order
67

only by a person who feels he owns the house.

However, since the rapid liberalization of Eastern Europe collapsed the Soviet Union,
Reagan’s seconds-long sound bite from in front of the Brandenburg Gate has become the
American “shorthand to describe the complicated fall of communism.”

68

The

construction of Reagan’s legacy seems to dictate that the President asked for the wall to
be torn down – and it simply fell.
Reagan’s remarks at the Berlin Wall that afternoon did, however, provide an
opportune moment for a consideration of the transpired events that ultimately permitted
the President to make such comments. Indeed, it is unlikely that Reagan would have
stood feet from East Germany and unequivocally asked Brezhnev to destroy the Berlin
Wall. Nor would Andropov or Chernenko be any less aghast at Reagan’s words. It was
only as Cold War tensions tempered could Reagan do so. Ronald Reagan’s use of the
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games as a mediator in Cold War relations served a
role in tempering those tensions.
The Soviet decision to boycott the Games does not diminish the fact that
Reagan’s actions in the lead up to the Games demonstrate that there is much more to the
1984 Los Angeles Olympics than just a retaliatory story. From an outside perspective,
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especially that of American media, it appeared as if Reagan’s administration failed its
country, its Olympic Committee, its associated athletes, and – perhaps most of all – the
Olympic Movement, for not successfully luring in the Soviet Union. However, the 1984
Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games did become a small part of a much larger foreign
policy picture as Reagan and the Kremlin moved ever closer to the historic summits that
would eventually lead to the end of the Cold War. Reagan’s concessions at the Olympics
were proof to the Soviet Union that, perhaps, the American President was not a “rogue
cowboy” or a “raving lunatic” bent on driving international relations into a deepening of
the Cold War. After all, Reagan – in his policy-shifting speech of 16 January 1984 –
provided an anecdote about what American-Soviet peace could provide:
Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and Anya could find
themselves, say, in a waiting room or sharing a shelter from the rain or a
storm with a Jim and a Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep
them from getting acquainted. Would they then deliberate the differences
between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves
comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?
Before they parted company they would probably have touched on
ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and the
problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways,
maybe Anya would say to Ivan, ‘wasn’t she nice, she also teaches music.’
Maybe Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn’t like about his
boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get
69

together for dinner some evening soon.
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Reagan’s political use of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games was but his first step in
successfully seeing to it that Ivan and Anya, and Jim and Sally, met for dinner without
fear of a life-eradicating nuclear holocaust interrupting their evening.
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